

ISSN 2413-3558  
eISSN 2521-6465

ӘЛ-ФАРАБИ атындағы ҚАЗАҚ ҰЛТТЫҚ УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ

# ХАБАРШЫ

Дінтану сериясы

---

КАЗАХСКИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ имени АЛЬ-ФАРАБИ

# ВЕСТНИК

Серия Религиоведение

---

AL-FARABI KAZAKH NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

# EURASIAN JOURNAL

of Religious Studies

---

№2 (38)

Алматы  
«Қазақ университеті»  
2024



# ХАБАРШЫ

ДІНТАНУ СЕРИЯСЫ №2 (38) маусым

ISSN 2413-3558  
eISSN 2521-6465



29.07.2015 ж. Қазақстан Республикасы Инвестициялар және даму министрлігі  
Байланыс, ақпараттандыру және ақпарат комитеті

Қуәлік №15490-Ж

*Журнал жылына 4 рет жарыққа шығады  
(наурыз, маусым, қыркүйек, желтоқсан)*

## ЖАУАПТЫ РЕДАКТОР

**Байжума С.** (Қазақстан)

Тел.: +7 700 789 0987

E-mail: sametbaizhuma@gmail.com

## РЕДАКЦИЯ АЛҚАСЫ:

**Байтенова Н.Ж.**, филос.ғ.д., профессор – ғылыми редактор (Қазақстан)

**Абжалов С.Ө.**, филос.ғ.к., қауымд. профессор – ғылыми редактордың исламтану ғылыми бағыты бойынша орынбасары (Қазақстан)

**Борбасова Қ.М.**, филос.ғ.д., доцент – ғылыми редактордың дінтану ғылыми бағыты бойынша орынбасары (Қазақстан)

**Мейрбаев Б.Б.**, филос.ғ.к., қауымдастырылған профессор (Қазақстан)

**Құрманәлиева А.Д.**, филос.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

**Әлжанова Н.Қ.**, PhD, аға оқытушы (Қазақстан)

**Сатершинов Б.М.**, филос.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

**Затов Қ.А.**, филос.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

**Муминов Ә.Қ.**, т.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

**Демеуова А.А.**, филос.ғ.д., профессор (Қазақстан)

**Луснан Турсеску**, Конкордиа университетінің профессоры, PhD, дінтанушы (Канада)

**Луиза Райан**, Шеффилд университетінің профессоры, дінтанушы (Ұлыбритания)

**Мухаметшин Р.М.**, саяс.ғ.д., профессор (Ресей)

**Мухетдинов Д.В.**, саяс.ғ.к., теол.ғ.д., профессор (Ресей)

**Челеби И.**, Мармара университетінің профессоры, исламтанушы (Туркия)

**Хизметли С.**, PhD, профессор (Қазақстан, Түркия)

**Алиева Зохра**, PhD, Әзірбайжан ҰҒА қауымд. профессоры (Азербайджан)

## ТЕХНИКАЛЫҚ РЕДАКТОР

**Дүйсенбі Д.**, магистр (Қазақстан)

Дінтану сериясы журналында қоғам үшін өзекті діни мәселелерді арқау еткен зерттеулер жарияланады.



## Жоба менеджері

*Гульмира Шаккозова*

Телефон: +7 701 724 29 11

E-mail: Gulmira.Shakkozova@kaznu.kz

## ИБ №15388

Пішімі 60x84 1/8. Көлемі 9,25 б.т. Тапсырыс №10389.

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университетінің  
«Қазақ университеті» баспа үйі.

050040, Алматы қаласы, әл-Фараби даңғылы, 71.

Баспа журналдың ішкі мазмұнына жауап бермейді.

© Әл-Фараби атындағы ҚазҰУ, 2024

**Ю. Шаповал** 

Евразийский национальный университет им. Л.Н. Гумилева, г. Астана, Казахстан  
e-mail: shapovaluv@gmail.com

## **ВОВЛЕЧЕНИЕ КАЗАХСТАНСКИХ ЖЕНЩИН В ТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКУЮ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЮ ИГИЛ: ФАКТОР ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ**

В статье рассматривается влияние фактора идентичности на вовлечение казахстанских женщин в террористическую организацию ИГИЛ, так как среди выехавших в «Исламское государство» граждан значительное количество составляли женщины и дети. Роль фактора идентичности исследуется на основе концепции формирования идентичности известного психолога Э. Эриксона, который акцентирует внимание на возрастных кризисах идентичности во взаимодействии с историческими и социальными контекстами. Методом исследования являлись интервью с женщинами, возвращенными из Сирии в рамках гуманитарной операции «Жусан». Применение подхода Э. Эриксона к казахстанскому материалу позволило прийти к выводу, что формирование идентичности многих женщин через этапы возрастных кризисов идентичности происходило путем накопления нерешенных конфликтов, что привело к «спутанности идентичности» и негативной идентичности, основанной на отчуждении от общества и на поколенческом разрыве с семьей, с этническими и культурными традициями, что способствовало уязвимости перед идеологией ИГИЛ. В условиях постсоветского контекста идеологического кризиса, затянувшегося поиска новой государственной идеологии и постоянного реформирования институтов социализации, ИГИЛ предлагало молодым людям упрощенную идеологическую систему с четкими ориентирами и новую исламскую идентичность. Данное исследование выявило проблемные зоны в институтах социализации, на которые следует обратить внимание обществу и государству для снижения рисков вовлечения молодых людей, включая девушек, в религиозно-мотивированную экстремистскую идеологию.

**Ключевые слова:** идентичность, казахстанские женщины, ИГИЛ, идеология, постсоветский контекст.

Yu. Shapoval

L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, Kazakhstan  
e-mail: shapovaluv@gmail.com

### **Involvement of Kazakhstani Women in the ISIS Terrorist Organisation: Identity Factor**

The article considers the influence of the identity factor on the involvement of Kazakhstani women in the terrorist organization ISIS, as a significant number of women and children were among the citizens who left for the 'Islamic State'. The role of the identity factor is explored on the basis of the famous psychologist E. Erikson's concept of identity formation, who focuses on age-related identity crises in interaction with historical and social contexts. The research method was interviews with the women returned from Syria as part of the humanitarian operation 'Jusan'. The application of E. Erikson's approach to the Kazakhstani material allowed us to conclude that the identity formation of many women occurred through the stages of age-related identity crises and accumulation of unresolved conflicts, which led to "identity confusion" and a negative identity. These identities were based on alienation from society and on a generational gap with family, with ethnic and cultural traditions, which contributed to vulnerability to the ISIS ideology. In the post-Soviet context of ideological crisis and the protracted search for a new state ideology and constant reform of the socialization institutions, ISIS offered young people a simplified ideological system with clear guidelines and a new Islamic identity. This study has identified problems in socialization institutions that the society and the state should take into consideration to reduce the risks of involving young people, including young women, in religiously motivated extremist ideology.

**Key words:** identity, Kazakhstani women, ISIS, ideology, post-Soviet context.

Ю. Шаповал

А.Н. Гумилев атындағы Еуразия ұлттық университеті, Астана қ., Қазақстан  
e-mail: shapovaluv@gmail.com

### Қазақстандық әйелдерді ДАИШ террористік ұйымына тарту: бірегейлік факторы

Мақалада қазақстандық әйелдердің ДАИШ террористік ұйымына тартылуына ықпал еткен бірегейлік фактордың әсері қарастырылған, өйткені «Ислам мемлекетіне» кеткен азаматтардың ішінде басым бөлігі әйелдер мен балалар болған. Бірегейлік факторының рөлі тарихи және әлеуметтік контексттермен өзара әрекеттесудегі жас ерекшелік дағдарыстарына назар аударған белгілі психолог Э. Эриксонның тұлға бірегейлігінің қалыптасу тұжырымдамасы негізінде зерттеледі. Зерттеу әдісі «Жусан» гуманитарлық операциясы аясында Сириядан оралған әйелдермен сұхбат түрінде болды. Э. Эриксонның теориясын қазақстандық материалға қолдану кезінде көптеген әйелдердің жас ерекшелік дағдарыстарының кезеңдерінен өту барысында қоғам мен отбасыдан алшақтауға, ұрпақтық қатынасты үзуге, этникалық және мәдени дәстүрлерден қашудың себебі болған «бірегейліктің шатасуы» және теріс бірегейліктің қалыптасуы сынды шешілмеген қақтығыстардың жинақталуы аталмыш әйелдердің ДАИШ идеологиясының алдында осалдық танытуларына жол берді. Посткеңестік идеологиялық дағдарыс жағдайында, жаңа мемлекеттік идеологияны ұзақ іздестіру мен әлеуметтену институттарын үнемі реформалау жағдайында ДАИШ жастарға нақты бағдарлары бар жеңілдетілген идеологиялық жүйені және жаңа исламдық бірегейлікті ұсынды. Бұл зерттеу жастардың, соның ішінде қыздардың діни-уәжді экстремисттік идеологияға тартылу әрекеттерін азайту үшін қоғам мен мемлекет тарапынан назар аударуды қажет ететін әлеуметтену институттарындағы проблемалық аймақтарды анықтады.

**Түйін сөздер:** бірегейлік, қазақстандық әйелдер, ДАИШ, идеология, посткеңестік контекст.

#### Введение

Характеризуя современный джихадизм, известный исследователь О. Руа (Roy, 2017: 33), отмечает рост числа женщин в рядах джихадистских организациях с 1990-х годов, что приобрело массовый характер с появлением ИГИЛ и провозглашением им халифата, куда женщины выезжали как с семьями, так и в одиночку. По данным Международного центра изучения радикализации и политического насилия (ICSR) не менее 41 490 граждан из 80 стран отправились в Сирию и Ирак, на территорию так называемого «Исламского государства», четверть из которых были женщины и несовершеннолетние дети (Cook&Vale, 2018: 3). Политический деятель и исследователь Е. Карин, принимавший непосредственное участие в организации и проведении гуманитарной операции «Жусан» по возвращению казахстанских граждан из зон террористической активности Сирии и Ирака, в своей книге, основываясь на данных казахстанских спецслужб, приводит данные, что из Казахстана выехало более 870 казахстанских граждан без учета детей (Карин, 2020: 20), а также дает информацию, что с 2015 по 2017 год более половины казахстанцев, выехавших в «Исламское государство», составили женщины и несовершеннолетние дети (Карин, 2020: 130).

Проблема вовлечения женщин в экстремистские организации поднимается ООН. Так, в ре-

золюции Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН 70/291, посвященной Глобальной контртеррористической стратегии ООН содержится призыв к государствам членам и структурам ООН особое внимание обратить на факторы, ведущие к радикализации женщин с вовлечением их в террористическую деятельность. (Руководство по гендерным аспектам мер борьбы с терроризмом в рамках уголовного правосудия, 2019:14), а также учитывать их в контртеррористических стратегиях государств.

Хотя так называемое «Исламское государство» территориально было разгромлено в Ираке в 2017 году, а в Сирии в 2019 году, однако продолжают существовать его ответвления, в частности «Вилаят Хорасан» в Афганистане, а также сумевшие бежать боевики, боевики ИГИЛ, заключенные в тюрьмы, беженцы из ИГИЛ в лагерях Аль-Холь и Аль-Радж (в основном женщины и дети), где по мнению исследователей имеются высокие риски повторной радикализации (Cook, 2023: 51).

Таким образом, изучение факторов вовлечения женщин в джихадистские организации, в частности, в ИГИЛ является актуальной проблемой как для всего мира, так и для Казахстана. Понимание факторов радикализации женщин важно в свете реализации программы реабилитации и реинтеграции женщин, возвращенных из Сирии в Казахстан в ходе гуманитарной операции «Жусан» и превентивных программ по во-

влечению людей в религиозно-мотивированные экстремистские группы.

### Обоснование выбора темы, цели и задач

Масштабы вовлечения женщин в так называемое «Исламское государство» обусловили рост интереса исследователей и экспертов к проблеме радикализации женщин и присоединения их к джихадистским организациям.

Попытки составить унифицированный социальный профиль данных женщин, как и в случае с профилем мужчин-джихадистов, привели большинство исследователей к опровержению многих стереотипов в отношении людей, уязвимых к идеологии джихадизма. В этом отношении, одной из информативных и обобщающих работ является исследование М. Сейджмана, которое опровергает сложившиеся стереотипы в отношении типологических характеристик джихадистов. А именно, что это молодые люди из бедных семей с низким социально-экономическим статусом, с низким уровнем образования, безработные, с наивными и уязвимыми умами и являющиеся пассивными реципиентами промывания мозгов, с ментальными расстройствами (Sageman, 2008: 47-71). В отношении уровня их религиозности и происхождения из светских или религиозных семей, то однозначного вывода также нет, так как многое зависело от географии, а именно те, кто выросли в Европе, были преимущественно из светских семей, а данные опроса из Индонезии и Малайзии показали, что многие были из религиозных семей и с молодости являлись религиозными людьми, а также были те, кто учился в медресе. М. Сейджман отмечает две черты, которые свойственны большинству джихадистов, в частности молодой возраст, в среднем 25 лет, и поверхностное представление о религии. М. Сейджман приходит к выводу, что необходим более индивидуальный подход к исследованию мотивов и факторов присоединения молодых людей к джихадистским группам, учитывающий личные ситуации и социальные контексты, в которых они жили. Например, в европейском контексте это ситуация с мигрантами во втором поколении, которые не смогли в полной мере интегрироваться в европейское общество, испытывающие кризис идентичности, и находящиеся в поиске принадлежности к группе и «моральной вселенной», которая коррелировала бы с их собственным опытом (Sageman, 2008: 71-89). Таким образом, М. Сейджман указывает на поиск идентичности и смыслообразующей

понятной идеологии в качестве взаимосвязанных и важных факторов.

В отношении женщин, вовлеченных в ИГИЛ, исследователи Э. Солтман и М. Смит, исследовав 100 женских профилей женщин, выехавших в ИГИЛ, приходят к сходным с М. Сейджманом выводам. Так, они отмечают «значительное разнообразие в профилях женщин, становящихся радикализированными и мигрировавшими в ИГ» (Saltman, Smith, 2015:5) и невозможность создать единый профиль данных женщин, основываясь на возрасте, этничности, семейных отношениях, уровне образования или уровне религиозности.

Исследователь де Лид указывает не только на разнообразие в социальных профилях женщин, присоединившихся к ИГИЛ, но и на разнообразие их мотивов. Де Лид считает необоснованным стереотип «невест джихада» как главного и всеобъясняющего мотива выезда этих женщин. Исследователь поясняет: «В то время как замужество – это важная практика женщин поддерживающих ИГИЛ, объяснение мотивов женщин только перспективой замужества это упрощение сложности феномена, который усиливает стереотипы в отношении женщин и ислама» (Seran de Leed, 2018: 43-44). Утверждая комплексность факторов радикализации женщин, де Лид делит их на три уровня: макроуровень, мезо-уровень и микроуровень. Макроуровень включает международные и национальные контексты, такие как рост исламофобии, политика западных стран по отношению к мусульманским государствам, что подпитывало тезис ИГИЛ о том, что умма под угрозой и необходимо встать на ее защиту. На национальном уровне это могут быть действия правительства, направленные на запрет носить хиджаб, никаб и ограничения, налагаемые на покрытых женщин, что может привести к их отчуждению и, вместе с другими факторами, к переезду в «Исламское государство». На мезоуровне, можно выделить такие факторы как влияние религиозных радикалов из социального окружения, поиск принадлежности к группе, которая бы приняла их с теплотой и пониманием. Факторы микроуровня могут включать тяжелую личную ситуацию, например, смерть близкого человека, проблемы в семье, опыт насилия в семье. Также, это может быть поиск приключений и романтический фактор, а именно желание выйти замуж за настоящего мужчину-защитника ислама. Данные разноуровневые факторы, усиливая друг друга, могли привести к хиджре в так называемое «Исламское государство». Сре-

ди перечисленных факторов на разных уровнях одним из значимых факторов является фактор идентичности.

В качестве значимого фактора вовлечения женщин в ИГИЛ, исследователи отмечают гендер-ориентированную пропаганду данной террористической организации. Исследователи Х.Рафик и Н. Малик (Rafiq, Malik, 2015:8-10) приводят обещания ИГИЛ для женщин, в которых подчеркивается, что женщины играют большую роль в построении «Исламского государства», отличную от мужчин, но не менее значимую. Эта роль заключалась в воспитании следующих поколений джихадистов и поддержка мужей-джихадистов. Кроме того, им обещали создание возможностей для реализации себя как благочестивых мусульманок, чего они были лишены в стране происхождения из-за законодательных ограничений, обретение нового понимающего социального окружения – сестер. Как показывает исследователь Х. Хелгат-Дуст (Khelghat-Doost, 2017: 21-22), данная организация использовала прагматический подход для инкорпорации женщин в «Исламское государство», предлагая им утопическое общество, в котором они могут выполнять свои социальные обязательства и придерживаться строго религиозных предписаний, создавая параллельные институты для женщин и, соответственно, благоприятную среду для их использования в различных ролях, не только как домохозяйку, но и учителя, врача, члена женской бригады «аль-Ханса», вербовщика в социальных сетях и др. Это, по мнению исследователя, можно рассматривать как вызов западной модели эмансипации женщин (Khelghat -Doost, 2017: 22).

Исследователь Мохамед Х.А. (Mohamed, 2017: 130), обобщая пропаганду ИГИЛ в отношении женщин, приходит к выводу, что, по сути, она обещала женщинам-мусульманкам новую привлекательную идентичность, а именно быть частью большого проекта «Исламского государства» и, в его рамках, принадлежать к сестрам ИГИЛ. Мохамед Х.А. пишет: «Чувство отчуждения от общества, к которому они принадлежат, но с которым они себя не идентифицируют, поиск исламской идентичности и чувства принадлежности и сестринства – ключевые факторы для выезда» (Mohamed, 2017: 130).

Исследователь политического ислама О. Руа, также актуализирует тему идентичности, характеризуя процесс радикализации молодых людей, становление их «новыми радикалами», присое-

динившимися к ИГИЛ. О. Руа называет их «рожденными вновь» (Roy, 2017: 26), конкретизируя это такими понятиями как «поколенческий разрыв», что означает отказ от следования традициям, идеям своих отцов, а также отказ от ценностей и культуры общества, разрыв с обществом, в котором они родились и живут, бунт молодежи, внутренний конфликт, эстетизация насилия, стремление стать героем-мстителем как в видеоиграх и поиск утопического общества как контробщества по отношению к существующему, что они и нашли в идеологии «Исламского государства» (Roy, 2017: 31-32).

Все, что описывает О. Руа и вышеупомянутые ученые, является свидетельством кризиса идентичности как одного из значимых факторов хиджры в «Исламское государство».

Цель настоящей статьи – исследовать роль фактора идентичности в процессе вовлечения казахстанских женщин в экстремистскую идеологию и их выезда в так называемое «Исламское государство». Для достижения цели, мы, во-первых, рассмотрим концепцию формирования идентичности Э. Эриксона как призму, через которую мы будем исследовать казахстанский материал. Во-вторых, покажем на примере кейсов казахстанских женщин-репатрианток, возвращенных в ходе гуманитарной операции «Жусан» роль фактора идентичности в решении выезда в ИГИЛ. В-третьих, рассмотрим «новую ментальность», новую идентичность, которую они приобрели в «Исламском государстве».

### Методология исследования

В связи с тем, что само понятие идентичности является многоаспектным, включающим социально-психологическое, духовно-нравственное, культурологическое, социологическое, политическое измерение для раскрытия темы исследования мы применяли междисциплинарный подход.

В качестве концептуальных рамок статьи мы использовали концепцию идентичности и кризисов идентичности известного психолога Э. Эриксона по нескольким причинам. Первое, Э. Эриксон дает целостное определение идентичности. Идентичность, согласно Э. Эриксону (Эриксон, 2006: 12), – это самоопределение личности во всем богатстве ее отношений к себе и окружающему миру, целостный образ личности, включающий самоощущение и отнесение

себя к группе (принадлежность к группе), владение личностью, независимо от ситуаций и способность личности к решению задач, возникающих на каждом этапе развития. Второе, Эриксон рассматривает процесс формирования идентичности через переживание человеком ряда психосоциальных кризисов (кризисов идентичности), в которых он стоит перед необходимостью решения задач, от которых зависит успешность или неуспешность последующей жизни (Эриксон, 2006: 13-16, 25-26). Третье, на формирование идентичности на разных этапах развития влияют различные факторы, от отношений в семье и «социальной топологии обстановки его детства» (Эриксон, 2006:70), включая культуру региона и особенностей социальных и культурных норм, до исторических перемен и динамики современного ему общества. Четвертое, понятие о негативной идентичности, которое представляет для нас большой интерес. Преимуществом концепта Э. Эриксона является показ процесса кристаллизации идентичности не только как внутреннего психологического процесса, а как включенного в историко-культурные, социальные и политические контексты и находящегося под их влиянием.

В качестве метода исследования мы использовали интервью с женщинами, возвращенными из Сирии, которые мы проводили вместе с исследователем М.С. Бекмаганбетовой в ходе нашего участия в гуманитарной операции «Жусан», а также и в ходе индивидуального исследования через год после их возвращения. Социальные профили женщин, стратегии радикализации и выводы о мотивах выезда казахстанских женщин представлены в совместной статье (Шаповал, Бекмаганбетова, 2021) на основе 40 интервью. Настоящая статья представляет более детальное рассмотрение фактора идентичности и его роли в вовлечении казахстанских женщин в ИГИЛ через призму концепции кризиса идентичности Э.Эриксона с конкретными примерами из жизни этих женщин. Собранный эмпирический материал был дополнен историями жизни женщин-репатрианток, содержащимися в книге Е. Карина, подробно рассказывающей о гуманитарной операции «Жусан».

В рамках соблюдения конфиденциальности имена женщин, с которыми мы проводили интервью, в тексте статьи не приводятся, а заменяются буквенными обозначениями. Факты из жизни казахстанских женщин, взятые из книги Е. Карина, приводятся с именами женщин, поскольку автор их опубликовал.

## Результаты исследования

1. Концепция кризиса идентичности Э. Эриксона и ее применение к изучению проблемы вовлечения женщин в экстремистские организации

Исходя из того, что большинство исследователей, как было показано выше, указывают на гетерогенность социального профиля радикалов, а также их мотивов, то важно адаптировать более комплексный подход, который комбинирует внимательное исследование жизненного опыта людей, присоединившихся к экстремистским организациям с влиянием исторических и социальных контекстов, что позволило бы выявить общие черты, где это релевантно. Также такой подход позволит выявить проблемные зоны в обществе, которые требуют особого внимания и решения.

В своей концепции кризиса идентичности Э.Эриксон выделяет восемь возрастных кризисов идентичности, через которые проходит каждый человек для формирования своей идентичности. Путем переживания этих кризисов у человека формируются базовые чувства, знания, навыки, поведенческие установки, ценностные ориентиры, которые позволяют прийти к целостному образу своего «Я», пониманию себя и своего места в обществе. Если человек не преодолевает успешно каждый возрастной кризис идентичности, то в результате накапливающихся нерешенных внутренних конфликтов, формируются неправильные идентификации и он приходит к состоянию «спутанности идентичности», и к негативной идентичности, что означает неспособность найти свое место в жизни, отчуждение от общества и высокие риски делинквентного поведения, которое нарушает правила общественного порядка, нравственно-этические нормы общества, соответственно, ведет к допущению насильственных действий и их оправданию.

