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PREVENTION OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SECULARISM AND RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM

This article examines the problem of the relationship between the model of secularism and religious symbolism in the context of the risk of religious radicalization in Kazakhstan. This topic is especially relevant at the present time in conditions of geopolitical turbulence in the Eurasian region. Due to the complex nature of the problem, three main components are distinguished: 1) consideration of the features of the French model of secularism applied in Kazakhstan; 2) analysis of external destructive religious influence on Kazakhstan; 3) the alleged religious and ideological risks existing in Kazakhstan. Summarizing these three components, a general conclusion is drawn about the necessary measures that should be taken to relieve the «degree of tension» between secular principles and religious symbolism, which can reduce and/or neutralize the risks of extremist, and, as a consequence, terrorist actions on the territory of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, measures are being taken to counter the so-called destructive religious movements/organizations (abbreviated as DRM/DRO). However, there is no legal definition for this concept. In public discourse, DRM/DRO are contrasted with «traditional religions», the definition of which also does not exist in domestic legislation. Legally, there is only a list of prohibited (extremist, terrorist) organizations and a list of registered religious associations on the territory of Kazakhstan. One way or another, realities dictate to the state and society the need to counteract destructive religious influence. It should be noted that destructive behavior comes from a destructive ideology. The purpose of the work is to identify ideological risks for the religious situation in Kazakhstan, as well as to apply preventive measures to eliminate religious and ideological threats. The article describes the existing risks for the state in the field of ideological prevention of religious extremism and terrorism, and provides appropriate recommendations that are of theoretical and practical benefit.

Key words: extremism, terrorism, laicism, religion, securitization.

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Зайырлылық пен діни символизмнің арасындағы қарсыластық жағдайында діни экстремизм мен терроризмнің алдын алу

Бұл мақалада Қазақстандағы діни радикалдану қаупі контекстінде зайырлылық моделі мен діни символизмнің арақатынасы мәселесі қарастырылады. Бұл тақырып әсіресе қазіргі уақытта Еуразия аймағындағы геосаяси турбуленттілік жағдайында өзекті болып отыр. Мәселенің күрделі сипатына байланысты үш негізгі құрамдас бөліктер ажыратылады: 1) Қазақстанда қолданылатын француздық зайырлылық үлгісінің ерекшеліктерін қарастыру; 2) Қазақстанға сыртқы деструктивті діни ықпалды талдау; 3) Қазақстандағы болжамды діни және идеологиялық тәуекелдер. Осы үш құраушыны қоса келе, зайырлы қағидаттар мен діни символизм арасындағы «шиеленіс дәрежесін» жеңілдету үшін қабылданатын қажетті шаралар туралы жалпы қорытынды жасалады, бұл болса Қазақстан аумағында экстремизм көріністерінің, соның нәтижесі ретінде террористік әрекеттердің пайда болу қауіптерін азайтуға және/немесе бейтараптандыруға мүмкіндік беретін. Қазақстанда деструктивті деп аталатын діни ағымдарға/ұйымдарға (қысқартылғанда – ДДА/ДДҰ) қарсы шаралар қабылдануда. Алайда бұл ұғымның заңдық анықтамасы жоқ. Қоғамдық дискурста ДДА/ДДҰ «дәстүрлі діндерге» қарсы қойылады, соңғының анықтамасы да отандық заңнамада жоқ. Заңды түрде Қазақстан аумағында тыйым салынған (экстремистік, террористік) ұйымдардың тізімі мен тіркелген діни бірлестіктердің тізімі ғана бар. Қалай болғанда да, мемлекет пен қоғамға деструктивті діни ықпалға қарсы тұру қажеттілігін талап етеді. Жұмыстың мақсаты – Қазақстандағы діни ахуалға төніп тұрған идеологиялық тәуекелдерді анықтау, сондай-

ақ діни және идеологиялық қатерлерді жою үшін алдын алу шараларын қолдану. Мақалада діни экстремизм мен терроризмнің идеологиялық алдын алу саласындағы мемлекет үшін орын алып отырған қауіптер сипатталып, теориялық және практикалық пайдасы бар тиісті ұсыныстар берілген.

Түйін сөздер: экстремизм, терроризм, лаицизм, дін, секьюритизация.

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Профилактика религиозного экстремизма и терроризма в условиях противостояния светскости и религиозного символизма

В данной статье рассматривается проблема соотношения модели светскости и религиозного символизма в условиях риска религиозной радикализации в Казахстане. Данная тема особо актуальна в настоящий момент в условиях геополитической турбулентности в евразийском регионе. В связи с комплексным характером проблемы выделяются три основные компоненты: 1) рассмотрение особенностей французской модели светскости, применяемой в Казахстане; 2) анализ внешнего деструктивного религиозного влияния на Казахстан; 3) предполагаемые религиозно-идеологические риски, имеющиеся в Казахстане. Суммируя данные трех компонентов делается общий вывод о необходимых мерах, которые следует предпринять для снятия «градуса напряженности» между светскими принципами и религиозным символизмом, что может снизить и/или нейтрализовать риски проявления экстремистских, и, как следствие, террористических действий на территории Казахстана. В РК принимаются меры по противодействию так называемым деструктивным религиозным течениям/организациям (сокращенно, соответственно – ДРТ/ДРО). Однако, юридически нет определения данному понятию. В общественном дискурсе ДРТ/ДРО противопоставляются «традиционные религии», определения которым также не существует в отечественном законодательстве. Юридически есть только список запрещенных (экстремистских, террористических) организаций и список зарегистрированных религиозных объединений на территории Казахстана. Так или иначе, реалии диктуют государству и обществу необходимость противодействия деструктивному религиозному влиянию. Следует отметить, что деструктивное поведение исходит от деструктивной идеологии. Целью работы является определение идеологических рисков для религиозной ситуации в Казахстане, а также применение превентивных мер по исключению религиозно-идеологических угроз. В статье описываются существующие риски для государства в сфере идеологической профилактики религиозного экстремизма и терроризма, и даются соответствующие рекомендации, которые несут теоретическую и практическую пользу.

Ключевые слова: экстремизм, терроризм, лаицизм, религия, секьюритизация.

Introduction

According to paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Constitution, the Republic of Kazakhstan is proclaimed as a secular, legal and democratic state in which the highest values are the person, his life, rights and freedoms. Accordingly, the country has established freedom of religion and prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. A clear indicator of the pluralism of Kazakhstani society is that representatives of more than 130 ethnic groups and 18 registered religious denominations live in the state. If unregistered ones are taken into account, the number of denominations will increase even more. In this regard, the preservation of

interfaith and interethnic peace and agreement is a vital condition for the existence of the state. Work in this vein does not lose its relevance. The Law «On Countering Terrorism» has been in force in the Republic of Kazakhstan since 1999, and in 2005 the Law «On Countering to Extremism» was also adopted. The latest Law defines religious extremism: «incitement of religious discord of strife, as well as related with violence or incitement to violence, as well as use of any religious practice, causing a threat to security, life, health, morality or rights and freedoms of citizens (religious extremism)» (The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2005). As is known, extremism and terrorism are interrelated phenomena; the former

can give rise to the latter: a call to incite religious hatred can lead to terrorist acts. In this regard, it is extremely necessary to suppress extremist manifestations. However, at the same time, what can often be missed is that extremist behavior is a consequence of extremist ideology. It is necessary to nip extremism and terrorism in the bud – by neutralizing destructive ideology.