Из восьми кризисов идентичности шесть кризисов приходятся на период от рождения до 25 лет. Первые три кризиса идентичности приходятся на период от младенчества до шести лет: 0-18 месяцев; 3-4 года; 5-6 лет. В этот период важную роль играет семья, отношения в семье, личности родителей, их отношение к ребенку. Необходимо учитывать культурные и социальные контексты, в которые живет семья. Э.Эриксон отмечает, что нужно соотносить детство человека с существованием его семьи в определенном регионе (юг, запад, восток, север, центр-периферия), с миграцией семьи, с до-

стижениями и потерями семьи, учитывать, были ли в семье переходы в другую религию, а также выявить, какая часть семьи оказывала наибольшее влияние на ребенка.

Следующие три кризиса идентичности приходятся, согласно Э. Эриксону на школьные годы (6-12 лет), юность (12-19), молодость (20-25 лет). Стадии отрочества и юности, которые приходятся на данные три кризиса идентичности являются критическими для формирования идентичности человека. Школьный период в соответствии с концепцией Э. Эриксона представляет собой очень важный этап жизни человека, когда он овладевает знаниями, навыками, установками, ценностными ориентирами, которые необходимы для построения дальнейшего жизненного проекта в данном обществе. Э. Эриксон подчеркивает, что в этот период очень важна роль учителя, который призван помочь овладеть необходимыми компетенциями и предупредить неправильные идентификации, которые ведут к отчуждению от общества. Отрочество и юность характеризуются «страстными поисками тех людей и тех идей, которым можно верить» (Эриксон, 2006: 139-140), а также поиск идентичности через принадлежность к группам. Для юноши и девушки важно в данный период переживания очередного кризиса идентичности быть в движении, участвовать в движениях своего времени, чувствовать себя важным. В отношении потребности в идеях, то в идеологическом плане в этот период для молодежи являются привлекательными простые, порой тоталитарные и жесткие доктрины, которые дают готовые решения. Если государство не может предложить молодежи идеологию, которую бы она разделила, а также включить молодых людей в конструктивные виды деятельности, в позитивные группы, в выполнение задач, стоящих перед обществом и государством, то возникают повышенные риски формирования негативной идентичности. Негативная идентичность выражается в пренебрежительном отношении к тем ролям, которые ему предлагает семья и общество. Это может быть привести к отчуждению от семьи, этнокультурных традиций, от гражданских ценностей, общества в целом, которое воспринимается как фальшивое. Эриксон отмечает, что в этом случае человек может даже назваться новым именем и заново реконструировать свое прошлое, соответственно, формируется новая идентичность не как преемственная по отношению к предыдущей, а как отрицающая ее (Эриксон, 2006: 182-183).

Формирование идентичности, или как ее обозначает Э. Эриксон, «драма развития личности» (Эриксон, 2008:9), находится под влиянием исторических перемен и кризисов общественного развития. Если общество переживает радикальные перемены, то увеличивается риск обращения определенной части молодежи к альтернативным идеологическим проектам, как правило радикальным. Развитие новых технологий дает возможность лидерам и группам, несущим альтернативную идеологию, распространить свое влияние и вовлекать в свои ряды неофитов.

Таким образом, Э. Эриксон указывает на ключевые аспекты формирования идентичности, на которые стоит обратить внимание при анализе вовлечения людей в экстремистские организации, в данной статье в фокусе нашего внимания – вовлечение женщины. Это семья и детский опыт; это школа как критически важный этап, который охватывает подростковый период; это события периода юности, включая изменения в жизни, переезды в другой город, новое социальное окружение, принадлежность к группе, виды деятельности, авторитеты, ценностные ориентиры; это наличие у государства идеологической системы, которая обеспечивала бы ценностную ориентацию и включение в общественные и государственные процессы; это исторические перемены, которые влияют на жизнь человека и социальные структуры, в которые он включен.

В контексте темы исследования, следует добавить учет гендерных особенностей. Исследователи Э. Спекхард и М.Д. Элленберг провели 220 глубинных интервью с последователями ИГИЛ, включая репатриантов, беженцев, а также заключенных в тюрьмах по выявлению их опыта вовлечения в ИГИЛ и мотивов выезда на территорию «Исламского государства». Среди них были представители разных европейских и неевропейских стран, включая Казахстан. Они выделили психосоциальные факторы, которые способствовали уязвимости людей для воздействия ИГИЛ, и, показали, что, при сходных факторах, значимость их для мужчин и женщин отличается. Так, если для мужчин среди факторов уязвимости преобладают в большей степени социальные факторы такие как безработица, криминальное прошлое, экономические причины, и в меньшей степени психоэмоциональные. Для женщин особенно важными оказались психоэмоциональные факторы уязвимости, в частности развод родителей и семейные конфликты, предыдущие травматические события, влекущие



стресс и депрессию, раннее отделение от родителей. Также женщины называли пережитый опыт эмоционального и физического насилия, тогда как среди мужчин таких был совсем маленький процент (Speckhard, Ellenberg, 2020:97). Данные исследователи отдельно выделили мотивы мужчин и женщин, которые послужили непосредственной причиной их эмиграции в «Исламское государство», и иерархия мотивов имела различия. У женщин первыми по значимости мотивами были исламская идентичность, семейные связи, помощь мусульманам, романтика, тогда как у мужчин преобладающими мотивами были помощь мусульманам, исламская идентичность, трудоустройство, идеология халифата, джихадистская идеология (Speckhard, Ellenberg, 2020: 106). В этом исследовании представленность людей с разных стран дает широкую картину уязвимостей и мотивов, но, с другой стороны, дает меньше возможностей учесть специфический контекст стран. Исследователи делают различие между европейскими и неевропейскими странами, но среди неевропейских стран также много различий в историко-культурных, социальных и политических контекстах.

## **2. Фактор идентичности в процессе вовлечения казахстанских женщин в ИГИЛ**

Значительный объяснительный потенциал концепции Э. Эриксона подтверждается собранным казахстанским эмпирическим материалом. В отношении семьи, следует отметить, что многие казахстанские женщины, совершившие хиджру, выросли в неполных семьях (Карин, 2020: 172). Исследователь Е. Карин приводит цифру 39%. Это также подтверждается нашим исследованием. В частности, данные женщины указывали, что родители развелись, и они воспитывались одним из родителей (в большинстве случаев матерью), или бабушкой и дедушкой. Е. Карин описывает кейс одной из женщин, которую в детстве бросила мать, оставив дочь и двух братьев на попечение отца, страдающего алкоголизмом (Карин, 2020: 173). В нашем исследовании, была молодая женщина из неполной семьи, которая из-за алкоголизма матери, оказалась в интернате. Также, были молодые женщины, которые указывали на конфликты в семье, свидетелями которых они были. В семье закладывается «чувство базисного доверия» (Эриксон, 2006:106), что является краеугольным камнем личности и оказывает большое влияние на формирование идентичности человека. Если чувство базисного доверия снижено, то это вы-

ражается в отчуждении, в уходе в себя, в конфликте с другими или самим собой. В этот же период формируется автономное «Я» ребенка, его самооценка, а также границы возможного в сфере морали. Опыт конфликтности в семье в период трех возрастных кризисов идентичности (с периодом младенчества до школьного возраста) ведет к в росту внутренней конфликтности и проблемам с формированием идентичности.

В отношении образования, все женщины прошли институты социализации в виде средней школы, колледжа, института, кроме тех, кто был вывезен ребенком и, соответственно, не окончил среднюю школу. По данным нашего исследования, 45% женщин, выехавших в ИГИЛ, имели высшее и среднее специальное образование, 30 % учились в ВУЗах или колледжах, и не доучившись, выехали в «Исламское государство», 13 % не продолжили учебу после окончания 9 классов и 11 классов, остальные женщины были вывезены родителями, когда учились в школе (Шаповал, Бекмаганбетова, 2021: 301). Это коррелирует с данными Е. Карина, согласно которому 40% имела на момент выезда высшее и среднее специальное образование, а среднее имело 35% (Карин, 2020:171). Подавляющее большинство женщин окончили школу, то есть прошли основной институт социализации общества, но не нашли свое место в обществе, не усвоили ценности этого общества, и оказались уязвимы для экстремистской идеологии. Школьные годы и период юности являются важнейшими и критичными для формирования идентичности. В случае успешного прохождения кризисов идентичности молодой человек обретает позитивную идентичность, интеграцию личности и понимание своего места в обществе, а в случае неудачного течения данных периодов формируется негативная идентичность, которая сопровождается отчуждением от себя и от общества. На школьные годы приходится кризис идентичности подросткового возраста, когда актуальными становятся вопросы поиска идентичности через принадлежность группы и направление энергии подростков в конструктивное русло. В этот период, как отмечает Э. Эриксон, для преодоления кризиса и формирования позитивной идентичности необходим авторитетный учитель, идеологическая система, дающая устойчивые ориентиры и идеалы, вовлечение в различные виды развивающей и полезной деятельности. Исходя из этого, школьное образование не может быть только передачей знаний, а должно включать воспитание. Образование означает формирова-

ние целостного образа, путь духовного самоопределения человека, что приводит к позитивной идентичности. Большой процент молодых женщин, окончивших школу, но, оказавшихся уязвимыми для экстремистской идеологии, свидетельствует о проблемных зонах в главном институте социализации, которые проходят все молодые люди.

М. Сейджман в своей книге о джихадизме подробно анализирует вовлечение в данную идеологию двух девушек-сестер, которым было по 13 лет, когда они были осуждены за подготовку теракта в 2003 году, в Рабате (Марокко). Жизненная траектория девушек представляет собой накопление нерешенных конфликтов, которые сопровождали кризисы идентичности. Это опыт неблагополучной конфликтной жизни в семье с бабушкой и дедушкой, а потом с матерью, это уход из школы, учителя которой не пытались вмешаться и оказать помощь. В результате излишняя энергия подросткового возраста и желание самоутвердиться через принадлежность к группе привели их в радикальное исламистское окружение в одной из мечетей, среди которого были такфириты. Девушки стали посещать собрания, слушать радикальных проповедников. Они нашли здесь принявшую их группу, лидера группы, который стал героем, образцом для подражания для них. Идеи о страдании мусульман, справедливости и необходимости борьбы легли на благодатную почву отчуждения от общества. М. Сейджман отмечает, что они были злы на мир и то, что они читали и слушали в этой группе, давало им интерпретацию мира и руководство, что делать в жизни. История их поведения на суде и, затем, в тюремной заключении, также подтверждают, что в результате нерешенных кризисов идентичности, сформировалась негативная идентичность. В современном обществе вовлечение подростков в религиозно-мотивированные экстремистские группы стало проблемой, которая требует более детального исследования и внимания со стороны государства.

Следующий период кризис идентичности – юность, когда бушующая энергия молодого человека требует идей и идеалов, «моральной вселенной», которые бы дали ясную картину миру для юношей и девушек с понятными смыслами и возможностями для самореализации и участия в важном деле. В условиях неопределенности относительно государственной идеологии или ее недостаточной корреляции с духовными, когнитивными, эмоциональными потребностями молодежи, молодые люди ищут альтернативные

идеологические системы. Одной из таких альтернатив стала идеология ИГИЛ, проповедники которой активно действовали и до сих пор действуют в медиапространстве.

В случае с Казахстаном, и в целом, с постсоветским пространством, следует отметить общий идеологический кризис, который создал условия для радикализации сознания молодежи, в рамках которого часть молодых людей обратилась к идеологии джихадизма. В этом контексте становится понятным тезис О. Руа об «исламизации радикализма» (Roу, 2017: 10), когда он описывает «новых радикалов», разделяющих идеологию джихадизма.

Исследователь Д. Гараев отмечает важность учета постсоветского контекста для понимания русскоязычного джихадизма, проповедники которого через понятный постсоветскому человеку язык, образы, концепции продвигали данную идеологию (Garaev, 2023: 10, 100). Для Казахстана это также актуально, поскольку большинство присоединившихся к ИГИЛ казахстанских граждан слушали русскоязычных проповедников. Исходя из наших интервью с женщинами-репатриантками, один из наиболее популярных проповедников среди них, чьи лекции они регулярно слушали, был русскоязычный проповедник джихадизма Саид Бурятский (Полевые записи автора, май 2019 г.). Он был ликвидирован российскими спецслужбами в 2010 году до возникновения ИГИЛ и провозглашения «Исламского государства» в июне 2014 года, но его медиа-джихадизм продолжал вовлекать молодежь. Анализ его жизни и проповедей, проведенный Д. Гараевым (Garaev, 2023: 100-105), делает понятным его привлекательность для молодых людей. В его проповедях звучали идеи об «искренности», «самопожертвовании», «великих делах», что подкреплялось его собственной смертью, которая стала восприниматься как смерть мученика. Все эти идеи и его образ героя, готового пожертвовать своей жизнью ради идеи, соответствовали устремлениям молодых людей в период кризиса идентичности юности. Е.Карин в своей работе называет имена радикальных проповедников Дарына Мубарова, Назраттулы, Надира Бухари, которых также слушали женщины-репатриантки до выезда в «Исламское государство», и почерпнули у них идеи «о джихаде для женщин, как «борьбу со своим нафсом (страстями) и совершение хиджры (переселение)» (Карин, 2020: 177). Среди казахстанских женщин-репатрианток были молодые женщины, которые выехали в ИГИЛ, при-

влеченные образом героя – настоящего мусульманина, защищающего мусульман, готового на самопожертвование, что коррелирует с образом и идеями Саида Бурятского. Так, респондентка Д. выехавшая в ИГИЛ, будучи студенткой университета, целенаправленно искала себе мужа с твердыми идеологическими убеждениями, носителя идеи «Исламского государства», и, выходя замуж за второго мужа, предпочтение отдала мужчине, который имел опыт борьбы за земли Шама (Полевые записи автора, октябрь 2020).

Период юношества, как правило, сопровождается большими изменениями в жизни молодого человека, а именно, поступлением в колледж или высшее учебное заведение, переездом в другой город, необходимостью адаптироваться к новому социальному окружению, в целом к взрослой жизни, выбирать свою жизненную стратегию. Значительная часть женщин-репатрианток оказалась в такой жизненной ситуации, в частности, в ситуации переезда из небольшого поселка/небольшого города в большой город в связи с учебой, или начали работать, и среди своего нового социального окружения встретили женщин, вовлекших их в радикальные женские джамааты (община), где они слушали джихадистских проповедников, им находили мужей с соответствующими взглядами, что в результате приводило к выезду в «Исламское государство». Так, респондентка Г. приехала в большой город, поступив в университет, начала подрабатывать продавцом в бутике в торговом центре и стала общаться с женщиной с соседнего бутика, с которой она начала читать намаз, затем одела хиджаб, затем стала посещать женские собрания, потом ей нашли девушки из джамаата состоятельного мужа, но с радикальными взглядами, и через несколько лет они вместе выехали в «Исламское государство» (Полевые записи автора, май 2019). Е. Карин приводит также историю молодой женщины Малики Таженовой, которая прожила в Сирии пять лет, и сама смогла сбежать с территории ИГИЛ в Турцию, а затем вернулась в Казахстан. Она выросла в благополучной семье, но рано уехала из родительского дома, из небольшого города Кульсары в областной центр Атырау, где после окончания 9-ти классов поступила в колледж и попала в новое окружение. На съемной квартире жила вместе с девушками, которые ее вовлекли в радикальную идеологию, а затем подобрали мужа из радикального джамаата (Карин, 2020: 200-203).

Как мы отмечали, неизжитые предшествующие кризисы идентичности, проблемные зоны в

институтах социализации и неопределенность в идеологической системе государства повышают риски «спутанности идентичности», когда юноша или девушка не могут найти свое место в обществе. Э. Эриксон отмечает, что «спутанность идентичности» приводит к спутанности ценностей. В этой ситуации возникают большие риски того формирования негативной идентичности, которая предполагает отвержение семьи, культуры, общества, государства и поиск альтернативной идеологической системы, которая бы стала ориентиром для формирования новой идентичности. На наш взгляд, этап «спутанности идентичности» и негативной идентичности пережили многие молодые женщины, выехавшие в ИГИЛ с мужьями или в одиночку.

Среди мотивов выезда больше половины казахстанских женщин (51%), согласно нашему исследованию, указали желание жить в Исламском государстве, которое они называли Дауля, где все, по их словам, функционирует по шариату, в соответствии с нормами ислама (Шаповал, Бекмаганбетова, 2021: 312). Через отрицание своей прежней жизни и прежней идентичности они пришли к исламской идентичности и картине мира в интерпретации сторонников ИГИЛ.

### ***3. Новая идентичность как цель «Исламского государства»***

Исследователь О. Руа, характеризуя джихадизм, отмечал, что новшества, которые были введены в исламскую доктрину разработчиками этой идеологии в виде новой интерпретации джихада, куфра и других понятий, в конечном счете, преследователи цель не просто привлечь людей на войну с неверными, а создать новый тип мусульман, которые были бы оторваны от своих семейных, родовых, национальных, этнических связей (Roy, 2017: 18). Религия этих новых мусульман лишена культурных традиций народа, среди которого получила распространение, что он обозначил как декультурацию религии (Roy, 2017: 12).

Исследование Е. Карина и наше исследование подтверждают тезис о цели ИГИЛ сформировать новую идентичность, основанную на поколенческом разрыве и декультурации религии. Е. Карин приводит историю молодой женщины-репатриантки Толганай Мукыш, которая учась в университете, познакомилась с будущим мужем-практикующим мусульманином, ее одногруппником на тот момент. Следуя его примеру, она стала читать намаз, потом по его просьбе надела хиджаб, несмотря на то, что родители

были против, затем вышла за него замуж. Она рассказывает: «Муж на 4-м курсе познакомился с какими-то парнями, салафитами, наверное, как я сейчас понимаю. Они были казахами, постарше нас, не знаю, откуда, тогда особо не вникала. Муж рассказывал, вот, мол, оказывается, мы неправильно практикуем ислам – нужно так по религии, а не так» (Карин, 2020: 207-208). Вскоре муж выехал в ИГИЛ, а затем позвал ее, и она поехала к мужу в Сирию, где ее муж погиб, а она провела пять лет и вернулась на родину в рамках гуманитарной операции «Жусан-3».

В нашем исследовании, респондентка А. говорила, что считает казахские обычаи ширком, в частности паломничество к святым местам, а также, по ее мнению, люди, совершающие паломничество, выходят из ислама (Полевые записи автора, май 2019). Женщины в «Исламском государстве» одевались во все черное, полностью закрывались, включая лицо. Женщины-репатриантки ссылались на то, что есть хадис, в котором говорилось, что женщины времен пророка Мухаммада одевались в черное как вороны. Многие женщины, возвратившись в Казахстан и поменяв фасон и цвет мусульманского покрытия на более светлые цвета, сначала чувствовали себя некомфортно.

Подтверждением того, что ИГИЛ было нацелено на формирование новой исламской идентичности, является большое внимание, которое они уделяли работе с детьми, их образованию и воспитанию в духе ИГИЛ. После разгрома ИГИЛ в Ираке были обнаружены учебные материалы для образования детей на территории провозглашенного халифата. Как отмечают авторы, представившие анализ этих материалов, учебная программа ИГИЛ «представляет собой систематическое формирование картины мира, в которой детям дается моральная основа для убеждения в том, что повествование и мировоззрение Исламского государства правдивы, а все остальное ложно» (Zeiger et al., 2021: 15), а также, что «их личность подвергается нападкам со стороны врага или «другого», и они должны присоединиться к идентичности ИГИЛ и использовать такие средства, как насилие, чтобы обеспечить сохранение себя и своих сверстников» (Zeiger et al., 2021: 15). Казахские женщины-репатриантки рассказывали, что мальчиков с 12 лет забирали в муаскары на военную подготовку, формируя из них «львят халифата», а с девочками, которые назывались «жемчужинами халифата», проводились занятия для их индоктринации

и подготовки как будущих жен джихадистов и матерей будущего поколения «Исламского государства».

Ярким свидетельством о принятии новой идентичности выехавшими в ИГИЛ является то, что они сжигали паспорта, чтобы окончательно разорвать связь со своим прошлым, с государством, где они родились. Это был жест в пользу новой идентичности, принадлежности к «Исламскому государству». Как отмечает Е. Карин они считали себя мухаджирами, совершившими хиджру в «Исламское государство» (Карин, 2020: 18) и связывали свою дальнейшую жизнь и жизнь своих детей с этим государством. Соответственно, возвращенные казахские женщины и дети были без документов, и документирование стало одной из важных задач процесса их реабилитации и реинтеграции.

### Обсуждение

Разнообразие в социальных профилях и мотивах выезда женщин в ИГИЛ заставляет исследователей искать более индивидуальный подход к рассмотрению данного феномена, учитывающий гетерогенность внутри этой категории женщин, и уже на основе этого выявлять общие черты. Фактор идентичности рассматривается многими учеными, включая упомянутых в статье, как один из ключевых среди факторов вовлечения женщин в идеологию ИГИЛ и совершения ими хиджры в провозглашенный халифат. На наш взгляд, применение концепции формирования идентичности известного психолога Э. Эриксона позволяет более детально и глубоко изучить роль идентичности как значимого фактора для выезда казахских женщин в ИГИЛ. Психосоциальные кризисы идентичности, переживание которых представляет собой периоды формирования идентичности человека. Шесть из восьми кризисов идентичности приходится на период жизни от рождения до 25 лет, что объясняет уязвимость именно молодых людей для экстремистских идеологий. Успешность прохождения и преодоления кризисов идентичности приводит к формированию позитивной идентичности молодого человека, ответственного перед собой и нашедшего свое место в обществе, разделяющего его традиции и ценности. В этом отношении, позитивная идентичность предполагает преемственность с предыдущими поколениями и встроена в единый континуум передачи традиций, ценностей, смыслов. В слу-

чае, нерешенного и непреодоленного кризиса идентичности на каждом этапе становления личности, накапливается конфликтность человека в отношениях с самим собой и с обществом, что в результате приводит к «спутанности идентичности», когда молодой человек не находит своего места в обществе и приходит к негативной идентичности, отвергающей семейные, родовые, этнические, культурные связи и ищет альтернативные идеологические системы и существует большие риски вовлечения в экстремистские идеологии.

Концепция Э. Эриксона дает ключевые ориентиры для внимательного изучения жизненных историй казахстанских женщин-репатрианток. В частности, это детство и опыт пребывания в семье, затем школа как главный институт социализации, который проходят все граждане страны, и опыт прохождения которого совпадает с критическими для формирования идентичности периодами отрочества и юности, далее изменения, связанные с вступлением во взрослую жизнь, отделением от родительской семьи, учебой в колледже или ВУЗе, начало профессиональной деятельности, необходимость выстраивания самостоятельного жизненного проекта.

Как было показано на конкретных примерах, значительное количество казахстанских женщин, выехавших в ИГИЛ, выросли в неполных семьях или в конфликтных семьях, затем в школе и других институтах социализации они не получили ориентиров, идеалов, ценностей для понимания себя и своего места в обществе, что способствовало росту отчуждения от общества и состоянию «спутанности идентичности» и ценностей, далее следовало формирование негативной идентичности, основанной на поколенческом разрыве и поиске альтернативной системы идей и смыслов, чем воспользовались проповедники и вербовщики ИГИЛ. В отношении казахстанских женщин, вовлеченных в ИГИЛ, важно учитывать социальный и политический контекст, в котором происходило формирование идентичности молодых людей, а именно постсоветский контекст идеологического кризиса и поиски государственной идеологии, которые продолжаются до настоящего времени. При этом, следует отметить, что «Исламское государство» серьезно занималось вопросами идентичности приехавших мухаджиров, включая женщин, о чем свидетельствует их гендер-ориентированная пропаганда, и детей, для которых создавались институты социализации для усвоения ими идеологии ИГИЛ.

## Заключение

В рамках данной статьи мы рассмотрели влияние фактора идентичности на вовлечение казахстанских женщин в радикальную идеологию и на их решение уехать в так называемое «Исламское государство» через призму концепции формирования идентичности Э. Эриксона. Основываясь на жизненных историях казахстанских женщин-репатрианток, возвращенных в ходе гуманитарной операции «Жусан» из Сирии, мы показали, что их переживание кризисов идентичности сопровождалось накоплением нерешенных конфликтов и постепенным отчуждением от общества, что привело к формированию негативной идентичности, разрывающей семейные, этнические, культурные связи, и уязвимости для идеологии ИГИЛ, в которой учитывалась и роль женщин. Следуя концепции Э.Эриксона о влиянии исторических перемен, социальных, политических, культурных контекстов на формирование идентичности молодого человека мы выявили, что кризисы идентичности, свойственные молодому возрасту, казахстанские женщины проходили в условиях постсоветского кризиса идеологии и продолжающимися поисками государственной идеологии в последние десятилетия. Кроме того, изучение фактора идентичности выявило проблемные аспекты, связанные с институтами социализации, особенно школы, которая охватывает важнейшие для формирования идентичности периоды подросткового возраста и юности и должна способствовать формированию позитивной идентичности через воспитание. Также, особое внимание надо обратить на разработку государственной идеологии, которая бы предложила молодежи ясные и четкие ориентиры, смыслы, ценности и возможности для реализации в обществе.

Исследование фактора идентичности, представленной в этой статье, не является исчерпывающим. Многоаспектность концепции Э.Эриксона открывает новые перспективы для дальнейшего изучения, например, более глубокого исследования контекстов, которые оформляли становление идентичности казахстанских женщин, включая культурные и социальные нормы в отношении роли женщины в семье и обществе, гендерные стереотипы, которые обуславливают опыт женщин и их жизненный проект, особенности религиозности женщин и другие.

Исследование влияния фактора идентичности на процесс вовлечения казахстанских жен-

щин в экстремистскую идеологию и выезд в ИГИЛ, а также их новой идентичности, оформленной ИГИЛ, способствуют более эффективной реализации программ реабилитации и реинтеграции репатриантов с целью преодоления поколенческого разрыва в их идентичности и восстановление преемственности идентичности, соответственно, формирования позитивной идентичности. Также, важно учитывать фактор идентичности при организации и проведении превентивной работы с молодежью, что позволит не только снизить риски радикализации, но

и сформировать у молодых людей устойчивость против воздействия экстремистских идей.

### Благодарность и конфликт интересов

Статья подготовлена в рамках финансирования КН МНВО РК (ПЦФ BR21882428 «Влияние и перспективы ислама как духовно-культурного, политического, социального явления в постнормальные времена: опыт стран Ближнего Востока и Центральной Азии»). Конфликт интересов на всех этапах подготовки статьи отсутствовал.

### Литература

- Cook J. (2023) Distinguishing Children From ISIS-Affiliated Families in Iraq and Their Unique Barriers for Rehabilitation and Reintegration. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 3 (17): 42- 69.
- Cook J., Vale G. (2018) From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State. Report of ICSR. London: King’s College. – 72.
- Garaev D. (2023) Jihadism in the Russian-Speaking World. The Genealogy of a Post-Soviet Phenomenon – London and New York: Routledge. – 174.
- Knelghat-Doost, H. (2017) Women of the Caliphate the Mechanism for Women’s Incorporation into the Islamic State”. *Perspective on Terrorism* 11(1): 17-25.
- Mohamed, H. A. (2017). Woman and ISIS: Social Diagnosis and Interventions. *Radicalism and Terrorism in the 21st Century: Implications for Security*, edited by A. Sroka, F. C.-R. Garrone, & R. D. T. Kumbrián. – 123–138.
- Rafiq, H., Malik, N. (2015) Calliphettes: Women and the Appeal of Islamic State. Quilliam. – 53.
- Roy, O. (2017) Jihad and death. The Global appeal of Islamic State. London: Hurst&Company. – 159.
- Sageman, M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad. Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia. – 200.
- Saltman E.M., Smith, M. (2015) ‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’. *Gender and ISIS Phenomenon*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. – 80.
- Seran de Leed (2018) Western Women Supporting IS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq – An Exploration of their Motivations. *International Annals of Criminology*. 56: 43-54.
- Speckhard A., Ellenberg M. D. (2020) ISIS in Their Own Words: Recruitment History, Motivations for Joining, Travel, Experiences in ISIS, and Disillusionment over Time – Analysis of 220 In-depth Interviews of ISIS Returnees, Defectors and Prisoners. *Journal of Strategic Security*. 1 (13): 82-127.
- Zeiger S., Atamuradova F., Elsayed L., Chung M. (2021) Planting the Seeds of the Poisonous Tree: Establishing a System of Meaning through ISIS Education. 2021. Program of Extremism. – Washington DC. – 117.
- Карин Е. (2020) Операция «Жусан». Кого и почему вернули из Сирии? - Print House Gerona. – Алматы. – 272.
- Руководство по гендерным аспектам мер борьбы с терроризмом в рамках уголовного правосудия. (2019) – Вена: UNODC– 229.
- Шаповал Ю.В. Бекмаганбетова М.С. (2021) Хиджра в «Исламское государство» через призму женских нарративов. *Государство, религия и церковь в России и за рубежом*, 3: 289-315.
- Эриксон Э. (2006) Идентичность. Юность и кризис. – М.: Флинта: МПСИ: Прогресс. – 352.
- Эриксон Э. (2008) Трагедия личности. – М.: ООО «Алгоритм-Книга», 2008. – 121.

### References

- Cook J., Vale G. (2018) From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State. *Report of ICSR*. London: King’s College. – 72.
- Cook J. (2023) Distinguishing Children From ISIS-Affiliated Families in Iraq and Their Unique Barriers for Rehabilitation and Reintegration. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 3 (17): 42- 69.
- Erikson Je. (2006) Identichnost. Junost i krizis [Identity. Youth and crisis]. – М.: Flinta: MPSI: Progress. – 352. (in Russian)
- Erikson Je. (2008) Tragedija lichnosti [Personal tragedy]. – М.: ООО «Алгоритм-Книга», 2008. – 121. (in Russian)
- Garaev D. (2023) Jihadism in the Russian-Speaking World. The Genealogy of a Post-Soviet Phenomenon – London and New York: Routledge. – 174.
- Karin E. (2020) Operacija «Zhusan». Kogo i pochemu vernuli iz Sirii? [Operation “Jusan”, whom and why returned from Syria]. – Алматы: Print House Gerona. – 272. (in Russian)

- Knelghat-Doost, H. (2017) Women of the Caliphate the Mechanism for Women`s Incorporation into the Islamic State”. *Perspective on Terrorism* 11(1): 17-25.
- Mohamed, H. A. (2017). Woman and ISIS: Social Diagnosis and Interventions. *Radicalism and Terrorism in the 21st Century: Implications for Security*, edited by A. Sroka, F. C.-R. Garrone, & R. D. T. Kumbrián. – 123–138.
- Rafiq, H., Malik, N. (2015) *Calliphettes: Women and the Appeal of Islamic State*. Quilliam. – 53.
- Roy, O. (2017) *Jihad and death. The Global appeal of Islamic State*. London: Hurst&Company. – 159.
- Rukovodstvo po gendernym aspektam mer bor`by s terrorizmom v ramkah ugovnogo pravosudija (2019) [Guidance on Gender Dimensions of Counter-Terrorism Responses in Criminal Justice]. – Vena: UNODC– 229. (in Russian)
- Sageman, M. (2008) *Leaderless Jihad. Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia. – 200.
- Saltman E.M., Smith, M. (2015) `Till Martyrdom Do Us Part`. Gender and ISIS Phenomenon. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. – 80.
- Seran de Leed (2018) Western Women Supporting IS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq – An Exploration of their Motivations. *International Annals of Criminology*. 56: 43-54.
- Shapoval Ju.V. Bekmaganbetova M.S. (2021) Hidzhra v «Islamskoe gosudarstvo» cherez prizmu zhenskikh narrativov. *Gosudarstvo, religija i cerkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom* [Hijra in the Islamic State through the prism of women`s narratives. State, religion and church in Russia and abroad], 3: 289-315. (in Russian)
- Speckhard A., Ellenberg M. D. (2020) ISIS in Their Own Words: Recruitment History, Motivations for Joining, Travel, Experiences in ISIS, and Disillusionment over Time – Analysis of 220 In-depth Interviews of ISIS Returnees, Defectors and Prisoners. *Journal of Strategic Security*. 1 (13): 82-127.
- Zeiger S., Atamuradova F., Elsayed L., Chung M. (2021) Planting the Seeds of the Poisonous Tree: Establishing a System of Meaning through ISIS Education. 2021. *Program of Extremism*. – Washington DC. – 117.

**Сведения об авторе:**

Шаповал Юлия Васильевна – доктор философских наук, доцент кафедры религиоведения Евразийского национального университета имени Л.Н. Гумилева (г. Астана, Казахстан, e-mail: shapovaluv@gmail.com).

**Information about author:**

Shapoval Yuliya Vasilievna – Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor of Religious Studies Department of L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Astana, Kazakhstan, e-mail: shapovaluv@gmail.com).

Поступила: 28 апреля 2024 г.

Принята: 13 июня 2024 г.

A. Shanbayeva<sup>1\*</sup> , Zh. Kantarbayeva<sup>1</sup> , John Mahoney<sup>2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

<sup>2</sup>Kansas State University, Manhattan, USA

\*e-mail: shabaya123@mail.ru

## ACTIVITIES OF MOSQUES OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE FIELD OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

The mosques has also a big influence on the religious stability throughout the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This article refines the direct functions of the mosques on the religious sphere of education and analyses the current work being conducted on this course. The authors highlighted the historical stages of the mosque development as a religious educational center and defines their contribution on a spiritual and moral value of society and their support of cultural heritage. A special attention was paid into modern state of religious education in Kazakhstan, including evaluation of the quality of educational programs, methods of teaching by using informational technology on abovementioned process. Also this investigational article presents an actual problems which face the mosques especially in the context of islam, such as destructive religious movements, radicalism, extremism, xenophobia and separatism. The authors could analyze the role of the mosques on preventing such phenomenon, mostly in Islam, proposes the ways of enhancement of work being done on this sphere. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan is a large Islamic religious organization that includes 2,854 mosques and 357 prayer rooms in the country. The number of employees in all mosques is 4,728 people. The research article views the effectiveness of work executed by Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan – a major Islamic religious organization, which operates a significant number of the mosques and prayer halls. The authors identify the strongest points of this organization on religious educational sphere and propose the improvement measures by taking into consideration the modern social demand.

**Key words:** Mosques of Kazakhstan, the role of mosques, the work of religious education, Islam, Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan.

А. Шаңбаева<sup>1\*</sup>, Ж. Қаңтарбаева<sup>1</sup>, Джон Махони<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

<sup>2</sup> Канзас мемлекеттік университеті, Манхэттен қ., АҚШ

\*e-mail: shabaya123@mail.ru

### Қазақстан мешіттерінің діни ағарту саласындағы қызмет бағыттары

Қазақстан Республикасында діни ахуалдың орнықтылығына мешіттер де үлес қосып келеді. Мақалада Қазақстандағы мешіттердің діни ағарту саласындағы қызмет бағыттары нақтыланып, сол бағытта жасалып жатқан жұмыстарға талдау жасалады. Авторлар мешіттердің діни білім ошағы ретінде дамуының тарихи кезеңдерін талдап, олардың қоғамның рухани-адамгершілік құндылықтарын қалыптастыруға және мәдени мұраны қолдауға қосқан үлесін айқындайды. Қазақстан мешіттеріндегі діни білім берудің қазіргі жағдайына, оның ішінде оқу бағдарламаларының сапасын бағалауға, оқыту әдістемесіне және оқу үдерісінде ақпараттық технологияларды пайдалануға ерекше назар аударылады. Зерттеуде әсіресе ислам контекстінде деструктивті діни ағымдар, радикализм, экстремизм, ксенофобия және сепаратизммен күрес сияқты мешіттердің алдында тұрған өзекті мәселелер көрсетілген. Авторлар аталған құбылыстардың алдын алудағы мешіттердің рөлін талдап, осы бағыттағы жұмыстарды жақсарту бойынша ұсыныстарын береді. Қазақстан мұсылмандары діни басқармасына еліміздегі 2854 мешіт пен 357 намазхана жататын ірі исламдық діни ұйым, барлық мешіттердегі қызметкерлер саны 4728 адамды құрайды. Мақалада еліміздегі мешіттер мен намазханалардың едәуір бөлігін басқаратын ірі исламдық діни ұйым болып табылатын Қазақстан мұсылмандары діни басқармасының жұмысының тиімділігі де қарастырылған. Авторлар аталған ұйымның діни білім беру саласындағы жұмысының басымды жақтарын анықтап, қоғамның заманауи сын-қатерлері мен сұраныстарын ескере отырып, бұл қызметті жетілдіру шараларын ұсынады.

**Түйін сөздер:** Қазақстан мешіттері, мешіттердің рөлі, діни ағарту жұмысы, ислам, ҚМДБ.



А. Шанбаева<sup>1\*</sup>, Ж. Кантарбаева<sup>1</sup>, Джон Махони<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, г. Алматы, Казахстан

<sup>2</sup> Канзасский государственный университет, г. Манхэттен, США

\*e-mail: shabaya123@mail.ru

### **Деятельность мечетей Казахстана в сфере религиозного образования**

В статье рассматривается деятельность мечетей Республики Казахстан в сфере религиозного образования, анализируется работа, проводимая в этом направлении. В статье рассмотрены основные этапы развития мечетей как центров религиозного образования, их вклад в формирование духовно-нравственных ценностей общества и поддержку культурного наследия. Сегодня Духовное управление мусульман Казахстана входит в состав крупного религиозного объединения, управляющего всеми мечетями страны. В нашей стране, особенно в сфере ислама, существуют проблемы деструктивных религиозных течений, радикализма, экстремизма, ксенофобии, сепаратизма, экстремизма, поэтому представляет интерес работа мечетей в стране с народом в целях предотвращения подобных проблем. Духовное управление мусульман Казахстана – крупная исламская религиозная организация, владеющая 2854 мечетями и 357 молитвенными залами в стране, а численность сотрудников во всех мечетях составляет 4728 человек. Какую работу он ведет в направлении религиозного образования, требует специального изучения. Потому что устранить ошибки в сфере религии можно только путем повышения религиозной грамотности и с каждым годом совершенствуя направленность религиозного образования. Авторы анализируют сферы услуг мечетей республики по направлению религиозного образования и вносят собственные предложения по совершенствованию этих услуг.

**Ключевые слова:** мечети Казахстана, роль мечетей, работа религиозного образования, ислам, ДУМК.

#### **Introduction**

From the first years of independence, Muslims of Kazakhstan turned to Islam as their ancestral religion. The people who renounced atheism felt the freedom of religious beliefs and began to show special sympathy for their traditional religion. The rate of construction of new mosques and religious schools increased year by year. The topic of mosques in Kazakhstan, which is based on scientific research, mainly refers to the post-Soviet period, although it is known that the construction of mosques and religious schools in the Kazakh steppe began with the arrival of Islam. It is natural to ask what kind of religious education the mosques of the republic are providing, and whether the results of such education are visible. For this reason, there is a need to analyze the religious educational activities of mosques in the country.

#### **Justification of the choice of articles and goals and objectives**

Even though Kazakhstan is accepted as a civil state, it is known that vast majority of the population confess Islamic faith. In this regard Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan thoroughly monitors this huge audience and corresponds religious clarification in several ways. As religious extremism, radicalism and terrorism in the territory

of the country has been occurred mainly since the Islamic factor, it is really important to analyze the work done by Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan, identify the areas of activity of the mosques and review their particular indicators. Up to now, it has been established that no works has been executed on systematic and integrated study of the mosque activities in Kazakhstan. For this reason, the main idea of the article is to held investigational works on religious and educational activity of the mosques in the territory of Kazakhstan, which is a part of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan. The main aim the study was to focus on each area of activity, identified by Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan, sum the work done, weigh its effectiveness and work out their own ways on how to improve in the future.

#### **Scientific research methodology**

The article the method of historical analysis is used for a deeper investigation of the mosques, and the content analyses method for differentiation of collected materials. The method of analysis and sorting of received data was also used. In addition, the theoretical concepts of native investigations have been studied, which consider problems that the mosques faced in the period of getting its independence, the annual report of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan from

different regions, annual reports of head of Muftiates, the concept of religious education development of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan till 2020, the innovative article done by the Supreme Mufti H. Taganuly, reports of Local informative and propaganda group and information posted on the official sites of the Muftiates.

### Main part

A number of scientific articles and works published in this field show that researchers are interested in the subject of mosques in Kazakhstan from various angles. In particular, Sadykova S.Sh. We consider the architectural models of the first mosques that were built with the arrival of Islam in the Kazakh steppe. For example, S. Shklyayeva, in her study, "Retrospective innovation in the interior of the mosques of Kazakhstan (1991-2015)", and the artist G. Eshkenov's creative experience. According to G. The visual analysis of Eshkenov allows us to determine the stylistic features of the artist's compositional choice. In beautifying the architecture of mosques with sacral elements, Islamic and Kazakh ornaments were used in calligraphy. The decor models in the prayer rooms are a clear example of the artistic approach of "Retrospective Innovation" in modern regionalism. In addition, the outline of the distribution of dome ornament patterns in historical and religious buildings is being reworked and includes the style of the artist and the syntax of Kazakh ornament (Shklyayeva, 2016: 37). Sadykova S.Sh. In the question of the main types of modern mosques in Kazakhstan, it is argued that in the post-independence period, many new religious buildings were built in Kazakhstan, and the study and analysis of their architecture allows to determine the main typological characteristics of these objects. They are: assignment, capacity, functional planning, architectural-spatial structure, constructive decision, location of the object in the city structure. The author says that one of the main signs of classification of buildings and constructions is their purpose, and according to this feature, modern mosques in Kazakhstan are divided into 6 main types: 1. Main city mosques (juma or cathedral); 2. Quarter mosques (masjid-juma); 3. Jamaat mosques (mosques of national Muslim communities); 4. Rural mosques; 5. On the outskirts of the city (musalla); 6. Mosques of Islamic cultural centers (Sadykova, 2024). Beisenova A.M., Camoylov paid close attention to the regional characteristics of Almaty mosques in the XIX – XX centuries. In their study, they found that the most productive period of mosque construction in

Kazakhstan was the second half of the XIX century, marked by the permanent annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia, during which the economy developed, trade and industry developed, and contributed to the revival of construction activities, in addition, the diversity of natural and climatic conditions of the vast territory of Kazakhstan and regional it is thought that the features of construction influenced the emergence of mosques with different architectural composition solutions (Beisenova, Samoilov, 2022: 60).

In his scientific article "Mosques of Astana: Strategies and Practices of Designing New Public Spaces", Kikimbaev M. draws attention to the use of an infrastructural approach that allows to determine the important aspects of the topography of mosques in the metropolis, the features of relations between state authorities, patrons, Muslim clergy and other interested parties. This contributes to their strengthening. directly affecting and developing mosques as an important public space. It is also predicted that the practice of opening museums of Islamic culture next to mosques in the last decade will contribute to changing the usual image of mosques and increasing their value as an important object of the infrastructure of cultural memory in the public mind (Kikimbaev, 2023: 63). K. A. Medeuova, M. J. Kikimbaev, in his study "Museumization of the mosque: Kazakh discourse of public spaces", based on statistical data from 1990-2021, as well as field data collected between December 2021 and March 2022, revised the role of the mosque in Kazakh society and its place in discourses in public space. He observed how the cultural memory goes beyond museums, how the museumization of Kazakh mosques and wider public space is progressing. The authors document the new trend of openness of the religious space in Kazakhstan, where mosques not only perform the usual religious rituals, but also become a new public space, a meeting place of the state, religious and cultural institutions. Expanding the functions of mosques, including cooperation aimed at using various local community representatives for broad social communication, spreading the narrative of religious values and cultural memory, was analyzed as individual cases (Medeuova, Kikimbaev, 2022: 149). "Compositional changes in the architecture of mosques of Kazakhstan in the 9th – 19th centuries." in the study, Kasymbekova M.B., Glaudinov B.A. determined the main changes in the compositional structures of the architecture of mosques in Kazakhstan during these centuries, and tried to identify certain features in some compositional priorities, using the example of individual monuments of re-

ligious architecture in the country (Kasymbekova, 2012: 50). T.J. Shahuov, M.M. Almenbaev, J.K. In his article “Methods of evacuation from mosques with standard fire safety requirements”, Makishev considered the conditions of worship that complicate the evacuation process. Research on religious objects, determined the time of evacuation, studied the demographic composition of the mosque community. Field monitoring of the flow of people in the mosque was conducted and defined safe evacuation criteria for various functional areas of the mosque. He established a connection between the area and the size of the functional contingent and proposed to standardize the width of emergency exits (Shahuov, Almenbaev, Makishev, 2019: 82). M.K. Bektenova, L.N. Toktarbekova, in the article “The role of modern women in the mosque space: the influence of Islamic feminism”, considered the role and place of women in the mosque space, gender segregation (separation), the situations in which Muslim women face various problems in mosques, and the formation of the Islamic identity of Muslim women. analyzed the influence of Islamic feminism (Bektenova, 2023: 163). “The rapid growth of the number of mosques in the last thirty years is not a phenomenon unique to Kazakhstan. This phenomenon fits well into the wider context of the global Islamic renaissance, the post-Soviet resuscitation of cultural, historical and religious memory and the practice of investment in prestigious capital” (Kikimbaev, Medeuova, 2021: 127). M. Zhuzey, N. Seytakhmetova, M. Bektenova, Sh. Zhandosova “Mosque in Post-Soviet Central Asia: sacred and spiritual contexts” In this case, you will need to know where the mixer is located and where you will find the role of the control system. Baylanysty maselelerdi karastyrgan (Zhuzey, Seytakhmetova, Bektenova, Zhandosova, 2020). If in 1990 the number of mosques in Kazakhstan was 46, it increased sharply in the years after independence. In 2020, the number of mosques was 2,689, and growing at this rate, their total number increased fifty-eight times over the last thirty years (table 1).