Justification of the choice of articles and goals and objectives

One of the urgent tasks of the modern world, and Kazakhstan, in particular, is the prevention of religious extremism and terrorism. In conditions of confrontation between secular principles and religious foundations, this issue may become even more heated. The issue of security is also important at the regional level. Kazakhstan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The CSTO has «The List of organizations recognized as terrorist and extremist in the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization», and the SCO has «The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Countering Extremism». The security of an individual state largely depends on regional security. This is especially noticeable in the period of globalization, when the issue of information security is acute, since at the moment there are practically no obstacles in the world to the dissemination of information, including destructive information. It can be mentioned that the Law «On National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan» mentions «information security» among six types of security. Thus, the lack of measures to prevent destructive informational ideological influence can cause significant damage to the security of a particular state. Every year, Muslim representatives raise the issue of schoolgirls wearing the hijab in schools, despite the secular nature of school education and Order No. 26 of the Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 14, 2016, which declares the inadmissibility of including religious symbolics in school uniforms. Also, there is a request from Muslims to open prayer rooms within the walls of government institutions, military units, public schools, colleges and universities, despite the official ban prescribed in the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan «On Religious Activities and

Religious Associations» dated October 11, 2011 No. 483-IV. In this regard, the authors set a goal to comprehensively study this problem. It is not uncommon for destructive religious organizations and movements to hide behind Islam, but, of course, not only this religion. However, the authors focus on extremism and terrorism under the guise of Islam, due to the relevance of this topic in the region. Due to the complexity of the topic, the following tasks were set: 1) analyze the features of the French model of secularism used in the Republic of Kazakhstan; 2) consider the current (!) external destructive religious influence exerted on the Republic of Kazakhstan; 3) identify religious and ideological risks for Kazakhstan. Together, these three components provide a comprehensive vision of the problem of preventing religious extremism and terrorism in the context of confrontation between secularism and religious symbolism. Accordingly, the main part of the article is divided into these three components.

Scientific research methodology

Modern scientific methods of cognition are used in the research, including the comparative method, source analysis, the principle of historicism, complex analysis, systematization method, and deduction. The comparative method is necessary to identify correspondences and contradictions between the legal systems of different states and different eras. Analysis of the historical background of a phenomenon can help to identify further trends in the development of this phenomenon. At the same time, a comprehensive analysis of all factors (socio-political, historical, ideological, geographical) influencing the religious situation allows us to form the most complete picture of reality.

Results and discussions

The relationship between the French model of secularism and religious symbolism

Despite growing geopolitical tensions, Kazakhstan remains an oasis of stability. In the Eurasian space, accumulating contradictions (including religious ones) often result in armed clashes. There is an escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, which has political and religious overtones. External actors also intervene in the conflict. For Central Asia, the

«Taliban» (from Pashto طالبان – students), those «who studying in madrasah; the organization's activities on the territory of Kazakhstan were prohibited by a decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated March 15, 2005; however, on December 29, 2023, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan announced a decision to exclude the «Taliban» from the list of prohibited organizations) movement that has gained power in Afghanistan is causing concern. One of the conditions for maintaining stability is adherence to the principle of secularism. This term needs to be defined.

Secularism (from the Latin «saecularis» meaning «century-old, hundred-year-old; worldly») is a government system in which the state is separated from religion. The state does not interfere in the affairs of religion, and religion does not interfere in the affairs of the state, in contrast to theocratic or clerical government systems, where a particular religion officially dominates. At the same time, this is not an atheistic system, since there is no official propaganda of atheism and there is freedom of choice of religion. In general, there are two models of secularism – Anglo-Saxon and French (Kuznetsov, 2013: 44). The Republic of Kazakhstan uses the French model known as laicism (from the French «laïcité» – «secularism»). This model is different in that it seeks to exclude religious symbolics in government institutions: schools, military installations, municipal buildings, et cetera, as well as from public space (Kuru, 2009: 103). Thus, religious neutrality and equality are achieved, and the dominance of any religious denomination is excluded.