The number of mosques is not uniform in the regions. It can be seen that the most are in the Turkestan region, and the least are in Astana. (see Table 2).

The authors, who considered the construction of mosques in Kazakhstan in the years after independence, formulate and present the following typology of the main subjects in the construction of mosques: 1) projects within the framework of «mosque diplomacy»; 2) projects ordered by state bodies; 3) projects commissioned by oligarchs and political elites; 4) projects commissioned by na-

tional diasporas; 5) projects commissioned by rural settlements and interested communities. At present, those mentioned can be considered the main subjects of the construction of mosques in Kazakhstan, they are implementing various participation scenarios that contribute to further strengthening the status of mosques as important forms of public space (Kikimbaev, Medeuova, 2021: 138).

**Table 1** – Growth dynamics of Islamic associations in Kazakhstan (1990-2020) (Kikimbaev, Medeuova, 2021: 127)

Year	Number of Islamic associations	Year	Number of Islamic associations
1990	46	2007	2 334
1991	68	2008	2 337
1993	296	2009	2 634
1995	483	2010	2697
1996	679	2011	2756
1997	826	2012	2228
1999	1003	2015	2458
2001	1282	2016	2516
2003	1652	2017	2592
2005	1766	2018	2598
2006	1853	2020	2691

**Table 2** – Regional index of mosques of Kazakhstan (Kikimbaev, Medeuova, 2021: 127)

No	Regions and cities	Number of Islamic associations
Total		2691
1	Turkestan region	750
2	Almaty region	474
3	Zhambyl region	313
4	East Kazakhstan region	208
5	Kyzylorda region	174
6	Karaganda region	145
7	Shymkent city	106
8	Pavlodar region	94
9	Akmola region	90
10	Aktobe region	68
11	North Kazakhstan region	63
12	Almaty city	52
13	West Kazakhstan region	47
14	Mangistau region	33
15	Atyrau region	31
16	Kostanay region	30
17	Astana city	13

Now let's come to the work of mosques in Kazakhstan in the direction of religious education. It is known from the history of Islam that the main function of mosques is to provide religious education to the people. Today, the Religious Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan operates as a large religious association with 2,854 mosques, 357 prayer halls and its own system of religious education in the country. In 2022, the number of employees in all mosques was 4728. In 2021, supreme muft N. Taganuly approved seven directions of the mosque's work within the scope of his orientation report at the extended Toralka meeting of the Religious Board. They are information and public relations, propaganda, charity, education and personnel potential, ihsan teaching, religion and tradition, work with foreign religious trends. The chief imams of the mosques are obliged to report on these seven areas every month. However, in 2023, these seven directions were reorganized as five directions: "Religion and tradition", "Good society", "Charity and propaganda", "Religious education and education" and "Insurance against foreign religious movements". Begalinova K., Ashilova M., Begalinov A. In his study, he gave extensive information about the spread of religious extremism and the prevention of them (Begalinova, 2020: 125).

In 2014, Supreme Mufti Ye. Malgazhiuly declared that year as the year of "Religion and Tradition". In addition to the publication of a special book entitled "Religion and Tradition", the Mufti explained in his address the importance of preserving the harmony of religion and tradition, and stated that with the help of mosques, he would carry out the following activities in this direction: expanding the use of the mother tongue in society, religious revival, promotion of rites in harmony with Islam, teaching young people inculcating national values and traditional education, promoting the legacy of important people who praised faith in our history, teaching mosque visitors the place of customs in Islamic sharia, respecting traditions, educating the younger generation in patriotism. In line with the same direction, as part of the educational work of mosques, the mosque staff traditionally organizes the following events: "Ak Bata" blessing contest, Zharapazan chanting relay race, republican song mushaira on the theme "Religion and Tradition", intellectual competition among young women, national and national conducting sports tournaments in accordance with the Sunnah, etc.

In 2023, a special Department of Religion and Tradition was opened at the Muftiyat, and the Pub-

lic Relations, Youth Affairs and Women's Sectors are working together. In this project, the following measures were taken: a republican and regional forum of elders in each region, the first-ever blessing contest among the elderly, 3 meetings of the Council of Experts established by the Muftiyat, the conference "Doszhan Ishan – an outstanding religious figure and spiritual educator of Kazakhstan", "Traditional Islam in Kazakh spirituality" place" republican scientific and educational conference, more than 11,000 events were held throughout the year. In addition, 15,941 events in the direction of propaganda and literacy, public works and sports across the Republic, "DINTELLECT" educational contest on the topic of religion among young Algyrians occurred for the first time in all mosques. In addition, there were 10,986 events with the participation of 408,828 people including the women, "The status of women in the Kazakh steppe" on the theme of the republican women's forum, the opening of the women's club "Shugyla" (Territory of Turkestan), the 3rd republican competition among girls in reciting and reciting the Koran. Finally, the "Tradition Fest" exhibition was held for the first time in Almaty. Assoc. Professor Bagasharov K. in the article "The place of ritual in the Quran and hadiths", analyzing the place and types of ritual in Islamic sources, he expresses the following opinion: "Customs have a specific place in the Quran and Sunnah. However, the main requirement at this point is that when the verdicts are set according to the Islamic legal system, ritual practices that do not contradict the Shariah evidence and practices are taken into account. This is because, when giving a verdict in Islamic law, not taking into account the customs of the local people and the cases approved by the intellectuals creates difficulties for people, and it is contrary to the purpose of Islamic law" (Bagasharov, 2024). In 2019, within the framework of the "Religion and Tradition" project, the author of the books "Pearls of Kazakh Traditions", "Travel to the World of Traditions", cultural researcher, ethnographer-scientist, B. Ospan gave a lecture to the congregation on the topic of Kazakh national traditions.

One of function of mosques is to create a good society. The demands of any religion is consistent with peace and stability. In the Middle Ages, al-Farabi, a native of the Kazakh steppe, wrote about the benevolent city and expressed his dream about such a good city. Every national intellectual wanted his country to be happy and worked in that direction. For this reason, mosques should encourage the country to do good deeds, initiate good deeds, and

participate in the humanization of society with their activities. On this occasion, it is planned to organize a republican conference on the topic “Islam and good society”. Religious Department of Muslims of Kazakhstan has announced 2023 as the “Year of Islam and Good Society” for mosques in the country. Several volumes are being prepared in this period under the scientific project “Encyclopedia of Islam” including the work, “Muslim school in the Kazakh steppes in the footsteps of the ancestors”, and “Religion and Tradition.” The republican women’s forum on the topic, “Women’s status in the Kazakh steppe” was also organized this month. In 2023, sixty-two seminars were organized at the district and regional levels under the theme “A good society begins with changing yourself.”

According to N.Taganuly, the word “Ihsan” means sincerity. “Ihsan” means worshipping God with fear, sincerity and responsibility as you see him. The teaching of “Ihsan” educates a Muslim child to be sincere in every act and every act of worship. In fact, Allah Almighty knows every deed, word, intention, and even the thoughts of every person. There is no blessing in action without sincerity. Supreme Mufti N. Taganuly says that Khoja Akhmet Yasawi and his murids worked hard to form the doctrine of «Ikhshan». Yasawi combined Turkic traditions and Islam, thus foreseeing religious and cultural conflicts. Muftiyat’s book «Ihsan – the basis of spiritual education» contains such large chapters as «Ihsan to the Creator», «Personality», «Ihsan and society», and the concept of Ihsan is widely explained by Muslim scholars. 2021 is called the year of Ihsan, and mosques of the country are tasked with promoting this concept more widely. The following works have been done on this topic this year. Published books include: «Enemy No. 1» (about acquiring a language), «Hakim Abay and ihsan ilimi». 201 articles related to ihsan in different levels of mass media of the country, 317 infographics on social networks, 383 video sermons recorded and posted on networks, and 94 events (round table, seminar) were held in online and offline formats.

Since charity work is one of the priorities for mosques, a number of measures have been taken in this direction. Supreme Mufti N. Taganuly, in his speech entitled, «The teaching of kindness breeds virtue», mentioned the following among the charity works done by mosques in 2020: opening 30 bridges and 40 wells in 30 settlements with the help of sponsors, giving muftia grants to 30 graduates from disadvantaged families, planting 30 thousand

saplings, in general planting of 1,170,712 saplings of different types, mobilizing 301,566 people for these measures, and handing over the keys to 329 shelters to homeless people within the framework of the republican project «Country’s share in housing», etc. During the COVID pandemic, 18 ventilators, 891 oxygen devices, 20 anti-plague clothing, 255 monometers, 528 pulsometers, 60 thermometers, 136,701 face masks and medicines worth 32 million tenge were delivered to the appropriate places as part of the campaign «Give Hope to Life» during the pandemic. With the [www.qurban2020.kz](http://www.qurban2020.kz) project, 81,301 socially disadvantaged families distributed sacrificial meat. In the annual report of 2022, payment of the annual tuition fees of 48 students studying at Nur-Mubarak University with the «Religious Department of Muslims of Kazakhstan grant» campaign, 2,200 tons of food aid for 115,997 families with the «Taikazan» campaign, donations for 12,951 families with the «Hand to hand» project assisted. 6,490 orphans were helped by the project «If you see an orphan, don’t eat», and school supplies were distributed to 17,870 school children from poor families with the «Road to School» campaign. With the project «Together in Trouble» blankets were provided to the villages affected by the flood in the amount of more than 500,000 tenge, with the project «Urgent help to Kostanay» 54,006,111 tenge of funds and necessary items were given to the Kostanay region, which suffered from a catastrophic fire, with the project «Give Heat» to Ekibastuz thermal power station 29,148,400 tenge were spent on the accident at the heat transfer station, and the necessary tools for additional repair work were sent. In addition to the weekly Friday sermon, preaching activities in mosques are required to be conducted twice a day (after the Friday and Friday prayers) and special topics are set for it. It is the responsibility of the imam on duty that day to explain a verse from the Quran after the morning prayer, and to preach to the congregation on a topic determined by the Muftiyat for about fifteen minutes after the evening prayer. In addition, these sermons are videotaped and uploaded to social networks. In a three-volume book published under the name «Friday pulpit», domestic Islamic scholars and theologians have developed ready-made examples of sermons to be delivered in the mosque on Friday. Mosques are assigned topics from this book as annual Friday sermons (see Table 3). Holy days and nights in the calendar are also taken into account in the table.

**Table 3** – Topics of sermons delivered during Friday prayers in mosques of the Republic (fixed for 2020) (QMDB resmi saity, 2020)

**Friday topics and dates for 2020**

No	Topics	Friday days	Religious holidays
1.	Repentance is God's blessing	03.01.2020	
2.	Really willingness	10.01.2020	
3.	Extravagance damage	17.01.2020	
4.	Politeness is morality the beginning ( <i>"Seven spiritual "Pile" platform by</i> )	24.01.2020	
5.	A man with merit ( <i>"Seven spiritual "Pile" platform by</i> )	31.01.2020	
6.	Harmful from habits away let's be	07.02.2020	
7.	Mosque is faith nest	14.02.2020	
8.	Prayer is great worship	21.02.2020	
9.	To another gratitude say If you don't get it , tell God can't	28.02.2020	
10.	in Islam of a woman place	06.03.2020	
11.	To God said submission (Taslimiyat)	13.03.2020	
12.	Various nation and nation to be creation wisdom	20.03.2020	Migraj night (March 21/22)
13.	Wrong faith is from the road will stop	27.03.2020	
14.	Honest food	04/03/2020	Night of Baraat (April 8/9)
15.	Believer's the ideal is artistic character	10.04.2020	
16.	Islam is purity religion	17.04.2020	
17.	Ramadan is God's gift	24.04.2020	Fasting start (April 25)
18.	Pende for the fee to be careful	01.05.2020	
19.	Zakat in society place	08.05.2020	
20.	Dignity of the night property	15.05.2020	Dignity night (May 20/21)
21.	Muslim to Muslim liver	22.05.2020	Fasting say (May 24)
22.	To the dead respect for the living duty ( to the deceased reward touching actions)	29.05.2020	
23.	Honorable preservation – from faith ( <i>"Seven spiritual "Pile" platform by</i> )	05.06.2020	
24.	Let's see of non-acceptance the end	12.06.2020	
25.	To the hereafter faith	19.06.2020	
26.	human body of the heart place	26.06.2020	
27.	Answer unbroken donations	03.07.2020	
28.	Five duties one is Hajj	10.07.2020	
29.	Child education from the cradle	17.07.2020	
30.	Eid Al-Adha (sacrifice day) it is great holiday	24.07.2020	Arab Day (July 30)
31.	A relative fee	31.07.2020	Sacrifice say day 1
32.	Youth time is deposit	07.08.2020	
33.	Lust from temptation beware	14.08.2020	
34.	Honest profession	21.08.2020	
35.	Education is two of the world candles ( <i>"Seven spiritual "Pile" platform by</i> )	28.08.2020	Day of Ashura (August 29)
36.	Heaven belongs to God gift	04.09.2020	
37.	Teacher increases	11.09.2020	
38.	Of the country strength in unity ( <i>"Seven spiritual "Pile" platform by</i> )	18.09.2020	
39.	To the elder respect to the younger izet	25.09.2020	
40.	Charity and his types	02.10.2020	
41.	Worship and life Ihsan's place	09.10.2020	
42.	Interfaith peace	16.10.2020	

Table continuation

No	Topics	Friday days	Religious holidays
43.	Our Prophet's (peace be upon him) kindness	23.10.2020	Maulit (October 28/29)
44.	To the Prophet said love and healthy don't say reward	30.10.2020	
45.	Napil your worship advantage	06.11.2020	
46.	To religion firmness (istikama)	13.11.2020	
47.	With the congregation worship of doing reward	20.11.2020	
48.	To creation kindness show	27.11.2020	
49.	Quran study advantage	04.12.2020	
50.	Homeland love is from faith ( <i>"Seven spiritual "Pile" platform by</i> )	11.12.2020	
51.	Fair the end of the work is good ( <i>"Seven spiritual "Pile" platform by</i> )	18.12.2020	
52.	An orphan if you see without eating go	25.12.2020	

Until 2020, the Friday sermons, which were given in each mosque on a free topic, have been systematized from this year to be given on the same topic in all mosques. In 2023, 680,751 sermons were delivered in the country's mosques, and 17,516,605 people listened to them. The main topics included in the sermon in 2021 are: Islamic worship, family science, the history of prophets, the merits of holy prayers, hadith teachings, Ihsan teachings, creed, etc. In 2023, the Head of the Propaganda Department B. Berdenuly presented information about preaching and propaganda activities carried out in mosques throughout the republic, according to which, in 2023, 128,236 Friday sermons were delivered in mosques on 52 topics approved, and a total of 723,916 people were included in the sermon. 274,593 besin sermons, 277,922 money sermons were preached. In order to guide the mullahs who preach in the mosques, the Mufti has organized events of various formats at the republican level on the topics of «Artistic Preaching Etiquette», «Republican Field Seminar», «Illnesses of Society» and other topics. In 2022, 704 people were rehabilitated within the framework of religious rehabilitation in the direction of «Insurance from foreign religious movements». As part of the rehabilitation of adepts who have gone to destructive trends, and within the framework of informational activities, members of RANT (Republican information and interpretation group) held 645 meetings with the community, attended by 301,800 people, and 21,219 meetings were held with members of ZHANT (Local Information and Interpretation Team), involving 9,251,362 people. In addition, 60 video sermons were prepared with the participation of Muftiyat teachers and published on the Tik-Tok social network. Today, its total views have reached 2,540,844. The Republican information and inter-

pretation group was established in 2013. ZHANT is a Local Information and Interpretation Team. The goal is to provide them with correct religious information and to answer their questions during meetings with the people, to help find solutions in areas where religious problems are complicated, to involve qualified specialists in rehabilitation work, to contribute to the prevention of foreign religious movements, to glorify the Hanafi school, and to prevent various mistakes. In 2017, RANT members held 1,190 meetings in different regions of the country, attended by 258,416 people. In 2023, the «RANT and ZHANT platform» was adopted, which includes issues that should be taken into account during the outreach work to republican advocacy groups. The «Religious Information Center» is working in some mosques in the country. People can contact this center and get answers to their concerns. In contrast to to Call Centers (33-30-30) opened in 2020, people can come directly to these centers and meet mosque specialists. In 2023, 24 Kazakh-speaking preachers and 12 russian-speaking preachers worked in RANT. In order to be admitted to the RANT, it is mandatory to pass a special certification at the Central Office of the Religious Department of Muslims of Kazakhstan. In the first stage of the test, answering electronic exam questions, jurisprudence, sira, laws and legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, history, etc. passing an exam on subjects, and an oral exam is required in the second stage.

As one of the directions set for mosques is education, mosques are doing a number of works in this direction. In 2020-2021, 11,137 online lectures were given to mosque congregations at the level of republican and regional mosques. 15,678,238 people listened to these lectures. Lipina T.A., Shapoval Y.V. In the article entitled «Religious

education in Kazakhstan: the challenge of the pandemic of COVID-19”, he extensively analyzed the transition of religious education to the online format during the quarantine (Lipina, 2021: 352). The work of the direction of religious education and human resources can be said to be close to this direction.

The Head of the Department of Religious Education and Personnel Training S. Seytbekov gave the following report for 2022: “In the academic year 2021-2022, the total number of graduates who graduated from educational institutions of the Religious Board is 603. 220 of them graduated from the Nur-Mubarak Egyptian University of Islamic Culture, and 120 graduates who graduated from the said university this year entered madrasa-colleges. 217 graduates are employed. Among the rest, there are those who continued their education and went to work in other fields. In 2023, the total number of imams who graduated from the Institute of Islam is 158. The number of religiously literate mosque congregations is 18,035. Religious literacy courses related to mosques include “Memorizing the Koran” and “Learning to pray”. This year, the Koran memorization course was organized in 905 mosques and 16,721 people participated, while the prayer course included 17,267 people. The structure of the Islamic religious education system of Muftiyat is described in the Concept of Development of Religious Education of Muftiyat until 2020:

1. Courses of religious literacy and memorization of Quranic surahs;
2. Preparatory courses developed by entrants to religious educational institutions;
3. Charitable institutions conducting religious education;
4. Elders who teach professional recitation of Quranic surahs by heart training centers;
5. Madrasa-colleges providing technical and professional education;
6. A higher educational institution and post-higher educational institution providing religious education educational institutions;
7. Institute for improvement of education and qualification of imams.

Since 2010, the Muftiyat has opened seven centers for the purpose of training elderly people who can read the Qur’an competently. They are: “Qawamaddin al-Itqani al-Farabi al-Turkistani”, “Ikhlas”, “Mashhur Yusuf”, “Maral Ishan”, “as-Salam”, “Balabi Qari”, “Kordai” etc. serving with a horse. In addition, there is Khadisha, an all-girls nursing home. To train literate elderly people and bring them to the level where they can compete at the international level, to participate in national and international

level competitions, to teach prayers from the Qur’an to the congregation in mosques during Ramadan, to perform the function of a beautiful melodious call to prayer, to raise the dignity of the elderly people of Kazakhstan, to pass the elderly people through certain expertise. The main goals are to send them to mosques throughout the republic, improve their knowledge in the direction of complete memorization of the Holy Quran.

Competitions for memorizing and reciting the Koran have been held since 2000 under the organization of Religious Department of Muslims of Kazakhstan. These competitions, which have grown to the district, region, republic, and even international level, are traditionally organized. It is inter-madrasah and conducted separately among girls. In 2008, 82 elderly people selected from all regions took part in the contest held in the Central Mosque of Almaty for the third time. The competition was held at 4 levels: 5 paragraphs, 10 paragraphs, 30 paragraphs from the Quran. Supreme mufti the winners of the competition, which was started by A. Derbisaly and judged by special religious experts, had to recite 30 bribes. Ersin; 10 para M. S. Herd; 5 pairs of S. Akhmetov. E. Baigabylov on figurative reading. In 2020, the 1st Inter-Madrasah Republican Quran Competition was organized. 18 candidates from 9 madrasahs took part in the competition organized by “Astana” madrasa and competed in the categories “para 29-30” and “para 30”. According to the rules of the competition, the ability to memorize verses, reading style and the melodious voice of students who answered three additional questions were taken into account. Pupils who became the winners: “Para 29-30”: Grand prize – “Abu Hanifa Madrasah College”, A. Relic; 1st place – “Astana Madrasah College”, N. Nurdaulet; 2nd place – “Saryagash madrasa college”, M. Aydin; 3rd place – Hibatulla At-Tarazi madrasa college, Konyratbayev B. According to the title “para 30”: 1st place – “Astana madrasa college”, Kh. Nurbergen; 2nd place – “Abu Hanifa Madrasah College”, S. Joy; 3rd place – “Shymkent madrasa college”, A. Anartaev. The grand prize winner won a trip to the Umrah pilgrimage. The competition of reciting and reciting the Koran among girls was organized online on the Zoom platform in 2021 due to the pandemic, organized by the Nazik girls’ club. The teacher of “Iryskeldi Haji” mosque Z.A. Shamidullakovyna and teacher of “Aq meshit” mosque. Duisebekovna supervised and as a result A. Karsybayovna 1st place, B. Aitbaeva 2nd place, A. Bekmuratova and A. Zhunisovas won the 3rd place. All were presented with a “Letter of Appreciation” and given financial gifts. In 2016, for the first time,



the republican Koran competition among girls was organized, and the grand prize winner was Grand Mufti Yerzhan Haji Malgazhiuly A. Anarkul was presented with a certificate worth 450 thousand tenge. By the decision of the jury A. Ilespek was awarded the second place. The prize for the 2nd place is 370 thousand tenge. G. who deserved the 3rd place. Turganzhan received a certificate of 300 thousand tenge. In addition, all seniors who participated in the competition were given a financial prize. In 2023, on the eve of the Republic Day, the Religious Department of Muslims of Kazakhstan organized the Quran competition at the international level for the first time. Two old people from Kazakhstan took part in the competition: A.A., winner of the first prize of the 10th republican competition for memorizing and reciting the Holy Quran in Turkestan in the nomination “30 paras”. Zhaliev (Shymkent city) and the winner of the 11th national contest held in Kyzylorda in 2022 I. Myrzageldy. At the international event, a panel of judges was formed from experienced foreign seniors. The results of the competition are as follows: 1st place (\$20,000) – Ilyas Hajri (Kingdom of Morocco); 2nd place (\$ 15,000) – Turpal-Ali Sadykov (Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation); 3rd place (\$7,000) – Malek Abdullah Albadin (Libya); 3rd place (\$7,000) – Saghd Salim (People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria); IV place (\$ 5,000) – Abdurahman Faraj Hafiz Baragi (Arab Republic of Egypt); 5th place (\$3,000) – Muhammad Adib bin Ahmed Razani (Malaysia); A reward of 500 US dollars was also given to encourage other participants who took part in the competition. In 2021, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the republican contests for memorizing and reciting the Holy Quran, the works “History of Republican Quran Contests”, “I want to be old” (author M. Aitzhanovna) were published. The 12th competition of reciting the Qur’an at the republican level in Kazakhstan was organized in Aktau in 2023. In order to encourage young people to memorize and recite the Quran, Religious Department of Muslims of Kazakhstan is giving them a huge prize fund with the help of sponsors. In 2023, the total prize fund allocated for memorizing and recitation of the 12th Republican Quran amounted to 23,150,000.