Based on this vision, paragraph 13 of Article 2 of «The Requirements for compulsory school uniforms for secondary education organizations», approved by Order of the Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 14, 2016 No. 26, states the following: «Inclusion of elements of clothing of religious affiliation of various religious denominations in school form is not allowed» (Qazaqstan Respublikasy Bilim zhane gylım ministrліgi, 2016).

A similar rule, but at the legal level, exists in France. In 2004, the French Republic passed a law prohibiting the wearing of religious clothing in school (République française, 2004). In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) received six complaints against France alleging that

the Law was discriminatory and infringed on freedom of religion, but the ECtHR rejected these complaints as unfounded. Thus, such legislative practices in Europe are not considered discriminatory (Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, 2009).

Also, from September 4, 2023, the wearing of abaya and qamis in public schools is separately prohibited in France.

Abaya (colloquially and more commonly in Arabic: عبایة 'abayah, especially in literary Arabic: عباءة 'abā'ah; plural عبایات 'abayat, عباءات 'abā'āt), sometimes also called aba, is a simple, free new outerwear, essentially a robe-like dress worn by some women in parts of the Muslim world, including North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and much of the Middle East. (Yarwood, 1978)

Qamis (from Arabic قَمِيصٌ) is men's Muslim traditional clothing in the form of a long shirt. Semantically, the word قَمِيصٌ means «shirt» (Lane, 1885).

Previously, the abaya and qamis were considered primarily traditional clothing, rather than religious, as a result of which their wearing in French schools was not prohibited.

Also, the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan «On Religious Activities and Religious Associations» dated October 11, 2011 No. 483-IV stipulates a ban on religious services within the walls of military units, government institutions, schools, universities, colleges and universities, et cetera.

Thus, in «Chapter 3. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN», «Article 7. Religious rites and ceremonies», the following is stated:

«3. Conduct (commission) public worship, religious rites, ceremonies, and (or) meetings, as well as the implementation of missionary activity are not allowed in the territory and buildings of:

- 1) state bodies, organizations, except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Article
- 2) the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations, judicial and law enforcement agencies, and other services related to public safety, protection of life and health of individuals;
- 3) the organizations of education, except for the spiritual (religious) educational institutions» (The Republic of Kazakhstan, 2011).

A similar situation is observed in France. Thus, in 2023, it became known that in some schools in France, schoolchildren performed namaz (Muslim

prayer), as a result of which the French Minister of National Education and Youth Affairs, Pape Ndiaye, and the mayor of Nice, Christian Estrosi, condemned such an act, despite the fact that in the legislation The Republic does not have a literal ban on prayer within the walls of schools. A joint appeal was published by the minister and the mayor of Nice:

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France, schoolchildren performed salah (Muslim prayer), as a result of which the French Minister of National Education and Youth, Pap Ndiaye, and the Mayor of Nice, Christian Estrosi, condemned such an act, despite the fact that in the legislation The Republic does not have a literal ban on prayer within the walls of schools. On June 17, 2023, a joint appeal was published by the Minister and the Mayor of Nice (Ndiaye, 2023):



Paris, le 16 juin 2023,

DÉCLARATION COMMUNE DE PAP NDIAYE, MINISTRE DE L'ÉDUCATION NATIONALE ET DE LA JEUNESSE, ET CHRISTIAN ESTROSI, MAIRE DE LA VILLE DE NICE

Des atteintes très graves au principe de laïcité se sont déroulées dans trois écoles élémentaires de Nice, un collège et un lycée des Alpes-Maritimes.

Quelques élèves ont organisé des temps religieux et de prières pendant la pause méridienne.

Dès que les faits sont survenus, les parents ont été convoqués par les directeurs des écoles concernées et les équipes académiques valeurs de la République immédiatement mobilisées. Des séquences spécifiques sur la laïcité ont été organisées dans le cadre de l'enseignement moral et civique à l'attention de tous les élèves des écoles concernées.

De tels faits sont intolérables dans l'École de la République et doivent faire l'objet d'une réponse ferme, collective et résolue. L'École de la République est un sanctuaire pour tous nos enfants, il est de notre devoir de la protéger de tout entrisme religieux.