According to Khoja, nowadays Muslim peoples in Central Asia read the Koran with Asim’s reading. Especially, the narration of Hafs, one of the two famous narrators narrated by Asimyn, is widely spread. Most of the books of the Quran that are being published by publishers are printed with this effort (Kurmanaliyeva, 2023: 129). The

first 32 students graduated from the “Ijaza” department of the “Husamuddin al-Syganaki” Islamic Institute in Almaty, which was opened as a national center that provides Ijizat (certification or permission) for the elderly. 14 of them from the capital received an ijaza certificate from Dr. M.H. Mahmud Muhammad according to the Hafs narration of Asym’s Qiraqat through Shatibiya, while 18 from Almaty received I. Sh. Al-Mursidi al-Azharidan received the Ijaza certificate through Shatibiya according to Hafs and Shugba narrations of Asim Qiragat.

Reading and explaining religious scientific books is one of the aims of spiritual education of mosques working in the republic. The aim is to increase the religious literacy of the visitors to the mosque by giving the popular books of well-known scientists as lectures to the congregation. “Akmeshit” mosque teacher A. In his article “Method and system of religious teaching in the mosque”, Kuanysht mentions the following conditions: literacy courses are held in all mosques, from secondary school students to the elderly. Religious lectures in the mosque are held in the direction of “Quran – Shariat” (Islamic law). According to a specially approved lesson schedule, lessons on the history of Islam, five duties, Arabic grammar, creed, sira, hadith, and commentary are held regularly. Lecturers on well-known books at the central mosque of Almaty city: E. Amir “Tahawi Creed” and “Ihiyaw Ulumuddin”, E. Shokai “Quran commentary”, B. Life of Prophet Aliuly “Sira”, S. Akhmetov “Hanafi jurisprudence”, E. Kokirekbaev based on the book “Riyadus-Salihin”. During the quarantine, these lectures were broadcast live online on the Azan.kz YouTube channel and Instagram page. In Aktobe, the lecturers at the “Nur Otash” mosque: N. Smagulov “Fiqh”, Sh. Umbetov “Aqida” (beliefs of Islam), chief imam S. According to the book “Safuatu al-tafasir” by Enshibayuly (author Sabuni). In addition, there are also types of lectures that are given to the congregation only in the month of Ramadan. For example, in 2022, online and offline lectures were held in the mosques of the city of Shymkent under the name “Ramadan Lectures” following the five and two-day prayers. Al-Azhar graduate N. Teachers led by Mamedaliyev B. Zarnuzhi’s “Teacher’s training”, A. He held lectures with Iskandari’s book “Tajul Arus”. In 2020, one-month lectures entitled “Let’s learn to pray” were organized in the mosques of Atyrau during Ramadan. These lectures, organized in response to the congregation’s questions about prayer, were held after the five-day prayer. According to S. Imangaliyev, the teacher of the central “Imangali” mosque

in Atyrau, these lectures cover all the mosques of the region, city, district and village. In 2020, during the quarantine, the mosques of the West Kazakhstan region conducted online lectures on the topics of “Ramadan values”, “Family education”, “Learning the Quran”. 100 viewers a day participated in online lectures on the topics “Issues of dispute”, “Religious organizations banned in our country”, “Teaching of Hadith” on @parasat\_k.b.bko and @aqsaidin Instagram social pages. Shymkent central mosque B. Shotabekov gave 30 jurisprudence lectures with the book “Nurul idoh wa najatul aruah”. “S. Lectures and teachers held every day of the week between

the months of September and December 2022 at the Gilmani mosque: Kh. Amankulov “The Creed of the People of the Sunnah”, R. Nakypbekuly “Etiquette is one third of Islam”, S. Kurbanuly “Teaching of Kindness and Piety”, S. Khamanuly “Mukhtasar al-Quduri” (Author Abulhasan Ahmed ibn Muhammad al-Quduri), A. Akbayev “Mirqat al-Mafatih” (Author Mulla al-Qari). In 2018, a number of lectures were held at the Nur Astana Mosque in Astana. The schedule of lectures is published in the form of a schedule on the website of the mosque and is also posted on the bulletin board of the mosque (see: table 4)

**Table 4** – Lecture schedule at Nur Astana Mosque (2018)

Date	Time	Lectures	Teachers	Contacts
Monday	16.00-17.00	Alphabets of the Holy Quran	Yerbol Mambetov	+7 (778)1207788
	16.00-17.00		Maksat Baizak	+7(702)9587979
	second prayer – third prayer	Aqida (Belief in Allah)	Ruslan Baizakov	+7(702)5299909
	19.00-21.00	Ilm Al-Hal (A concise manual of basic Islamic teachings)	Ilyas Otarov	+7(775)7207510
	third prayer -fourth prayer		Salman Khadirshayev	+7(776)5055554
Tuesday	19.00-21.00	Alphabets of the Holy Quran	Dauren Muslimov	+7(707)1211591
	time between fourth and fifths prayer	Aqida (Belief in Allah) Ilm Al-Hal (A concise manual of basic Islamic teachings)	Nariman Isenov	+7(775)5622044
Wednesday	third prayer – fourth prayer	Alphabets of the Holy Quran	Salman Khadirshayev	+7(776)5055554
	19.00-21.00	Aqida (Belief in Allah)	Ilyas Otarov	+7(775)7207510
	time between fourth and fifths prayer	Ilm Al-Hal (A concise manual of basic Islamic teachings)	Adilkhan Serikbay	+7(778)2121161
Thursday	16.00-17.00	Alphabets of the Holy Quran	Maksat Baizak	+7(702)9587979
	19.00-21.00	Aqida (Belief in Allah)	Dauren Muslimov	+7(707)1211591
	time between fourth and fifths prayer	Ilm Al-Hal (A concise manual of basic Islamic teachings)	Nariman Isenov	+7(775)5622044
Friday	16.00-17.00	Alphabets of the Holy Quran	Yerbol Mambetov	+7 (778)1207788
	third prayer – fourth prayer	Aqida (Belief in Allah)	Salman Khadirshayev	+7(776)5055554
	time between fourth and fifths prayer	Ilm Al-Hal (A concise manual of basic Islamic teachings)	Adilkhan Serikbay	+7(778)2121161
Saturday	time between fourth and fifths prayer	Alphabets of the Holy Quran	Ruslan Baizakov	+7(702)5299909
		Aqida (Belief in Allah)	Nursultan Mamedaliyev	+7(700)4880408
		Ilm Al-Hal (A concise manual of basic Islamic teachings)		
Sunday	time between fourth and fifths prayer	Alphabets of the Holy Quran	Nursultan Mamedaliyev	+7(700)4880408
		Aqida (Belief in Allah)		
		Ilm Al-Hal (A concise manual of basic Islamic teachings)		

It was announced that in 2023, centers for providing special religious courses will be opened near all regional mosques. Books such as «Ghibadat Islamiya» and «Sopy Aldiyar», which were read by Kazakh intellectuals earlier, are planned to be taught in those centers.

### Research results and discussion

As for the results, it can be said that the religious education provided by mosques across the republic have been clarified only in recent years. After N. Taganuly became the Supreme Mufti, the directions of operation of mosques were determined. There is still room for improvement in the issue of propaganda. This is because some preachers made serious mistakes while preaching to the congregation in the mosque, which caused the anger of the people. Such situations undermine people's faith in preachers. For this reason, we think that mosques should have documented norms regarding preaching. It is better for the council of scholars to jointly discuss the problem of preachers who have made more than one mistake in preaching and consider ways of reprimanding them. It would not have been an advantage even if the Council of Ethics had been opened in the Muftiyat. Famous authors and their books that are held in mosques also need to be organized and listed. At present, each mosque decides this on its own and conducts it within the limits of its capabilities. We are of the opinion that it would be better to organize the lists of books that can be used as

lectures in the mosque in the direction of Hanafi-Maturidi and distribute them to the mosques. Since the teaching of ihsan is a deep level in faith, we believe that it is still necessary to propagate the simple truths of faith to the people.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, we notice that the directions of activity of the mosques of Kazakhstan in the field of religious education were set at seven years, and then they were reduced to five. The mosques of the Republic are working extensively within five areas: “Religion and Tradition”, “Good Society”, “Charity and Propaganda”, “Religious Education and Education” and “Insurance from Foreign Religious Movements». These were established and approved in 2023, and are reported every month. It is clear that these directions are determined by the religious situation in Kazakhstan and the internal conditions of the country's Muslims. However, in the future, we would like to suggest that these directions should be supplemented with a dialogue that will unite Muslim communities in the country and increase mutual understanding with other faiths in accordance with state policy. In addition, it is necessary to promote more materials in mosque sermons in accordance with the original religious knowledge of the Kazakh people. Ways to increase the activity of mosques in social networks and provide religious education to the community that does not go to the mosque should also be considered.

### Әдебиеттер

- Бағашаров Қ. (2024) Құран мен хадистердегі ғұрыптың орны // <https://iph.kz/expert/-ran-men-khadisterdegi-gypty-orny/> (қаралған уақыты: 06.01.2024)
- Бегалинова К., Ашилова М., Бегалинов А. (2020) Религиозный экстремизм в Казахстане: Угроза распространения и пути противодействия // Центральная Азия и Кавказ, 21 (4). – 124-131.
- Бейсенова А.М., Самойлов К.И. Региональные особенности мечетей г. Алматы в 19 – 20 веках // <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/regionalnye-osobennosti-mechetey-g-almaty-v-19-20-vekah> (қаралған уақыты: 06.01.2024)
- Бектенова М.К., Токтарбекова Л.Н. (2023) Современная женщина в пространстве мечети: влияние исламского феминизма // Адам әлемі. – №3 (97). – 163-173.
- Жузей М., Сейтахметова Н., Бектенова М., Жандосова Ш. (2020). Мечеть в постсоветской Центральной Азии: сакральное-духовные контексты // Центральная Азия и Кавказ, 21 (3). – 94-108.
- Касымбекова М.Б., Глаудинов Б.А. (2012) Композиционные изменения в архитектуре мечетей Казахстана IX – XIX вв. // Вестник Казахской головной архитектурно-строительной академии. – Алматы. – 2 (44). – 50-54 .
- Кикымбаев М. (2023) Мечети Астаны: стратегии и практики конструирования новых общественных пространств // Вестник КазНУ, Серия философии, культурологии и политологии, том 83 № 1. – 63-80.
- Кикымбаев М., Медеуова К., Рамазанова А. (2021) Мечети в постсоветском Казахстане: дискурсы интерпретации и практики регулирования // Центральная Азия и Кавказ. Т. 22. № 4. – 126-139.
- ҚМДБ ресми сайты (2020) 2020 жылғы жұма тақырыптары мен күндері. <https://www.muftiyat.kz/kk/nasihat/?cid=zhuma-uagyzdarynyn-zhospary>
- Құрманалиева А., Бағашаров Қ., Кожа Т. (2023) Исламдағы алғашқы қарилық мектептердің қалыптасуы // Адам әлемі. – № 2 (96). – Б. 119-130

- Липина Т.А., Шаповал Ю.В. (2021) Религиозное образование в Казахстане: вызовы пандемии COVID-19 // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология. Т. 37. Вып. 2. – 352–368.
- Медеуова К.А., Кикимбаев М.Е. (2022) Музеефикация мечети: казахстанский дискурс публичных пространств // Вестник ЕНУ им. Л. Гумилева Серия Исторические науки. Философия. Религиоведение. – Т. 140. – №. 3. – 149-164.
- Садькова С.Ш. (2024) Основные сложившиеся типы современных мечетей Казахстана // <https://dspace.enu.kz/bitstream/handle/data/2290/SadykovaSSH-Osnovnyie-slozhivshiesiya-tipy.pdf?sequence=1> (каралған уақыты: 06.01.2024)
- Шахуов Т.Ж., Альменбаев М.М., Макишев Ж.К. (2019). Нормирование требований пожарной безопасности к эвакуационным путям из мечетей // Вестник Кокшетауского технического института КЧС МВД Республики Казахстан. № 3 (35). – 82-89.
- Шкляева С. (2016) Ретроспективное новаторство в интерьере мечетей Казахстана (1991–2015) // Central Asian Journal of Art Studies 1 (1). – 37.

### References

- Bagasharov K. (2024) Kuran men hadisterdegi guryptyn orny [The place of ritual in the Qur'an and hadiths] // <https://iph.kz/expert/-ran-men-khadisterdegi-rypty-orny/> (karalghan uakyty: 06.01.2024) (in kazakh)
- Begalinova, K., Ashilova, M., Begalinov, A. (2020) Religiozniy ekstremizm v Kazahstane: Ugroza rasprostraneniya I puti protivodeystviya [Religious extremism in Kazakhstan: The threat of spread and ways to counter it] // Centralnaya Aziya I Kavkaz, 21 (4). – 124-131. (in Russian)
- Beisenova A.M., Samoilov K.I. (2024) Regionalnye osobennosti mechetey g. Almaty v 19 – 20 vekah [Regional features of mosques in Almaty in the 19th – 20th centuries] // <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/regionalnye-osobennosti-mechetey-g-almaty-v-19-20-vekah> (karalghan uakyty: 06.01.2024). – 60-63. (in Russian)
- Bektenova M.K., Toktarbekova L.N. (2023) Sovremennaya zhenshina v prostranstve mecheti: vliyanie islamskogo feminizma [Modern woman in the mosque space: the influence of Islamic feminism] // Adam alemi. – No3 (97). – 163-173. (in Russian)
- Kasymbekova M.B., Glaudinov B.A. (2012) Kompozitsionnye izmeneniya v arkhitekture mechetey Kazahstana IX – IX vv. [Compositional changes in the architecture of mosques in Kazakhstan in the 9th – 19th centuries] // Vestnik Kazahskoj golovnoj arhitekturno-stroitelnoj akademii. – Almaty. – 2 (44). – 50-54. (in Russian)
- Kikimbaev M. (2023) Mecheti Astany: strategii i praktiki konstruirovaniya novykh obshestvennykh prostranstv [Astana mosques: strategies and practices for designing new public spaces]// Vestnik KazNU, Seriya filosofii, kulturologii i politologii, tom 83 № 1. – 63-80. (in Russian)
- Kikimbaev M., Medeuova K., Ramazanova A. (2021) Mecheti v postsovetском Kazahstane: diskursy interpretatsii i praktiki regulirovaniya [Mosques in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: interpretive discourses and regulatory practices]// Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz. T. 22. № 4. – 126-139. (in Russian)
- Kurmanaliyeva A., Bagasharov K., Kozha T. (2023) Islamdagy algashky karilyk mektepterdin kalyptasuy [Formation of the first schools of old age in Islam]// Adam alemi. – No 2 (96). – 119-130. (in kazakh)
- Lipina T.A., Shapoval Yu.V. (2021) Religioznoe obrazovanie v Kazahstane: vyzovy pandemii COVID-19 [Religious education in Kazakhstan: challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic]// Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Filosofiya i konfliktologiya. T. 37. Vyp. 2. – 352-368. (in Russian)
- Medeuova K.A., Kikimbaev M.E. (2022) Muzeifikatsiya mecheti: kazahstanskiy diskurs publicnykh prostranstv [Museumification of a mosque: Kazakhstani discourse of public spaces] // Vestnik ENU im. L. Gumileva Seriya Istoricheskie nauki. Filosofiya. Religiovedenie. – T. 140. – №. 3. – 149-164. (in Russian)
- QMDB resmi saity (2020) 2020 jylgy juma taqyryptary men kunderi [Friday topics and dates for 2020]. <https://www.muftyat.kz/kk/nasihat/?cid=zhuma-uagyzdarynyn-zhospary> (in kazakh)
- Sadykova S.Sh. (2024) Osnovnye slozhivshiesya tipy sovremennykh mechetey Kazahstana [The main established types of modern mosques in Kazakhstan]// [SadykovaSSH-Osnovnyie-slozhivshiesiya-tipy.pdf](https://dspace.enu.kz/bitstream/handle/data/2290/SadykovaSSH-Osnovnyie-slozhivshiesiya-tipy.pdf) (enu.kz) (karalghan uakyty: 06.01.2024) (in Russian)
- Shahuov T.Zh., Almenbaev M.M., Makishev Zh.K. (2019) Normirovanie trebovanij pozharnoj bezopasnosti k evakuatsionnym putyam iz mechetey [Standardization of fire safety requirements for evacuation routes from mosques] // Vestnik Kokshetauskogo tehničkog instituta KChS MVD Respubliki Kazahstan. № 3 (35), 2019. – S. 82-89. (in Russian)
- Shklyayeva S. (2016) Retrospektivnoe novatorstvo v interere mechetey Kazahstana (1991–2015) [Retrospective innovation in the interior of mosques in Kazakhstan (1991–2015)] // Central Asian Journal of Art Studies 1 (1) – 37-49. (in Russian)
- Zhuzev M., Seytahmetova N., Bektenova M., Zhandosova Sh.. (2020) Mechet v postsovetской Centralnoy Azii: sakralno-duhovniyee konteksti [Mosque in post-Soviet Central Asia: sacred and spiritual contexts] // Centralnaya Aziya I Kavkaz, 21 (3). – 94-108. (in Russian)

### Information about authors:

*Shanbayeva Arailym Nurdygulqyzy* – PhD student of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: [shabaya123@mail.ru](mailto:shabaya123@mail.ru)).

*Kantarbayeva Zhanna Orynbasarovna* – Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Senior Lecturer of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: [\\_kantarbavaz@mail.ru](mailto:_kantarbavaz@mail.ru)).

*John Mahoney* – Professor of the Department of Philosophy of Kansas State University (Manhattan, USA, e-mail: [jmahoney@ksu.edu](mailto:jmahoney@ksu.edu)).

**Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**

Шаңбаева Арайлым Нұрдығұлқызы – әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті дінтану және мәдениеттану кафедрасының PhD докторанты (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: shabaeva123@mail.ru).

Қаңтарбаева Жанна Орынбасарқызы – философия ғылымдарының кандидаты, әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ Ұлттық Университеті дінтану және мәдениеттану кафедрасының аға оқытушысы (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: \_kantarbaevaz@mail.ru).

Джон Махони – Канзас Мемлекеттік Университеті философия кафедрасының профессоры (Манхэттен қ., АҚШ, e-mail: jmahoney@ksu.edu).

Registered: March 18, 2024.

Accepted: June 11, 2024.

A. Shagyrbay<sup>1\*</sup> , B. Moldakhmet<sup>2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies of CS MSHE RK, Almaty, Kazakhstan

<sup>2</sup>Nur-Mubarak Egyptian University of Islamic Culture, Almaty, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: almasbek85@gmail.com

## FEATURES OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AFTER GAINING INDEPENDENCE (informational and religious studies aspects)

The process of establishing Middle East Muslim States has been a subject of exploration and research, considering various accusations and efforts to transform Muslim ideas and institutions. In the context of the study topic, a number of domestic and foreign orientalists, regional scientists, historians have studied historical and political factors, in this article it is planned to analyze the religious aspects of the topic by considering information and religious aspects. The study provides a comprehensive study of theoretical materials, as well as professional opinions and thoughts of public figures, religious scientists in this region. As a result of the article, the study examined the participation and role of religious movements and parties in Arab society (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.) in the system of public administration, taking into account social and religious factors in the process of gaining sovereignty of the Middle East countries. It is clear that the relations between the main directions in Islam, sunnis and shiites, contributed to the non-preservation of religious identity in the Middle East, and it was found that Muslim thinkers and public figures were looking for ideas for a common dialogue between the two directions. To date, in order to conduct a productive study of the main factors of conflicts in the region, it is obvious that a number of final data in the article indicate understanding the importance of the subject matter in order to comprehend its significance. The article, which provides practical assistance in the work of specialists studying the religious situation in this region, has practical significance, contains information about Understanding the significance of religious elements and their place in society is crucial for gaining insight into this topic of declaration of independence of such states as Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Egypt.

**Key words:** middle east, islam, party, arab, factors.

А. Шағырбай<sup>1\*</sup>, Б. Молдахмет<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>ҚР ҒЖБМ ҒК Философия, саясаттану және дінтану институты, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

<sup>2</sup>Нұр-Мұбарак Египет ислам мәдениеті университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: almasbek85@gmail.com

### Тәуелсіздік алғаннан кейінгі ислам елдеріндегі қоғамдық-саяси жағдайдың ерекшеліктері (ақпараттық-дінтану аспектілері)

Бұл мақалада Таяу Шығыс өңіріндегі жекелеген ислам елдерінің тәуелсіздігін алу кезеңдерімен байланысты мәселелер қарастырылады, сондай-ақ мұсылман мемлекеттерінің қалыптасуының тарихи-діни ерекшеліктерінің жекелеген аспектілері талданады. Зерттеудің тақырыбы аясында бірқатар отандық және шетелдік шығыстанушы, аймақтанушы, тарихшы ғалымдар тарихи, саяси факторларды зерттеген, осы мақалада ақпараттық-діни аспектілерді қарастыру арқылы тақырыптың діни қырларын талдау жоспарланған. Зерттеу барысында теоретикалық материалдар мен қатар, осы өңірдегі қоғам қайраткерлерінің, дінтанушы мамандардың кәсіби пікірлерін, ойларын ортаға жинақтау арқылы жан-жақты зерделеу қарастырылған. Мақаланы жазу нәтижесіндегі зерттеу Таяу шығыс елдерінің егемендікке қол жеткізу барысындағы қоғамдық, діни факторларды ескеру арқылы араб қоғамындағы діни қозғалыстар мен партиялардың (Хамас, Хезболла, Мұсылман бауырлары т.б.) мемлекеттік басқару жүйесіне қатысулары мен рөлдеріне зерттеу жүргізілген. Ислам дініндегі басты бағыттар арасындағы, сүнниттер мен шииттердің қарым-қатынастары Таяу шығыстағы діни бірегейліктің сақталмауына ықпал етуші болғаны анық, мұсылман ойшылдары мен қоғам қайраткерлері екі бағыттың ортақ диалог құру идеяларын іздегені анықталды. Бүгінгі таңда, Таяу шығыстағы жанжалдардың басты факторларына нәтижелі зерттеу жүргізу үшін мақаладағы бірқатар қорытынды мәліметтер тақырыптың өзектілігін көрсетіп отырғаны анық. Аталған өңірдегі діни ахуалды зерттеуші мамандардың жұмыстарына

іс-жүзінде көмек беретін мақала тәжірибелік мәнге ие, Ливан, Иран, Сирия, Мысыр сияқты мемлекеттердің тәуелсіздік жариялаудағы діни факторлардың орны мен рөлдері туралы ақпарат қамтылған.