Une enquête de l'Inspection générale est diligentée pour établir précisément les faits et en tirer les conclusions utiles. Par ailleurs, les équipes valeurs de la République resteront mobilisées dans toutes les écoles concernées pour assurer de manière pérenne le plein respect du principe de laïcité.

Le Ministère de l'Éducation nationale et de la Jeunesse et la Ville de Nice rappellent que le principe de laïcité s'impose sur le temps de classe comme sur le temps périscolaire.

C'est pourquoi, en plus des formations déjà organisées par l'éducation nationale d'une part et la ville de Nice d'autre part, à destination de leurs personnels respectifs, sur le sujet de la laïcité et de ses enjeux à l'école, le Ministre de l'Éducation nationale et le Maire de Nice ont décidé conjointement que les formations « laïcité et valeurs de la République » feront désormais l'objet d'un module commun réunissant l'ensemble des personnels.

Au niveau national, des mesures complémentaires seront concertées avec les associations d'élus locaux dès la prochaine instance de dialogue avec les collectivités territoriales qui se tiendra le 3 juillet prochain. Gouvernement et élus locaux partagent tous une même boussole : le principe de laïcité n'est pas négociable dans notre République.

Figure 1 – Text of a joint appeal from the French Minister of National Education and Youth, Pape Ndiaye, and the Mayor of Nice, Christian Estrosi.

Translation of the appeal:

«JOINT DECLARATION BY PAP NDIAYE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION AND YOUTH, AND CHRISTIAN ESTROSI, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NICE

Very serious attacks on the principle of secularism took place in three elementary schools in Nice, a middle school and a high school in the Alpes-Maritimes. Some students organized

religious and prayer times during the lunch break. As soon as the facts occurred, the parents were summoned by the directors of the schools concerned and the academic teams of the Republic were immediately mobilized. Specific sequences on secularism were organized as part of moral and civic education for all students in the schools concerned. Such facts are intolerable in the School of the Republic and must be the subject of a firm,

collective and resolute response. The School of the Republic is a sanctuary for all our children, it is our duty to protect it from any religious entryism. An investigation by the General Inspectorate is carried out to precisely establish the facts and draw useful conclusions. Furthermore, the Republic's values teams will remain mobilized in all the schools concerned to ensure full respect for the principle of secularism in the long term. The Ministry of National Education and Youth and the City of Nice point out that the principle of secularism applies to both classroom and extracurricular time. This is why, in addition to the training already organized by the national education system on the one hand and the city of Nice on the other hand, for their respective staff, on the subject of secularism and its challenges to school, the Minister of National Education and the Mayor of Nice have jointly decided that the «Secularism and values of the Republic» training courses will now be the subject of a common module bringing together all staff. At the national level, additional measures will be coordinated with associations of local elected officials from the next instance of dialogue with local authorities which will be held on July 3. Government and local elected officials all share the same compass: the principle of secularism is non-negotiable in our Republic».

In the Republic of Kazakhstan, there is a request from some Muslim representatives to open prayer rooms within the walls of military units, government institutions, schools, universities, colleges and universities, et cetera, despite the official ban. Moreover, recommendations to allow the wearing of the hijab in schools and to open prayer rooms within the walls of government institutions are made both by representatives of the republican religious association «Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan» (RRA «SAMK»); the only registered Muslim religious association on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan) officially registered in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and by civil activists, human rights activists, and Salafis. So, specifically in the case of the hijab, on September 11, 2023, the press service of the SAMK reported that it had given appropriate recommendations to the authorized body on the issue of the hijab. The recommendations of this organization are as follows: to allow the wearing of scarves in blue and white colors («Qazaqstan musulmandary dini basqarmasy» respublikalyq dini birlestigi, 2023).