**Түйін сөздер:** таяу шығыс, ислам, партия, араб, факторлар.

А. Шағырбай<sup>1\*</sup>, Б. Молдахмет<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Институт философии, политологии и религиоведения КН МНВО РК, г. Алматы, Казахстан

<sup>2</sup>Египетский университет исламской культуры Нур-Мубарак, г. Алматы, Казахстан

\*e-mail: almasbek85@gmail.com

### **Особенности религиозно-политической ситуации в исламских странах после получения независимости (информационно-религиоведческие аспекты)**

В данной статье рассматривается проблематика, связанная с периодами обретения независимости отдельных исламских стран Ближневосточного региона, а также анализируются отдельные аспекты историко-религиозных особенностей становления мусульманских государств. В рамках темы исследования ряд отечественных и зарубежных востоковедов, регионоведов, историков изучали исторические, политические факторы, в данной статье планируется проанализировать религиозные аспекты путем рассмотрения информационно-религиоведческих особенностей данного вопроса. В ходе исследования предусматривается всестороннее изучение теоретического материала, а также профессиональных мнений, размышлений общественных деятелей, специалистов-религиоведов данного региона. В результате исследования в статье раскрыты формы участия и роли религиозных движений и партий в арабских странах (Хамас, Хезболла, Братья-мусульмане и др.) в систему государственного управления путем учета общественных, религиозных факторов в процессе достижения суверенитета странами указанного региона. Очевидно, что отношения между основными направлениями в исламе, суннитами и шиитами способствовали несоблюдению религиозной идентичности на Ближнем Востоке, мусульманские мыслители и общественные деятели искали идеи для создания общего диалога между двумя направлениями исламской религии. На сегодняшний день, для проведения продуктивного исследования основных факторов конфликтов на Ближнем Востоке, ряд итоговых данных в статье свидетельствует об актуальности темы. Материалы отраженные в данной статье имеют практическую значимость в работе специалистов-исследователей по регулированию религиозной ситуации в данном регионе, также содержит информацию о религиозных факторах провозглашения независимости таких государств, как Ливан, Иран, Сирия, Египет.

**Ключевые слова:** Ближний Восток, ислам, партия, араб, факторы.

#### **Introduction**

It is widely known that numerous historical events in the Middle East have deep connections to religious aspects and prevailing state ideologies. The nations within the Middle Eastern sphere were significantly influenced by the Ottoman Empire, with many public and governmental structures shaped by Sharia principles and the cultural traits of the region's inhabitants. Given the strategic, geographical, ideological, and resource significance of the area, Western world sought to prioritize their involvement in this region.

After collapse of the Ottoman Empire, several European nations pursued strategies to establish control over Islamic territories in the East. Geopolitical and economic advantages served as primary motivations for the occupation of neighboring countries in the eastern region. According to historical and socio-economic theories regarding the development of Islamic nations, the

refusal to remain under colonial dominance by Western powers, coupled with the aspiration for sovereignty, proved to be significant and decisive factors in achieving independence for these states. The article discusses the analysis of the influence and influence of religious movements and organizations in Islamic States on political processes in accordance with historical and religious aspects.

#### **Justification of the choice of articles and goals and objectives**

It is obvious that today in a number of different parts of the globe the socio-political, military and geopolitical situation in the Middle East is being paid attention. In this regard, during the development of the article, a study of socio-political and religious aspects of the time of the proclamation of the sovereignty of the Arab states was carried out in connection with the peculiarities of the state of religious affairs in this region. In addition, the research

article carried out information and religious analysis related to historical information, as well as social and religious situations.

### **Scientific research methodology**

After gaining independence, many Islamic countries have experienced complex religious-political situations that require a methodological approach to understand and analyze. This research aims to examine the religious-political situation in Islamic countries after gaining independence. Understanding the religious-political situation in Islamic countries after gaining independence requires delving into the historical, religious, and social intricacies that have shaped the landscape of these nations. It is essential to consider how the colonial legacy, the emergence of new political structures, and religious ideologies have influenced the power dynamics within these countries. Furthermore, a comprehensive analysis should also take into account the diverse interpretations of Islamic principles and their impact on political decision-making. By investigating the varying perspectives of religious leaders, political elites, and the general populace, a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between religion and politics can be achieved. By adopting a methodological approach that considers these multifaceted factors, a more comprehensive understanding of the religious-political situation in Islamic countries after gaining independence can be attained. Such in-depth analysis is crucial for informing effective policies and interventions aimed at fostering stability and inclusivity within these diverse and complex societies.

To conduct a comprehensive analysis of the religious-political situation in Islamic countries after gaining independence, researchers can employ various exact methods. One method is a comparative analysis of different Islamic countries to identify common patterns and unique developments in their religious-political dynamics. This may involve conducting case studies of specific countries and examining their historical trajectories, political structures, and religious influences. Another method involves utilizing content analysis of political speeches, religious texts, and media representations to uncover the recurring themes and rhetoric that shape the religious-political discourse in Islamic countries. This approach provided valuable research insights into the way religious and political narratives interweave and influence public opinion and policy decisions.

The use of historical and archival research to trace the evolution of religious and political ideologies in Islamic countries provided a deeper understanding of the factors that have contributed to the current religious-political situation. These exact methods have contributed to a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the religious-political situation in Islamic countries, enabling researchers to identify key factors driving the dynamics and informing effective policies and interventions.

### **Main part**

#### *The interplay of religion and politics in Middle East*

The novelty of this study lies in its comprehensive analysis of the influence of religious movements on social and political situations in the Middle East. Through an interdisciplinary approach, this research aims to uncover the complex dynamics and interactions between religious groups and the broader societal and political landscape in the region. By delving into the historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors, this study seeks to shed light on the unique ways in which religious movements have shaped and continue to impact the Middle East. Moreover, by examining the contemporary relevance and implications of these movements, this research aims to offer fresh insights and contribute to the ongoing discourse on religion and society in the Middle East.

To what extent have religious movements in the Middle East challenged or reinforced existing power structures and social hierarchies? How have religious movements in the Middle East reshaped the relationship between the state and religion? In what ways have religious movements in the Middle East contributed to or detracted from social cohesion and inter-religious dialogue?

Such statements of problematic issues in religious-political dynamics in Middle East requires deep analysis of wide range of materials.

It's important to note that the relationship between religion and politics in the Middle East is complex and multifaceted. While some movements advocate for a more prominent role of religion in public life, others focus on promoting social justice, human rights, and democratic reforms within an Islamic framework. Leila Austin explores this complexity by examining the role of Muslim youth in both Islamic activism and democratic reform movements (Austin, 2011).

The Middle East has seen a surge in religious movements that have significantly impacted



the social and political landscape. One notable example is the rise of *political Islam*, which gained momentum in the latter half of the 20-th century. This movement seeks to establish Islamic principles and laws as the foundation of political and social life (Seif, 2009).

Religious movements in the Middle East have had a significant impact on social and political situations in the region. These movements have not only shaped the religious landscape of the Middle East but have also played a pivotal role in influencing the social and political dynamics of the region. The rise of religious movements has often been met with both enthusiasm and apprehension, as they bring about changes in the traditional power structures and influence the way people perceive and participate in politics.

The Middle East has seen the emergence of movements advocating for a wide range of ideologies, from conservative to progressive, and their impact has been profound. These movements have mobilized masses, challenged existing power structures, and influenced public policies and governance.

Furthermore, the influence of religious movements has extended beyond the political realm, permeating into various aspects of society such as education, family life, and cultural norms. Their impact on social cohesion, gender roles, and ethnic relations has been particularly significant, shaping the everyday lives of people in the region.

Understanding the intricate relationship between religious movements and the social and political landscape of the Middle East is crucial in comprehending the region's complexities and the challenges it faces.

Religious celebrations and festivals also contribute to the social and cultural identity of the people in the Middle East. For instance, the legalization of religious festivals such as Kurban ait Muslim festivals and the celebration of Ramazan and Christmas in certain countries have an impact on cultural cohesion and the expression of religious identity. The intertwining of religious movements with social and political situations in the Middle East can also be observed in the realm of education. Many of these movements have fostered the establishment of religious educational institutions, shaping the intellectual and ideological landscape of the region. These institutions have often served as platforms for the dissemination of religious ideologies, influencing not only the educational curricula but also the future perspectives of the younger generations.

Moreover, the impact of religious movements on ethnic relations has been multifaceted. While some movements have sought to uphold ethnic solidarity and identity, others have contributed to tensions and conflicts, especially in regions with diverse ethnic compositions. Understanding these dynamics is essential for comprehending the complexities of ethnic relations in the Middle East. The impact of religious movements in the Middle East cannot be overstated. These movements have not only influenced the social and political fabric of the region, but they have also permeated various aspects of daily life, including art, literature, and even entertainment.

In terms of entertainment, religious movements have influenced the types of media and content that are deemed acceptable within the societal framework. This has led to the promotion of values and norms that align with the ideologies of these movements, thereby shaping the cultural landscape. Furthermore, the impact of religious movements on social cohesion and community dynamics cannot be overlooked. These movements often serve as focal points for community engagement, providing not only spiritual guidance but also a sense of belonging and identity for their adherents. They organize community events and initiatives that foster a strong sense of unity among their followers, shaping the social fabric of the region.

The influence of religious movements also extends to the legal and judicial systems in the Middle East. In some cases, these movements have advocated for the implementation of religious laws and regulations, impacting the legal frameworks of the countries in the region. This influence has not only shaped the legislative landscape but has also impacted the enforcement and interpretation of laws, further entwining religious principles with the governance of the region.

In conclusion, the impact of religious movements in the Middle East goes beyond the realms of politics and social dynamics. It has permeated various aspects of life, from art and literature to community engagement and legal systems, shaping the region in multifaceted ways. Understanding the depth of this influence is crucial for grasping the complexities of the Middle East's cultural, social, and political landscape.

#### *The analysis of the socio-political landscape in certain regions of the Middle East*

Historical reviews reveal that in the 20th century, Arab countries were subject to colonial control first by the Ottoman Empire and later by England, France,

Italy, and Spain. This resulted in a wide range of colonial policies in the Arab East, sparking different national liberation movements and forms of political and state development following independence. As a result, countries like Algeria, Libya, and Aden were under direct colonial rule, while Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain, and Kuwait were designated as protectorates. Sudan had a unique status under condominium, and Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Palestine were placed under a mandate system. Although Egypt and Iraq had formal independence, they were still bound by military and political treaties with Great Britain. The only countries that were not subjected to external colonial control were Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The late XIX century and the first half of the XX century significant and profound changes on a global scale can be seen as well as in the Muslim Eastern world, including in the Kazakh steppes. In this era, there was a movement of supporters in Muslim countries, which suffered a decline in all aspects of life and fell into a state of dependence on the power of outside powers, which brought forward the ideas of updating Islam, adapting it to changes in society. This movement under the influence of modernization is also called reformist movements, however, when it comes to the canons of religion, such a name contradicts its main dogmas, since there can be no reform in religion. This name, which was often given from the point of perspective of Western Orientalist orientation, was later absorbed and established in both worldview literature and methodological literature. In the same way, It is important to mention that pan-Islamism is also used in relation to these movements. This trend and movement, which covered Egypt and Pakistan, the Ottoman and Russian empires.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the national liberation movement led to most Arab countries becoming active players in regional politics. Egypt (formally independent since 1922, but effectively so after the anti-monarchist revolution on July 23, 1952), Libya (1951), Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan (1956), Yemen (following the revolution on September 26, 1962, though nominally independent since 1919), Iraq (after the July 1958 revolution, but officially independent since 1932), Mauritania and Somalia (1960), Kuwait (1961), and Algeria (1962) all embarked on paths of independent development. The Egyptian revolution's approach and tactics, which aimed to convert formal independence into tangible autonomy, served as a blueprint for revolutions in other nations (Beloglazov, 2013: 242).

The Arab world, known from history, forms the ethnic basis of the Middle East. As of 2016, the Arab world is about 350 million people, with a gross domestic product equal to five trillion US dollars and about 70 percent of the Earth's hydrocarbon wealth (Ostanin, 2022). The political regimes of the Arab countries currently imply the aggravation of state structures, political parties, organizations and informal movements of a socio-political nature, which can be considered as modern forms of political life of states in the Arab East as a whole (Kurpebaeva, 2018). Arab countries have experienced major population changes (Ganiev, 2014: 2-3). About 30 percent of the population is young people aged 20-35, this figure indicates a high number of young people (Dzhemal', 2004).

#### *Some aspects of research on Islamic states*

As Hala Mustafa, an Egyptian doctor of sciences, observes, the phenomenon of political Islam, also known as the movement for Islamic political renewal, encompasses various socio-political and intellectual dimensions that necessitate identification, research, and analysis. This movement originated from the actions of groups that emerged in Egypt in the late 1920s. Initially spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood, it later saw the addition of other groups such as al-Jihad and the Islamic Group, which appeared in the late 1960s, along with other smaller dissident and independent organizations.

In his review, Dr. Hala, Mustafa provides various insights into key aspects that enhance the comprehension of this intricate phenomenon. These insights encompass:

- The social foundations of the contemporary Islamic political movement, particularly drawing from the Egyptian experience;
- The impact of the Iranian model on the movement's ideology;
- The stance of Islamic political groups regarding democracy in the Muslim world.

It is widely recognized that the middle class significantly shaped modern Egyptian history, establishing various intellectual trends, organizations, parties, and political movements—ranging from the most liberal to the far-left, including movements of “anger,” “political refusal,” and “violence.” For many years, they dominated Egyptian life.

When analyzing the political history of the Egyptian middle class, several key points must be noted. Primarily, the middle class has long experienced instability due to continuous social movements. Their main concerns included modern

education, professional growth, and improving living standards. The stability of the middle class was directly related to the legality of social struggle methods: the more legal the methods, the greater the stability and influence on socio-political life. Conversely, less legal methods led to inhibited social movement and increased feelings of discontent and depression, sometimes resulting in resistance movements, uprisings, and even outright violence and terror. This behavior is typical of all radical Islamic groups, regardless of their organizational structure.

Despite the challenges and crises, the middle class remains the main pillar of stability. For instance, in the late 60s, after the military defeat of 1967, a powerful movement emerged from the middle class, rebelling against the existing political system. The middle class served as the social base for populist movements like Nasserism, Ba'athism, and other Arab nationalist movements of the 50s and 60s. In the 70s, middle-class representatives led Islamic movements using various methods (informational, ideological, and organizational) to influence society and power structures (Şubaev, 2014: 98-99).

An example of religious movements in Egypt is taqfirism, an ultraradical trend that broke away from the Egyptian party "Muslim Brotherhood" ("Ihuanul-muslimun") and received the name "Al-Takfiru Al-Hijra" ("accusations of irreligion and moving to another side to preserve their religion"). This current was founded by Mustafa Shukri, who was guided by the idea of the forcible seizure of power by the radical ideologist said Qutb, who was executed by the Egyptian authorities in 1966. This ideology, which is seen as the initial stage of extremist seduction of people, was guided by all terrorist organizations that emerged after it, starting with the terrorist organization "Al-Jihad" of Abdassalyam Faraj, who carried out the murder of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Abdassalyam Faraj further developed the theory of taqfir, combining it with the Salafi creed. In particular, taqfirs pay special attention to the practice of jihad, developed according to the Afghan model, in which the leader of state and civil servants, military and law enforcement officials are sentenced to "taqfir" (accusation of irreligion) for the declaration of jihad. That is, all employees of the above-mentioned state structures are accused of "irreligious" and their power is recognized as illegal in terms of reasoning on the basis of Muslim law on the basis of arrogant ideas. In addition, the taqfirs accused the secular state and its leaders of becoming not objects of administrative subordination for

people, but rather objects of religious worship, declaring them "taguts" – "idols". This viewpoint holds a pivotal position within the ideological frameworks of the taqfirs, serving as the cornerstone for psychologically influencing the religious mindset of individual Muslims. (Zhumaly, 2016: 104-105).

#### *Summary of Iran's Political Model*

During the 1970s, there was a notable rise in militant Islamist movements across many Muslim-majority countries. This trend reached its peak with the Iranian Revolution in February 1979, which saw the overthrow of the secular Shah regime and the establishment of an Islamic Republic guided by Ayatollah Khomeini's teachings. These events prompted a significant reevaluation of Islam's role: what was once viewed as a conservative and declining force against modernization became a focal point of global attention, with both aspirations and concerns. The Islamist movement, previously underestimated, was now seen as a revolutionary force with ambiguous outlines but perceived as radical and anti-Western (Jünis, 2010: 65).

Scholars focusing on the Middle East have proposed various interpretations of the Islamic revival and autonomy. The term "Islamic awakening" encompasses a wide spectrum of religious ideals and historical epochs within Muslim civilization. Presently, it denotes the politicization of Islam and the infusion of Islamic principles into politics, spurred by the setbacks experienced during the efforts to establish Western-style secular nation-states in the Eastern regions during the 1970s (Lapidus, 2002: 521-523). Within the global political landscape, the genesis of the "Islamic awakening" can be traced back to 1979: the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which elevated religion to a pivotal role" (Munavvarov, Shnajder-Deters, 2002: 10).

Based on research findings, it appears evident that the "Islamic awakening" should be perceived as a developing phenomenon that not only aligns with the broader concept of the "religious revival" but also significantly shapes its essence. Within this ongoing progression, marked by historical shifts, three distinct stages become apparent: firstly, during the 1970s and 1980s, the rise of the Islamic influence in global politics via regional developments in the Middle East; secondly, spanning from 1990 to 2000, the surge of Islamist extremism alongside heightened concerns over international terrorism; and finally, from 2010 to 2020, the emergence of "Islamism 2.0" coupled with active involvement of Islamists in the "color revolutions" (Baitenova, Zhorabek, 2023: 8-9). Simultaneously, it is important to emphasize

that all these stages continue to influence the socio-political and religious aspects of the studied region.

#### *Monarchical forms of Arab countries*

According to research conducted by Russian scholars, the development of the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East during the 20th and early 21st centuries involved more than just the establishment of new sovereign states. It also encompassed shifts in governmental structures. While many states in this region already had established governance systems upon gaining independence, there were several instances where this was not the case. For instance, some monarchies were replaced by republics following revolutions (Egypt – 1953, Iraq – 1958, Iran – 1979).

Generally, excluding Lebanon, the Arab republics are marked by the presence of enduring authoritarian single-party systems led by influential and charismatic figures who often consolidate the roles of both state and party leader. Notably, figures like Saddam Hussein in Iraq (1979 – 2003) and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt (1981 – 2011) exemplify this trend. Syria stands out as a quintessential “monarchical republic,” where Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father Hafez al-Assad in 2000 after his four-decade reign. In the realm of monarchies, a distinct regional characteristic emerges wherein the entire ruling family or clan plays a significant role rather than just the monarch. In certain Arab monarchies, these ruling families or affiliated clans have maintained authority for extensive periods, spanning even centuries, as seen in Bahrain since 1782 and Qatar. (Pochta, 2008: 69).

#### *Possible causes of protest movements in Arab countries*

The evolution of socio-political awareness in the Arab nations of the Middle East during the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century is influenced by several interrelated factors. Firstly, the concept of solidarity within the Arab and Islamic communities, coupled with a long history of resistance against the Christian world, including celebrated victories over the Crusaders and opposition to European colonial expansion, has deeply entrenched itself in the collective Arab psyche. Secondly, the onset of Westernization and modernization since the nineteenth century has exerted significant influence on diverse social strata and the overall fabric of Arab society. Each Arab state, with its unique historical trajectory, ethnic and religious makeup, is characterized by distinct national customs and traditions. Moreover, the fundamental elements of Arab identity,

encompassing shared beliefs, linguistic unity, territorial ties, and common ancestry, further contribute to shaping their worldview and behavior and certain general principles are formed that are associated with the historical fate. Thus, majority of the Arabic people are interested in the globalization processes and political changes imposed by the West (Sapronova, 2013: 239).

### **Results and discussion**

Most governments across the region have acknowledged the significance of political Islam and are endeavoring to integrate its moderate faction into the current state framework, particularly within the social and intellectual domains, while staunchly opposing any Islamist efforts to influence political decisions.

Presently, numerous regimes in the Arab-Muslim nations of the Middle East find themselves in a precarious position. On one hand, they extend support to movements like Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Islamic resistance groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet they frequently clamp down severely on Islamic opposition, even of a moderate nature, within their own borders.

A pivotal factor shaping the contemporary political landscape of Arab countries is the distinct role of the state, which remains the primary entity defining the objectives and trajectories of political and economic evolution in society. It's worth noting that none of the Arab nations can be deemed as a homogeneous political entity, given the presence of national, ethnic, and religious diversities.

Moreover, historical relations play a crucial role in shaping the region's modern political dynamics. This enables various political factions, adept at leveraging ethnic and religious factors, to sway the sentiments of followers or representatives of specific faiths or ethnicities, thereby engendering complex and entrenched political scenarios (Sapronova, 2015: 9).

### **Conclusion**

In S. Huntington's renowned book “The Clash of Civilizations”, in chapter “Islamic Renaissance,” expresses: “A huge number of Muslims refer to Islam as the source of identity, meaning, legitimacy, development, power and hope, which was expressed by the slogan “Islam is the solution.” The Islamic Renaissance in its scope and depth is the latest a phase in the adaptation of Islamic civilization to the West, an attempt to find a “solution” not in Western ideologies, but in Islam” (Hantington, 2003: 162).

According to A.V. Beloglazov, a researcher at Kazan University, within the broader context of the Islamic renaissance, Islam is exerting a growing and more active influence on global political dynamics. It's notable that the term "desecularization," coined by American theologian George Weigel to denote the increasing role of religion and religious institutions in society and politics, is predominantly applied in reference to the Islamic world.

Presently, Islam is actively shaping international relations, particularly evident in the responses of Muslim nations to the West's political and cultural expansion. The Islamic world addresses political, economic, social, theological, and cultural challenges not only through interstate diplomacy but also increasingly through Islamic organizations, which are assuming a significant role in contemporary international politics. Surprisingly, Western politics has also contributed to the heightened influence of Islam, Muslim nations, and Islamic organizations in global political affairs. Notably, Muslim countries have become more engaged in addressing global issues, exemplified by the invitation of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Indonesia—three Muslim-majority nations—to the G20 summit to address matters related to the global financial crisis (Kurpebaeva, 2018: 97-98).

The Islamic principle in the Middle East by taking as a basis as a leader several parties were formed. There in the ranks: "Hamas", "Hezbollah", "Fatah", "Brothers Muslims". Lebanon serving party Hezbollah (Allah the party). Today, this party has been talked about when the United Lebanese Shiite organization describes. Hezbollah party ideas of Iran in the middle of the XX-th century. I am in Iraq among the Shiites is the result of a set of views you can judge. The main party although political power is concentrated in the region Strengthened in Iran. Hezbollah movement Khomeini went under the name Ayatollah, 1979 in from the victory of the Islamic Revolution later settled in the region (Jonah, 2010: 1-2).

Democratic changes in Muslim countries cause considerable debate and disagreement within their traditional communities. As a result, Islamic political factions are gaining traction, promoting a fresh mindset marked by values like tolerance, inclusivity, and diversity. Islamic discourse, drawn from historical interactions between various movements and organizations within the Islamic world, often emphasizes religious Unitarianism as a cornerstone of political dominance.

Islamic countries exhibit diverse social and political layers shaped by centuries-old social relations and varying levels of religious values

and beliefs. In the contemporary world, Islamic countries embody a range of governmental forms, value ideals, and spiritual and cultural paradigms within their social structures. An examination of fundamental approaches in the socio-political milieu yields several historical trends:

- Islamic movements aspire to establish state-level governance fully aligned with religious canons.
- When legal and political avenues for openly propagating their ideology are lacking, Islamic movements may resort to clandestine activities.
- Political actions and participation in elections to governmental bodies serve as avenues for Islamic movements to advance their candidates and implement their programs in pursuit of predetermined political objectives.

Including such political parties and movements as "Hamas," "Hezbollah," "Fatah," and the "Muslim Brotherhood," which have gained significant recognition across Arab nations and exert influence on their geopolitical landscape and domestic affairs. It is also common to assume that the Centers and governing bodies of these parties are coordinated from abroad. In this aspect, it's crucial to consider the reality that all religious movements of the Arab states and the Middle East are not just organizations aimed at creating a theocratic state system, but movements that implement the geopolitical tasks of external foreign centers.

It is firmly believed that the Arab Caliphate represented the earliest example of a globalist liberal society in human history. This was founded on the idea of uniform laws applicable to all inhabitants across its territories within the Islamic world. Consequently, the contemporary West is viewed as the political successor to the caliphate, serving as the initial model for modernity (Kepel, 2004: 58).

Russian scholar V. Naumkin delineates three primary perspectives on the role of Islam in contemporary global politics:

1. The Islamic world is perceived as a unified collective entity, encompassing Muslim nations, international Islamic organizations, national Muslim groups, and Muslim communities. The West is commonly portrayed as the antithesis to the Islamic world. However, this view overlooks the existence of Muslim communities within the West.
2. The aforementioned states and transnational entities can function as independent actors, occasionally aligning against the West in specific circumstances.
3. Islam is regarded as a global actor within a civilizational framework. In this context, the significance of Islam transcends state or non-state institutions, as their actions are primarily driven by

goals and objectives distinct from religious ones (Sadiki, 2018: 30; Totten, 2012: 23; Zhumaly, 2016: 7).

Kazakh researchers believe that Initially, the term “islamism” (“Islamism”), which refers to the religion of Islam, was first formed in English in 1697 and in 1712. This term is present in the Pai in the decision of the US Supreme Court in the case of InreRoss (1891). At the onset of the twentieth century, the short and pure Arabic word “Islam” de Gen displaced this term. In addition, according to studies in the 1938 Encyclopedia of Islam by Orientalist scholars, the term “Islamism” “ was not used in English (Yakovlev, 2013: 9-10).

Generally, Islamism and religious devotion are viewed as distinctive features within religiously oriented public factions, political parties, and movements. It’s evident that these ideologies don’t

wholly represent the official stances of the Middle Eastern region or individual Arab states. We hold the belief that various disintegration processes in the era of integration in the humanitarian, education, science, economy, geopolitics in the Jahanian world should be resolved within the framework of human principles within the scope of international legal documents.

### Acknowledgement

This research has been funded by the Committee of Science of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Grant No. BR21882428 “The influence and prospects of Islam as a spiritual, cultural, political, and social phenomenon in post normal times: the experience of the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia”).

### References

- Jonah, K. A. (2010) the Islamic factor in the Lebanon - Israel conflict. Vestnik Kaznu. A Series Of Adventures. №1 (50). 1-2.
- Lapidus, I.M. (2002). A History of Islamic societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 521-523.
- Leila Austin (2011) The Politics of Youth Bulge: From Islamic Activism to Democratic Reform in the Middle East and North Africa. SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 31, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2011, pp. 81-96.
- Sadiki, L. (2018) Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization / International Journal of Middle East Studies. – 32.
- Seif, D. (2009) Islamic Resistance in Palestine: Hamas, the Gaza War and the Future of Political Islam, Holy Land studies., Edinburgh University Press., pp. 12-25.
- Yakovlev, A.I. (2013). Religious Factor in World Politics at the Age of Globalization: From Secularization to Fundamentalism. – Moscow University Bulletin. Series 25. International Relations and World Politics. - 11.
- Байтенова Н., Жорабек Ж. (2023) Исламизм, негізгі даму кезеңдері: дінтанулық дискурс. Хабаршы. Дінтану сериясы. №1 (33) – 3-11
- Белоглазов А.В. (2013) Влияние ислама на политические процессы в Центральной Азии: учеб. пособие / А.В. Белоглазов. – Казань: Казан. ун-т. – 294.
- Ганиев Т.А. (2014) Теория национальной и региональной безопасности. Монография - М.: ВУ. – 2-3.
- Джемаль Г. (2004) Освобождение ислама. /Умма. Москва – 48.
- Жумалы Р.Б. (2016) Арабский пасьянс. Хроники столетия. – Астана: КИСИ. – 7.
- Жүніс Қ.Ә. (2010) Ливан – Израил қақтығысындағы ислам факторы. Вестник КазНУ. Серия Востоковедения. №1 (50). 1-2.
- Кепель Ж. (2004) Джихад: Экспансия и закат исламизма / Пер. с фр. В.Ф. Денисова. М: Ладомир. – 65.
- Курпебаева Г.К. (2018) Араб елдерінің әлеуметтік-саяси дамуындағы ислам факторының рөлі. <http://rmebrk.kz/journals/4676/63025.pdf#page=98>
- Лаумулин М.Т. (2011) Геополитические процессы в исламском мире (в контексте председательства РК в ОИК): монография. – Алматы: КИСИ при Президенте РК. – 29-35.
- Мунавваров З.И., Шнайдер-Детерс В. (2003) Ислам и светское государства (по материалам Международного научно-теоретического симпозиума «Ислам и светское государство») <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zentralasien/50123-1.pdf>
- Останин В.Д. (2022) Поворот на Ближний Восток: фактор «исламского пробуждения». <file:///Users/nurmuhamet/Downloads/1057-1829-1-SM.pdf>. DOI: 10.31249/kgf/2022.02
- Почта Ю.М. (2008) Ислам и политика: Учеб. пособие. – М.: РУДН7 – 69-70.
- Сапронова М.А. (2013) Арабо-мусульманский мир: история, география, общество: учеб. пособие / М.А. Сапронова. – Казань: Казан. ун-т. – 242.
- Сапронова М.А. (2015) Политические системы арабских стран: учеб. пособие / М.А. Сапронова. – Казань: Казан. ун-т. – 11.
- Хантингтон С. (2003) Столкновение цивилизаций. М.: АСТ. – 162.
- Шубаев Н.Х. (2014) Дін және қазіргі заман: Қазақстан Республикасы Дін істері агенттігінің және Агенттіктің ведомствалық ұйымдары мен облыстық дін істері басқармалары қызметкерлерінің БАҚ беттерінде жарық көрген мақалаларының жинағы / Астана, Мәдениеттер мен діндердің халықаралық орталығы. 104-105.

## References

- Baitenova, N., Zhorabek, J. (2023) İslamizm, negizgi damu kezeñderi: dintanulyq diskurs [Islamism, the main stages of development: religious discourse]. Habarşy. Dintanu seriasy. №1 (33) – 3-11 (in Kazakh)
- Beloglazov A.V. (2013) Vlianie islama na politicheskie processy v Centralnoi Azii: uchebnoe posobie [Effect of Islam to the political process in the Central Asia/textbook]. – Kazan: Kazanski universitet. – 294. (in Russian)
- Dzhemal', G. (2004) Osvobozhdenie islama [Liberation to Islam]. Umma. – Moskva – 48. (in Russian)
- Ganiev T.A. (2014) Teoriya nacional'noj i regional'noj bezopasnosti [Theory of national and regional security]. Monografiya - M.: VU. – 2-3. (in Russian)
- Hantington, S. (2003) Stolknovenie civilizacij [Clash of Civilization]. – M.: AST. – 162. (in Russian)
- <http://rmebrk.kz/journals/4676/63025.pdf#page=98> (in Kazakh)
- Jonah, K. A. (2010) the Islamic factor in the Lebanon - Israel conflict. Vestnik Kaznu. A Series Of Adventures. №1 (50). 1-2.
- Jünis, Q.Ä. (2010) Livan – İzrail qaqtyğysyndağy islam faktory [The Islamic factor in the Lebanon-Israel conflict]. Vestnik KazNU. Seria Vostokovedenia. №1 (50). 1-2. (in Kazakh)
- Kepel, G. (2004) Dzhihad: Ekspansiya i zakat islamizma [Jihad: expansion and zacet Islamism]/ Per. s fr. V.F. Denisova. M: Ladomir. – 65. (in Russian)
- Kurpebaeva G.K. (2018) Arab elderinñ äleumettik-saiasi damuyndağy islam faktorynyñ röli [The role of the Islamic factor in the socio-political development of Arab countries]. <http://rmebrk.kz/journals/4676/63025.pdf#page=98> (in Kazakh)
- Lapidus, I.M. (2002). A History of Islamic societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 521-523.
- Laumulin, M.T. (2011) Geopoliticheskie processy v islamskom mire (v kontekste predsedatel'stva RK v OIK): monografiya/ Almaty: KISI pri Prezidente RK [Geopolitical processes in the Islamic world (in the context of the chairmanship of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the OIC): monograph]. – 29-35. (in Russian)
- Leila Austin (2011) The Politics of Youth Bulge: From Islamic Activism to Democratic Reform in the Middle East and North Africa. SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 31, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2011, pp. 81-96.
- Munavvarov, Z.I., Shnajder-Deters, V. (2002) Islam i svetskoe gosudarstva (po materialam Mezhdunarodnogo nauchno-teoreticheskogo simpoziuma «Islam i svetskoe gosudarstvo») [Islam and the Secular State (based on the materials of the International Scientific and Theoretical Symposium "Islam and the Secular State")]. – 10 (in Russian)
- Ostanin V.D. (2022) Povорот na Blizhnij Vostok: faktor «islamskogo probuzhdeniya» [The turn to the Middle East: the factor of "Islamic awakening"]. <file:///Users/nurmuhamet/Downloads/1057-1829-1-SM.pdf>. DOI: 10.31249/kgf/2022.02 (in Russian)
- Pochta, Y.M. (2008) Islam i politika: Ucheb. Posobie [Islam and Politics: textbook]. – M.: RUDN7 – 69-70. (in Russian)
- Sadiki, L. (2018) Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization / International Journal of Middle East Studies. – 32.
- Sapronova, M.A. (2013) Arabo-musul'manskij mir: istoriya, geografiya, obshchestvo: ucheb. posobie / M.A. Sapronova [The Arab-Muslim world: history, geography, society]. – Kazan': Kazan. un-t. – 242. (in Russian)
- Sapronova, M.A. (2015) Politicheskie sistemy arabskikh stran: ucheb. posobie [The political systems of the Arab countries]/ M.A. Sapronova. – Kazan': Kazan. un-t. – 11. (in Russian)
- Seif, D. (2009) Islamic Resistance in Palestine: Hamas, the Gaza War and the Future of Political Islam, Holy Land studies., Edinburgh University Press. – 12-25.
- Şubaev, N.H. (2014) Din jāne qazırgı zaman: Qazaqstan Respublikasy Dın isteri agenttiginñ jāne Agenttikñ vedomstvalyq üiymdary men oblystyq dın isteri basqarmalary qyzmetkerlerinñ BAQ betterinde jaryq körgen maqalalarynyñ jinağy [Religion and modernity: a collection of articles published in the media by the Agency for Religious Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan and employees of the Agency's departmental organizations and regional religious affairs departments]/ Astana, Mädenietter men dinderdñ halyqaralyq ortalyğy. 104-105. (in Kazakh)
- Totten, M.J. (2012) Arab Spring or Islamist Winter.// World Affairs Journal. - 23.
- Yakovlev, A.I. (2013). Religious Factor in World Politics at the Age of Globalization: From Secularization to Fundamentalism. – Moscow University Bulletin. Series 25. International Relations and World Politics. - 11.
- Zhumaly, R.B. (2016) Arabskii pasyans. Hroniki stoletya [Arabic solitaire. The Chronicles of century]. – Astana: KISI. – 7. (in Russian)

**Information about authors:**

*Shagyrbai Almasbek Duisenbekuly – PhD, Leading Researcher of the Center of Religious Studies at the Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies, of CS MSHE RK (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: almasbek85@gmail.com).*

*Meimankhozha Murmuhammed – Researcher of the Center of Religious Studies at the Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies, of CS MSHE RK (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: nureke.1987@list.ru).*

*Moldakhmet Bidas – Lecturer of the Department of Humanities of Egyptian University of Islamic Culture Nur-Mubarak (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: bidas.moldakhmet@gmail.com).*

**Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**





*Шағырбай Алмасбек Дүйсенбекұлы – ҚР ҒЖБМ ҒК Философия, саясаттану және дінтану институты дінтану орталығының жетекші ғылыми қызметкері (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: almasbek85@gmail.com).*

*Мейманқожа Нұрмұхаммед Рысбайұлы – ҚР ҒЖБМ ҒК Философия, саясаттану және дінтану институты дінтану орталығының ғылыми қызметкері (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: nureke.1987@list.ru).*

*Молдахмет Бидас – Нұр-Мубарак Египет ислам мәдениеті университеті жалпыгуманитарлық кафедрасының оқытушысы (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, bidas.moldakhmet@gmail.com).*

Registered: February 13, 2024.

Accepted: June 13, 2024.

M. Zeinesh<sup>1</sup> , J. Dosmagambetova<sup>2\*</sup> ,  
U. Aimbetova<sup>3</sup> , K. Khalykov<sup>4</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, Kazakhstan

<sup>2</sup>Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

<sup>3</sup>Kazakh National Academy of Choreography, Astana, Kazakhstan

<sup>4</sup>T. Zhurgenov Kazakh National Academy of Arts, Almaty, Kazakhstan\* e-mail: ddd\_dos@mail.ru

## REVITALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE YOUTH OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

The revitalization of religious consciousness among Kazakhstani youth is a complex phenomenon that plays a crucial role in shaping the socio-cultural and moral development of future generations. This study explores the factors contributing to this revitalization, focusing on the influence of education, media, family traditions, and religious institutions in a predominantly Muslim society with a rich multicultural heritage. The research examines how these elements interact to shape the religious attitudes and behaviors of young people, while also considering the impact of global trends such as digitalization and the internet. The study highlights the importance of religious education, dialogue, and community involvement in fostering a balanced and informed religious identity among youth. It also addresses the need for balancing religious values with modernity and tolerance in a pluralistic society. The findings emphasize the significance of understanding the mechanisms behind the revitalization of religious consciousness and developing appropriate strategies to support positive religious growth, as it has broader implications for national unity, social cohesion, and the moral foundations of Kazakhstani society. The insights provided by this research are valuable for policymakers, educators, and religious leaders in designing initiatives that promote religious understanding, tolerance, and moral integrity among the youth, contributing to the overall development of a harmonious and spiritually grounded society in Kazakhstan.

**Key words:** education, Islam, spirituality, morality, faith.

М. Зейнеш<sup>1</sup>, Ж. Досмағамбетова<sup>2\*</sup>, У. Аймбетова<sup>3</sup>, Қ. Халықов<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Л.Н. Гумилев атындағы Еуразиялық ұлттық университеті, Астана қ., Қазақстан

<sup>2</sup>Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

<sup>3</sup>Қазақ ұлттық хореография академиясы, Астана қ., Қазақстан

<sup>4</sup>Т. Жүргенов атындағы Қазақ ұлттық өнер академиясы, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: ddd\_dos@mail.ru

### Қазақстан Республикасы жастарының діни санасын ревитализациялау

Қазақстандық жастардың діни санасын жандандыру – болашақ ұрпақтың әлеуметтік-мәдени және адамгершілік дамуын қалыптастыруда шешуші рөл атқаратын күрделі құбылыс. Бұл зерттеу осы жандануға ықпал ететін факторларды зерттейді, білім берудің, бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарының, отбасылық дәстүрлердің және діни институттардың негізінен көп мәдениетті мұрасы бар Мұсылман қоғамындағы ықпалына назар аударады. Зерттеу бұл элементтердің жастардың діни көзқарастары мен мінез-құлқын қалыптастыру үшін өзара әрекеттесуін зерттейді, сонымен қатар цифрландыру және интернет сияқты жаһандық тенденциялардың әсерін қарастырады. Зерттеу жастар арасында теңестірілген және ақпараттандырылған діни бірегейлікті қалыптастыруға діни тәрбиенің, диалогтың және қоғамдастықтың қатысуының маңыздылығын көрсетеді. Ол сондай-ақ плюралистік қоғамдағы діни құндылықтарды қазіргі заманмен және толеранттылықпен теңестіру қажеттілігін қарастырады. Қорытындыда діни сананы жандандырудың тетіктерін түсінудің және оң діни өсуді қолдаудың тиісті стратегияларын әзірлеудің маңыздылығын көрсетеді, өйткені бұл ұлттық бірлікке, әлеуметтік бірлікке және қазақстандық қоғамның моральдық негіздеріне кеңірек әсер етеді. Осы зерттеуде келтірілген тұжырымдар саясаткерлер, ағартушылар және діни лидерлер үшін жастар арасында діни түсіністікке, төзімділікке және моральдық тұтастыққа ықпал ететін, Қазақстандағы үйлесімді және рухани негізделген қоғамның жалпы дамуына ықпал ететін бастамаларды әзірлеуде құнды болып табылады.

**Түйін сөздер:** Білім, ислам, руханият, адамгершілік, сенім.



М. Зейнеш<sup>1</sup>, Ж. Досмагамбетова<sup>2\*</sup>, У. Аймбетова<sup>3</sup>, К. Халыков<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Евразийский национальный университет имени Л.Н. Гумилева, г. Астана, Казахстан

<sup>2</sup>Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, г. Алматы, Казахстан

<sup>3</sup>Казахская национальная академия хореографии, г. Астана, Казахстан

<sup>4</sup>Казахская национальная академия искусств имени Т. Жургенова, г. Алматы, Казахстан

\*e-mail: ddd\_dos@mail.ru

### Ревитализация религиозного сознания молодежи Республики Казахстан

Возрождение религиозного сознания среди казахстанской молодежи представляет собой сложное явление, которое играет решающую роль в формировании социокультурного и нравственного развития будущих поколений. В данном исследовании рассматриваются факторы, способствующие этому возрождению, с акцентом на влияние образования, средств массовой информации, семейных традиций и религиозных институтов в преимущественно мусульманском обществе с богатым мультикультурным наследием. В исследовании рассматривается, как эти элементы взаимодействуют, формируя религиозные взгляды и поведение молодых людей, а также влияние таких глобальных тенденций, как цифровизация и Интернет. В исследовании подчеркивается важность религиозного образования, диалога и участия общественности в формировании сбалансированной и осознанной религиозной идентичности среди молодежи. В нем также говорится о необходимости сбалансировать религиозные ценности с современностью и терпимостью в плюралистическом обществе. Полученные результаты подчеркивают важность понимания механизмов, лежащих в основе возрождения религиозного сознания, и разработки соответствующих стратегий для поддержки позитивного религиозного роста, поскольку это имеет более широкие последствия для национального единства, социальной сплоченности и моральных основ казахстанского общества. Выводы, полученные в результате этого исследования, являются ценными для политиков, педагогов и религиозных лидеров при разработке инициатив, способствующих религиозному взаимопониманию, терпимости и моральной чистоте среди молодежи, способствуя гармоничному и духовному развитию общества в Казахстане.

**Ключевые слова:** образование, ислам, духовность, нравственность, вера.

### Introduction

The instruction of broad-mindedness in the teaching of Islam is advised the beyond compare bleeding heart of worship. Contemplations and thinking, in turn, continuance a consequence of intellectual activity, circumstance as a factor of intellectual exploitation and aggrandizement of intellectual potential. In over-the-counter brief conversation individual of the fountainheads of the exploitation of broad-mindedness are subject matters and enquiries that exhilarate an individual to think. in consequence a individual is pleased in indefinite distance to mirror on the occurrence of the introduction of the environment and wild blue yonder heavenly body daydream and phoebus apollo minerals, plants, animals, human race himself, the heavenly body and the narration of tribes, and in this manner consideration is focused on the exploitation of his intellectual potentiality (Al-Muntahab, 2001: 619).

The appropriateness is outstanding to the be in requirements of collective practice, which press for a well-controlled compassionate of the processes captivating accommodation in the ecclesiastical

get-up-and-go of society. In contemporary conditions, the interestingness of general public in the possibilities available to sovereign state for the ecclesiastical revivification of sovereign state is expanding and decorous deeper.

Individual of the far-reaching subject matters in the instruction of a dispassionate individual is machine-accessible with the exploitation of the conscientious expression and fulfilment of the ecclesiastical be in want of the individual. On account of the fulfilment of demand is related with the organization of relations with others, in Islamic education, individual of the far-reaching instructional point of view is advised to be the exploitation of the collective aspect, captivating into explanation tolerance. Relations with over-the-counter general public pauperization tolerance, appreciation and interest. Islam brings out tolerance, appreciation and interestingness in the essential nature of an individual and perceives insignificance bounteous innovational than tolerance, taking into consideration appreciation for over-the-counter general public as the justification of characteristic and collective ethical motive of a human race

recognizing it as the appurtenant justification for the aggrandizement of the ecclesiastical explanation in a person. Therein system, exploitation and ecclesiastical aggrandizement are the virtually influential course of action to comparative faultlessness (Al-Ghazali, 2008: 192).

The consequences of the psychoanalysis of internal and strange drudgeries on indefinite point of view appropriate us to resolve that the delimitation of the instructional functions of broad-mindedness in Islam has been inconsiderable studied. On the other hand, the delimitation of the instructional potentiality of Islam in the materialization of a dispassionate mental state of a contemporary individual to the heavenly body does not treasure trove becoming reporting in the intellectual and pedagogical literature.

Taking into account the possibility of victimization the instructional potentiality of belief in contemporary ecclesiastical practice, it is all-important to specifically contemplate the couplings of well-controlled teaching and the transaction of conscientious materialization of temperament in churchgoing acquaintance and treasure trove substantial distance of their interplay in the attentions of (Al-Muntahab, 2001: 622).

### **Justification of the choice of articles and goals and objectives**

The determination of the glance at to distinguish the instructional potentiality of Islam in the materialization of a dispassionate mental state of contemporary awkward age in the particularization of conditions, ways, customs and undergrounds of organizing and implementing performances for the absorption of collective and conscientious experience, prescriptive documents, instructional and instructional programs baccilar on the justification of the qualifications of the teaching of Islam.