That is a case when both representatives of the official Muslim religious association and representatives of the informal part of Muslim society agreed on a common position – to allow students to wear clothes with religious paraphernalia within the school walls (it does not matter what color the clothes are, the very fact of the recommendation about permission is important). In essence, there is a confrontation between the principles of the French model of secularism and religious symbolism.

The influence of external power on Central Asia

The situation is gradually heating up. There is a risk of further religiously motivated radicalization, which is vital for the state to consider, and preventive measures are necessary. It should add here the unstable international situation and geopolitical turbulence. There is an influence of the «Deoband» school in Central and South Asia.

«Deobandism» or the «Deobandi» movement (Urdu دیوبندی) (is a revivalist movement in Sunni Islam that adheres to the Hanafi madhhab) school (of fiqh) Islamic jurisprudence) (Commins, 2006; Ingram, 2018). It was formed at the end of the 19th century around the Muslim educational center «Darul Uloom Deoband» (Urdu دارالعلوم دیوبند, which means «Abode of Knowledge»), in the city of Deoband (Saharanpur district, Uttar Pradesh, Republic of India), from which the name came (Puri, 2009: 19-22; Syed, 2016: 139; Asthana, 2009: 66). The movement was founded by Muhammad Qasim Nanawtawi, Rashid Ahmad ibn Hidayat Ahmad Ayyubi Ansari Gangohi and other figures after the Indian Rebellion of 1857-8 (Lewis, 1991: 205). The movement called for the abandonment of grave worship, idolatry/polytheism (the Arabic تشرک), and sought to protect «orthodox» Sunni Islam from innovation (the Arabic بدعة), as well as Sunni Muslims of South Asia from non-Muslim influence. At the same time, it sought to «protect» conservative Muslim teachings from modernist, secular ideas.

The movement was heavily funded by Saudi Arabia from the early 1980s to the early 2000s (Sareen, 2005: 282). As a result, Salafist Sunni ideas penetrated «Deobandi». Pakistan also strongly supported the Mujahideen movement in the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It should be mentioned that many well-known leaders of the «Taliban» terrorist organization

studied in «Deoband» schools (Abbas, 2011: 33-34). A «Deoband» figure like Sami-ul-Haq is called the «Father of Taliban» because his seminary «Darul Uloom Haqqaniya» has produced many «Taliban» leaders and commanders. Also, a graduate of Darul Uloom Deoband is Maulana Ilyas Kandhlawi, the founder of the now extremist organization «Jamaat Tabligh» (Urdu تبلیغی جماعت – «Society of Preachers»), the organization's activities are prohibited in Kazakhstan by the decision of the Saryarka District Court of Astana on February 26, 2013. The organization was founded in Delhi, India in 1926 (Ahmad, 1994: 512). The headquarters of the organization is in the city of Raiwind in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The propaganda activities of the founder and organization are focused primarily on «ethnic» Muslims rather than on representatives of other religions. This is explained by the fact that the slogan of the founder of the organization was the words: «اے مسلمانو! مسلمان بنو!», which means in Urdu: «O Muslims! Become Muslims [for reals]!» Thus, the organization aims to increase the religiosity of Muslims in their understanding. The organization's proselytizing activities in the post-Soviet space and, in particular, in Kazakhstan began after the collapse of the Soviet Union of Socialist Republics in 1991. Filling the ideological vacuum, this transnational organization actively carried out its destructive activities on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan until its ban in 2013. The organization is prohibited in the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with the exception of the Kyrgyz Republic, where the organization officially operates. Members of the organization from different countries periodically organize meetings in countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia. Speaking about the connection between «Jamaat Tabligh» and extremism, a number of researchers highlight the rejection of secularism by members of this organization (Silber, 2011: 37-38), as well as the fact that the organization's teachings are fertile ground for further radicalization (Burki, 2013), since an impressive number of Islamist extremists were previously members of «Tablighi Jamaat» (Alexiev, 2005).

The following notable individuals were involved or were official members of the organization: former Presidents of Pakistan Farooq Leghari, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, former President of India Dr. Zakir Hussain, former Minister of

Punjab Province of Pakistan – Pervaiz Elahi and others.

There are also cases where the activities of this organization jeopardized biological safety. Thus, during the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, the organization organized an international mass religious gathering in a mosque in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from February 27 to March 1, 2020. This congregation of «Jamaat Tablighi» has been linked to more than 620 cases of COVID-19, making it the largest known epicenter of virus transmission in Southeast Asia. Also, «Jamaat Tablighi» has emerged as one of the major coronavirus hotspots in India after it was found that nearly 20% of the positive cases out of over 2000 cases detected in India originated from «Jamaat Tablighi». The «Jamaat Tablighi» organization became India's first coronavirus «superspreader»: as of April 4, 2020, 1,023 positive coronavirus cases were associated with the «Jamaat Tablighi», which is 30% of positive cases. On April 18, 2020, the central government stated that 4,291 cases, representing 29,8% of India's total 14,378 confirmed COVID-19 cases, were linked to «Jamaat Tablighi». Thus, in the region there is a significant influence of the large Deoband movement, which has a destructive influence and is a generator of various dangerous organizations. This movement also created the following organizations: «Ulema-I-Hind», «Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam», «Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam», «Lashkar-e-Jhangvi», «Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan», «Sipah-e-Sahaba». Deoband's jihadist interpretation of Islam poses a danger to the region. Also, one should take into account the fact that in Pakistan and India many high-ranking officials are in one way or another connected with this movement.

Religious and ideological risks

The extremist-radical ideas generated by the theologians of the «Deobandi» movement have a risk for Central Asia, and particularly Kazakhstan. Such formal characteristics as adherence to the Hanafi school of fiqh, the Maturidi aqeedah (creed) and the Naqshbandi order make Deobandis formally indistinguishable from adherents of the so-called «traditional Islam», which makes it easier for Deobandis to mimic the local religious context. This provides fertile ground for religiously motivated radicalization. In addition, religious sources can be used for radicalization. For example, in the classical Hanafi book «Mukhtasar

al-Quduri», there are the following lines in the section «كتاب السير» (Book of Military Campaigns) on page 231:

الجهاد فرض على الكفاية إذا قام به فريق من الناس سقط عن
الباقين وإن لم يقم به أحد أثم جميع الناس بتركه وقتال الكفار

واجب وإن لم يبدؤنا (Al-Quduri, 1997: 231):

Translation: «Jihād is a collective obligation; when a group of the people establish it, [the obligation] lapses from the rest, but if none of them establish it, [then] all of the people are guilty of wrongdoing by its omission. Fighting unbelievers is obligatory, even if they do not initiate it against us» (Kiani, 2010: 542).

There are other lines that will not be given in this article. It is not difficult to predict what can happen in the mind of a practicing Muslim when reading these lines literally. There is no information about the official reinterpretation of these lines by modern domestic theologians. This work has not been fully translated into Kazakh and Russian but is taught in the original language in religious educational institutions, including in Kazakhstan. All over the world, and in Kazakhstan, there is a problem of stagnation of theology, although it is recognized as a secular science. And any secular science must have stages of its development. As we know, the Republic of Kazakhstan allocates grants from the state budget for such a group of educational programs as «Religion and Theology». Further, there is a risk that radicals will take advantage of the position of the Hanafi madhhab, about which the following is written in the Preamble of the Law «On Religious Activities and Religious Associations»: «This Law... recognizes the historical role of Hanafi Islam and Orthodox Christianity in the development of culture and spiritual life of the people...». Moreover, in practice there are cases of Salafis calling themselves Hanafis. Oddly enough, theoretically there is no contradiction in this, since Salafism relates primarily to Aqedah (creed), and Hanafism relates to fiqh (jurisprudence). Thus, a practicing religious person can recite prayer according to Hanafi fiqh and believe, like the Salafis, that, for example, God is literally in heaven. That is, he may be a Hanafi without being a Maturidi, as is traditionally found. Due to the radicalization of religious people, the securitization of Islam may increase. Securitization is a process in which a certain object is recognized as a threat to security (in our case, state security) (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998: 25).

Conclusion

An analysis of the internal political and social situation in Kazakhstan, as well as the geopolitical situation, helps to identify a number of specific problems: 1) the problem of the relationship between the French model of secularism and religious demonstrative behavior in the context of growing conservative religiosity; 2) the growing influence of the «Deobandi» movement in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan; 3) the risk of Deobandis mimicking the religious context of Kazakhstan in conditions of coincidence of their formal religious identity with representatives of local «traditional Islam»; 4) the absence or low level of a renovationist approach in Islamic theology as a basis for the growth of radical-conservative ideas. It should be noted that any radical orthodox religious discourse is distinguished by the fact that it rejects any renewalist approaches in religion (as was mentioned above with the example of the «Deobandi» movement). It is easy to predict that with the growth of radical-conservative religiosity, the question of the relationship between the French model of secularism and demonstrative religious behavior in government institutions and secular educational institutions will become increasingly acute. In this regard, the current situation naturally leads to the conclusion that in order to balance and/or prevent radical conservative religiosity, it is necessary to develop modern approaches in theological science. If we talk about international experience, then similar developments can be found in such works of prominent world scientists as «Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition» (author: professor, philosopher, theologian Fazlur Rahman), «Коранический гуманизм. Толерантно-плюралистские установки» (author: professor, Doctor of Philosophy, Islamic scholar T. K. Ibragim) and other works. Among domestic works, one can note the translation of the Quran into Russian performed by S. B. Ryzhanov using a new approach. At the same time, it should be noted that in fact, the bearers of the «radical-conservative», «fundamental» Muslim worldview often, in practice and in theory, contradict the primary source of Islam. As is known, certain banned organizations call for abandoning national, including Kazakh, self-identification, and calling

themselves the nation of Islam, building a worldwide theocratic/clerical caliphate. This is even though this concept directly contradicts the primary source of Islam – the Quran. The 22nd verse of the 30th surah of the Quran says that the division of people into nations, the difference of languages and skin color is the idea and sign of God (Al-Quran al-Karim, 2007: 406). Also, in verse 92 surah 4 of the Quran it is clearly shown that believers can be representatives of different nations, that is, faith does not determine a nation – these are different categories. In addition, adherents of destructive ideology call for unconstitutional actions, for example: hatred on religious grounds, the construction of a state where they will kill «infidels», «apostates» (in their narrow understanding), et cetera. This is all even though in verse 256 of surah 2 of the Quran clearly proclaims freedom of religion (Al-Quran al-Karim, 2007: 42). In the same vein, one can look at the issue of religious demonstrative behavior and the issue of «Muslim clothing» (consider the original social function of this or that clothing among the pre-Islamic Arabs, analyze the nature of the use of this

or that type of clothing mentioned in the original source of religion). Thus, on the one hand, the bearers of the «radical conservative», «fundamental» worldview do not accept the renovationist approach, and on the other hand, they contradict the basic source, the foundation of their religion. Thus, for radicalization and for destructive, extremist religious ideology, fertile ground is nescience of the primary source of the Islamic religion, religious illiteracy, in a word – ignorance, retrograde. Accordingly, everything opposite to the above is a kind of «antidote» for such a destructive ideology. Only an ideology can effectively counter another ideology. If religious scholars, Islamic scholars and theologians develop at the academic level a renovationist and at the same time fundamental approach based on the original source of Islam, then we can expect effective ideological opposition to extremist-terrorist ideology hiding behind Islam, and effective work on deradicalization. As a result, the tension between secularism and religious symbolism can be relieved.

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Registered: January 22, 2024.

Accepted: June 13, 2024.