Pedagogy, as a particularly baccilar system, brings out in conformation with the qualifications of the time, on the justification of the accepted progression in the combination of educators and undergraduates in progression to carry through trustworthy substitutions in the materialization of the temperament of the enlightened (Isakhan 2014: 391).

Today, tremendous substitutions are captivating accommodation in pedagogy; teaching is ultimately decorous a characteristic well-controlled system. On the authority of the contemporary definition, teaching is a multifarious body of knowledge

and is intimately accompanying other sciences subdivisions.

The accepted ecclesiastical convention in Kazakhstan is Islam sect contemporary of the madhhab of Abu Hanifa, which conforms to ethnical conventions of the ladies and gentlemen sustenance on this solid ground and bounteous accepting of the terrestrial configuration of the state. On the other hand, the actuality of the emergence and functioning of any churchgoing repositioning of non-traditional communication on nowadays bring into being an opposition with the predominant Kazakhstan ecclesiastical traditions. Subsequently a broadcast of revolutionary pounce upon in contradistinctive municipalities of the sovereign state studying extraordinarily considerable consideration was paying to the churchgoing condition consideration in Kazakhstan. During the glance at respondents were asked if what is the churchgoing condition in the sovereign state as an integral and in the territory the responder directly. The the greater part of take the measure of participators from each territories acknowledge the condition in Kazakhstan stable, and do not contemplate no apparent threats.

Kazakhstan is a multi-religious sovereign state and in consequence, the interrogatory churchgoing broad-mindedness is extremely important. Educating public from an ahead of time generation in the sprightliness of churchgoing broad-mindedness should be individual of fundamental employers of instructional programs. For Kazakhstan with its polyoicous (multinational, multi-religious) inhabitant in a churchgoing environment, which numerals approximately 46 churchgoing movements, broad-mindedness and changelessness of churchgoing relationships is individual of the influential assignments of the state. Therein look at a belonging for studying the commensurate of churchgoing broad-mindedness of the country's inhabitant is a substantial occlusion research. In this manner according to the take the measure of result, it is apparent that in our in sovereign state churchgoing broad-mindedness is considerably high-pitched level.

Specialization of point of view in the churchgoing environment and acknowledgment legislation on churchgoing cults led to the emergence new, antecedently little known churchgoing movements. Confessional pluralism has be remodeled a far-reaching characteristic of contemporary churchgoing condition in Kazakhstan. At the corresponding time, for the contemporary churchgoing condition in Kazakhstan is defined by the emergence and invigorating of fundamental

churchgoing communities, revivification of centers non-traditional beliefs, increasing consequence of strange proselytizer repositioning and augmentation of the collective representation of denominational putting together exceptionally for youthfulness account. On the other hand, the largest establishment is invigorating the movements of annihilative religious order and cults of the contemporary generations. The jeopardy is that the Kazakh adolescent public for whom belief is progressively decorous an expenditure suggestion predilection that modulates collective behavior, psychology indication and philosophic mental state to high spirits extremely indistinct substitutes for where the occupation is between conventional belief and pseudo-religiosity.

Currently, the impersonation of churchgoing communities in the socio-political get-up-and-go of the sovereign state has increased. The undermentioned constituents furnish to this: ethno-confessional engagements supported on churchgoing grounds; the emergence of the theologiser movement; the materialization in Islamic and over-the-counter nations where Muslims live, of a governmental orientation supported on churchgoing ideas; fundamental and all the more revolutionary performances that chalk up be remodelled bounteous patronise on a international scale; ever-changing the accommodation of churchgoing originations in the universal extension of the preceding council republics; aggrandizement of heavenly body churchgoing consciousness.

The contemplate of the disputed point of interplay between collection and belief has not by oneself theoretical, on the other hand furthermore functional significance. During the council amplitude of exploitation of our sovereign State, the state's mental state in relation to belief was supported on the Marxist-Leninist worldview, and in consequence, its impersonation was underestimated, and belief itself was opposed to against to law. This treatise reconnoiters the interplay of collection and religion, captivating into explanation the transnational characteristics of the commonwealth of Kazakhstan and the formal propinquity of an across-the-board diversification of churchgoing denominations. Belief amuses oneself a substantial impersonation in control collective relations. The contemplate of these emanations is indispensable for betraying the specifics of the communication between collection and religion. The significance of the interplay between collection and belief as individual of the principal regulators of collective

relationships is revealed considerably full in the well-controlled literature.


In contemporary conditions, belief carries well-organized representatives of contradistinctive nationalities who be a member of to individual or another faith; therein look at people's concupiscence for circumstantial nationally indistinguishable values, including churchgoing ones, arbitrates the aggrandizement of governmental self-awareness, which furnishes at the contemporaneous stagecoach to the pauperization to constitute representations of efficacious sovereign state permissible principle of confessional relationships inside the sovereign state with the familiarity of administration institutions.

Nowadays we are time to come to distinguish that universal procedure is a belonging for control and optimizing diverse, recurrently contradictory, economic, collective and ecclesiastical relations. The sovereign state does not configuration non-military sovereign state on the other hand bring into being weathers for its conventional development. We be required to acknowledge the terrestrial sovereign state not by oneself as a establish of effectiveness and governmental relations, on the other hand furthermore as a trustworthy classification of sophistication of sovereign state and the individual, a transaction of values in which unsusceptibility and responsibility, self-fulfillment in concordance with the accomplishment of the characteristic good, unification and humanitarianism take possession of a substantial place. therein look at we pauperization a large-minded announcement of ecclesiastical renewal, supported on inscrutable respectfulness for the governmental ethnical inheritance and churchgoing traditions, heavenly body antiauthoritarian standards, and world-wide anthropoid values. Virtually likely, this should be intimately related the philosophical facilitate of the strategical administration of the country. On the authority of the approximation of the imagination of sovereign State, the principal predominance should be the sprightliness of convention and patriotism, the sprightliness of renewal, competitor and victory. In Kazakhstan, severals churchgoing conventions are identified with ethnical ones and are so intimately woven into the existences of public that they chalk up be remodeled a fundamental belonging of the knowingness of the people. This recommends that the humanitarian potentiality of beliefs be required to be euphemistic pre-owned to contraption the progression of collective modernization.

**Scientific research methodology**

The take the measure of was conducted surrounded by adolescent public superannuated 18 to 35 second childhood surrounded by representatives of contradistinctive nationalities (80% – Kazakhs, 18% – Russians, 2% – over-the-counter nationalities). Another characteristic of this take the measure of is that the collections psychoanalysis was carried elsewhere captivating into explanation the substantial determination of each voter who took belonging in the study. Therein course of action it testament be accomplishable to approximately transact elsewhere analyses transversely contradistinctive collective congregations and classes. Individual of

the principal of the contemplate was to distinguish the contemporary churchgoing constitution of the inhabitant of the premeditated regions. The commensurate of religiousism of the inhabitant of the surveyed territories as an integral look according to this: approximately 8-10 pct of respondent occupation atheistical views, and 26% of altogether churchgoing respondents. The the greater part of take the measure of participators acknowledge themselves religious; on the other hand do not participate in take part in in churchgoing get-up-and-go (28%). Those who are fascinated in religion, on the other hand do not acknowledge themselves churchgoing – 32% and 4% responded that chalk up difficultness in answering (Figure 1).



**Figure 1** – Survey of Kazakhstani youth on the attitude to religion

These are the results of the study for Kazakhstan as a whole. In a regional context, this indicator looks blurry. That is, the level of religiosity differs by region. This can be seen in

Table 1. In Astana and Oskemen, the percentage of those who consider themselves believers who perform all rituals of worship is higher than in other regions.

**Table 1** – Attitudes towards religion by region of Kazakhstan (%)

Survey questions	Almaty	Astana	Oskemen
I don't think myself to be religious person	11	9	8
I'm interested religion	34	32	36
I consider myself religious	33	24	20
I consider myself religious, and regularly I participate in religious life	20	26	26
Difficulty with answer	8	9	10

## Main part

In the contemporary heavenly body the contemplate of the participation of Islamic instruction and upbringing, which progressively invites the consideration of professionals in teaching and the determination of which is the publishing of several publications and magazines, testifies to the considerable grandness of the belief of Islam in anthropoid education. Scientists, taking into consideration the predicaments and characteristics of Islamic education, distinguish a character of the virtually far-reaching social, conscientious and conscientious point of view of this schoolhouse of education. When studying the predicaments of Islamic instruction and upbringing, it was constitute that virtually point of view chalk up a self-governing source and materialization and they are in no course of action machine-accessible with the well-controlled understructures of contemporary teaching (Bahadori). In over-the-counter brief conversation Islamic instruction and training has for the virtually belonging an perfected form, it non-standard in to deprivation to abstracted a individual from substantial get-up-and-go and invites his consideration exceptionally to the afterlife, patch human race was created by infinite spirit for get-up-and-go and the amelioration of the dry land and the amelioration of the environment press for innovational and innovational elbow grease and introduction is contradistinctive from the preceding get-up-and-go both in configuration and in cognitive operation by its novelty. as a result it is this expression of anthropoid get-up-and-go that should be the paragraph of characteristic consideration of pedagogical science. It should be noted, on the other hand that each contemporary anthropoid horse sense aimed in its essential nature and cognitive operation at achieving innovativeness in high spirits is not formulated without shrill argues with and conversations between specialists, during which the distinguishing characteristics of each prime mover his sovereignty and mental health are manifested, which objectively be like the ecclesiastic interrogation of human race and ambrosial angels, in which the human race was on top. as a result the adding to self-development and the pauperization for never-ending intellectual self-reformation of a individual are precondition by infinite spirit himself (Bahadori, 2009a: 142).

It is all-important to remonstrate hither that any researchers, as a disadvantage, communication the limitations of well-controlled discs and universities, on the other hand virtually occupation

the persuasion that each this, if insensitive, is leastways not ugly.

Let's come across individual example. A hardly anysecond childhood ago, a publication by J. Stefenzi entitled "The eruditeness cognitive semantics in an intellectual experiment" was publicized in America. Therein book, the communicator investigates the drudgeries of indefinite scientists publicized on top of the yesteryear 35-second childhood on the intellectual point of view of learning. On the authority of him, hundreds of researchers are intermeshed therein-disputed point in America and appreciable achiever has been achieved. e.g., by oneself on video receiver training, he refers to allude to to the conclusions of 399 researchers, on the authority of the proportion of classes – 281 authors, etc. As it put in an appearance from the publication by J. Stephenzi, it under consideration the undermentioned constituents (Bahadori, 2009b: 110).

Classes (presence or non-presence of students), etc. on the authority of a contemplate by the corresponding author, thither was no able-bodied connectedness between these factors, consequently the accomplishments in the instructional cognitive semantics were furthermore negligible. On the other hand, do not despair. Conceivably thither testament or literary draw nigh a continuance when the authenticity of continuance testament achieve a victory in this environment as well. On the other hand for this it is all-important to possess a truehearted will, appreciation and inscription to the elect course of action – eruditeness and education, search through examine and instauration – mastering the heavenly body accomplishments of body of knowledge and application and rising commandment methods. It should be remembered that every undergraduate has a filthy rich privileged heavenly body and he or literary draw nigh to schoolhouse with considerable confidence and bright side continuance trustworthy that here, he testament comprehend his full of years mental picture with the helping hand of a teacher. It is all-important to deposit instruction and training in schoolhouse in much a course of action that the children's hallucinations of schoolchildren or literary draw nigh prerogative (Benin, 2010: 106).

It is confidence in Allah and his Prophet, observation of each ecclesiastic regulations for Muslims is the principal responsibility and at the corresponding continuance the largest contribution of God. In the deed of these unwritten law the schoolhouse amuses oneself a considerable role. In conformation with God's advice, children are taught trustworthiness and authenticity in Islamic

schools. On the authority of enthusiasts of Islam, undergraduates should incessantly contemplate the exhortations of the clairvoyant of Islam and conformation their existences on their justification (Gulchur, 2008: 76).

Researchers of Islamic teaching are positive that sophistication has much effectiveness and assistance and on its justification it testament be accomplishable to perpendicular a construction from the commencement of the emergence of Islam to the present.

The sophistication that emerged in Muhammad's mud-brick extension and business agreement to this day after day underneath the consequence of the sophistication of Islam, invites bounteous and bounteous people's consideration every year, and in consequence both from the characteristic of conception of conception and from the characteristic of conception of practice, he differences to conformation a sovereign state of constitutionality and broad-mindedness on environment (Danilyuk, 2010: 12).

The selflessness and the highest ethical motive of human race his unsusceptibility and at the corresponding continuance responsibility previously infinite spirit get-up-and-go according to the consecrated publications and traditions, the application of body of knowledge and forward-looking acquaintance of general public and the concupiscence for their extremely adding to the disallowance of each varieties of oppression, and appreciation of effectiveness and political, economic, collective and ethnical constitutionality – each well-organized make certain the homogeneity of the nation.

### Results and discussion

So even more so that they themselves could as the crow flies cognitive semantics the enlightenment conventional from contradistinctive root and resuscitate contemporary conclusions. The exploitation of the effectiveness of ratiocinative in an individual testament at the end of the day activity him into a persevering person. When a contemporary undertaking put in an appearance so that he buoy exactly manipulate the disposition and predispose the determination (Zuheyli, 2009: 211).

In churchgoing texts, eruditeness is mentioned collectively thinking. On account of eruditeness without ratiocinative is useless, furthermore "thinking without eruditeness is impossible". Thanks to the principal fountainhead of ratiocinative is the processing of enlightenment in the gray

matter and eruditeness consists of the absorption of information. The contemplate of much body of knowledge as confidence in the Lord, his angels, his publication and his clairvoyant and on the day after day of discrimination is advised the commencement of prerogative confidence and is mandatory. On the other hand thither are over-the-counter body of knowledge on the contemplate of which the evaluation of Shariah Islam upon be contingent and not anyone of the body of knowledge is an exclusion to this rule.

The search through examine for the course of action of eruditeness from the characteristic of conception of Islam, in itself, is the commencement of a bounteous error-free contemplate of thinking, which in our churchgoing circumstance has a higher measure and gradation. Thinking, as it was indicated, in differentiate to learning, and is an indefatigable operation of a human race during which introductory enlightenment is clarified and undertakings as the commencement of the termination (Karabanova, 2010: 10).

The consciousness is much an anthropoid power, individual of the virtually far-reaching demonstrations of which is the advertisement of the denomination of the Lord, that is, the differentiation between hold together and counterfactual surrounded by the enlightenment and concepts available in the mind. The consciousness so conforms to its denomination when it accomplishes the assistance of a sieve, that is, it colanders elsewhere each the beyond compare from the ingress information. Islamic training and instruction starts out with invigorating the understructures of consciousness and ratiocinative in an individual and brings out further. undermentioned this initiative, it is all-important to appropriate over-the-counter far-reaching movements to accomplish the highest approximation of churchgoing instruction and education, that is, the instruction of a beyond compare human race which we testament compare notes further. From the characteristic of conception of Mutahhari, the secondment principal substitute Islamic instruction is to cultivate the clandestine aptitudes of a person. Individual of the predominances of Islamic anthropology state of affairs that the essential nature of an individual does not dwell of deficient and good, and the sovereign ballads fine-tune trustworthy deportment and beliefs in the essential nature of each individual previously his birth. Although much a commandment is underlying in every human race on the other hand general public be dissimilar and in several cases, the transliteration of a person's

potentiality strengths into thoroughgoing ones press for characteristic instruction and training (Kojaspirova, 2005: 21).

Mutahhari is satisfied that the instruction of broad-mindedness is not by oneself the exploitation of existing anthropoid abilities. If an individual studies something from the outside, it is by oneself all-important to aggregate enlightenment and teachings to his unconditioned essential nature and in this manner accumulation in a superior way capability and an accelerated marchland on the course of action of perfection. Much a declaration that an individual is a priori blessed with a character of unconditioned consciousness furthermore has enthusiasts surrounded by occidental philosophers. Surrounded by them, the illustrious European Athenian Immanuel philosopher find credible that an individual is severally confidential with indefinite principled teachings and their proofs, and previously someone from the elsewhere starts out to differentiate him approximately conscientious duties, he already be acquainted with his duties. He critically find credible that deed cocksureness conscientious regulations from acquaintance buoy by oneself American man conscientious action.

What the sovereign has deposit into an individual as unconditioned beliefs is extraordinarily positive, and in progression to carry through perfection, he be in want of insignificancy on the other hand the exploitation of his unconditioned abilities. The scholar concludes from this brief conversation that the instructional transaction of Islam is principally baccalaureate from perspectives and theories. Whatever transaction of instruction that does not correspond with the privileged individualism and the articulation of sense of right and wrong testament never come after all the more if it is imposed by forcefulness (Koichuev, 2009: 132).

## Conclusion

Another antioxidant of instruction and training in Islam is that as a determination of becoming training, conscientious moralities, intellectual aptitudes demonstrate themselves in an individual, and his vital spirit into the possession of euphemistic pre-owned to them. Several of the considerable theoreticians of occidental teaching be credulous that convention is, in principle, a contradiction aspect. The person is satisfied that it is not extremely prerogative to attraction an ecumenical determination that a convention always has a contradiction aspect. Because of the convention is

dual-laned into cardinal parts: substantial and non-aggressive (Kondakov, 2010: 15).

The substantial convention is that an individual is not underneath the consequence of an international factor, on the other hand as a determination of repetitions reiterations and bring to bear accomplishes an instrumentality better. e.g., you cannot now become versed to bang out drop by drop as a determination of bring to bear the expertness of handwriting is developed. Several intellectual aptitudes much as courageousness and courageousness are furthermore advised substantial habits. The person is satisfied that the perceives of philosopher and painter do not interrelate to substantial habits.

Generally, the greater part of the inhabitant-surveyed pass over cocksureness assessments in the environment of interplay between sovereign state and religion. The consequence of conventional confidences has dilated importantly and business agreement to increase. Generally, at the moment belief is detected to a in a superior way proportion as an ethnocultural phenomenon, on the other hand the character of "deep believers" is already considerably substantial and it buoy be expropriated that it testament aggrandizement in the time to come many decades. Fundamental of all, this applies to Islam. belief is at the moment viewed unquestionably population, which have in mind this fix up with provision reasons for increasing receptivity, i. general public volitionally acknowledge churchgoing values, be credulous that ecclesiastics of churchgoing persuasions deliver a sermon exceptionally cocksureness values.

A study of the religious consciousness of young people has shown that despite the fact that many young people consider themselves believers, there are very few really believers among them, since external religiosity prevails over internal and only some of them follow all the requirements of religion and strive to live in accordance with religious requirements and prescriptions. But it should be noted that the level of religiosity is decreasing, and the number of atheists is increasing. The low level of education and culture, the lack of desire to know the basics of religious doctrine and attitude to religion only as a means or tool necessary to gain self-confidence and improve their status, indicates the absence of deep religious needs, feelings and beliefs among modern Kazakh youth. Therefore, serious preventive work should be carried out among young people, preventing the manifestation of religious fundamentalism and involvement

in radical and extremist groups or sects, and educational work among schoolchildren, college and university students aimed at increasing their self-awareness, religious education and religious culture. However, our study was conducted in only one region, so it would be interesting to see what the situation in the country as a whole is, as well as compare some regions with each other in order to identify differences in religious orientations and motives for youth conversion to religion.

In conclusion, we note that the growth of religiosity among young people is explained by the fact that religion is gaining special importance:

1. Religion acts as an element of national culture, is perceived as a factor of generational continuity, respect for ancestors, their spiritual heritage. It is through religion that a significant part of the population seeks to revive traditional values and moral principles.

2. The role and place of religion in the system of public relations are changing. Perhaps this is a way of protection or a kind of response to the aggressive “invasion” of globalization.

3. The religious factor plays an important role in the process of personal formation of young people, the formation of their life orientations, social and civic self-realization. In the process of socialization of young people, religious values occupy an important place, and the value potential of religion is due to the fact that it helps to prevent negative phenomena such as alcoholism, drug addiction, etc. Today, the priority in society is to carry out information and propaganda work with a wide audience. An audience to create an atmosphere of rejection of the ideas of terrorism and extremism. Full-scale implementation is needed Concepts of youth policy, solving social problems, real, systematic and effective work with young people.

#### References

- Аль-Газали (2008) Основы духовности. – Санкт Петербург: издательство "ДИЛЯ". – 192.
- Аль-Мунтахаб фи Тафсир аль-Куран Карим (2001) Толкование Священного Корана на русском языке / перевод с арабского, ред. Р.У. Коджаева. – Казань: Издание Пресса. – 639.
- Бахадори, Н., Расул, К. (2009a) Духовное воспитание в мусульманской семье. Бабочки в раю/ Н. Бахадори, К. Расул. – Санкт Петербург: Издание ДИЛЯ. – 192.
- Бахадори, Н., Расул, К. (2009b) Мы растим гармоничного ребенка. Красота исламского образования/ Н. Бахадори, К. Расул. – Санкт Петербург: Издание ДИЛЯ. – 160.
- Бенин, V.L. (2010) О религиозной культуре, светской этике и новых провайдерах (полемиические заметки по известному поводу)//педагогический журнал Башкортстана., No. 4 (29). – 106-117.
- Гульчур, М.К. (2008) Культура поведение в исламе/ М.К. Гульчур. – Санкт Петербург: Издание ДИЛЯ. – 184.
- Зухейли, В. (2009) Мусульманская семья в современном мире (аль усра аль-муслим фи аль-алам аль-муасир). – М.: аль-киتاب. – 504.
- Исахан М., Керим С., Адильбаев А., Адильбаева С., Сулейменов П. и Сатыбалдиева А. (2014). Смысл и исторические предпосылки появления «Мединских конституций». Procedia – Социальные и поведенческие науки, 131, 391–395.
- Кожаспирова, Г.М., Кожаспиров, А.Ю. (2005) Педагогический словарь/ Г.М. Кожаспирова, А. Ю. Кожаспиров. – М.: ИСС "Марш"; Ростов н/а: Издательский центр "Марш". – 39.
- Койчуев, А.А.-Ж. (2009) Педагогический потенциал ислама в светском образовании: теоретические основы и практический опыт: монография/ А.А.-Ж. Койчуев. – Нижний Новгород: Издание Медина. – 266.
- Danilyuk, A.Ya., Kondakov A.M., Tishkov V.A. (2010) The concept of spiritual and moral development and education of the personality of a citizen of Russia. – М: Enlightenment. – 23.
- Karabanova, O.S. (2010) First of all, we form a civic identity// Educational policy. No.1-2 (39-40). – 9-14.
- Kondakov, A.M. (2010) It is important to preserve spiritual national values // Educational policy. №1–2 (39-40). – 15-18.

#### References

- Al-Ghazali (2008) Osnovy duhovnosti [Fundamentals of spirituality], – St. Petersburg: publishing house “DILYA”. – 192. (in Russia)
- Al-Muntahab fi Tafsir al-Quran al-Karim (2001) Tolkovanie Svyashchennogo Korana na russkom yazyke [Interpretation of the Holy Quran in Russian] /translated from Arabic, edited by R.U. Khodjaeva. – Kazan: Publishing house of the Press, – 639. (in Russia)
- Bahadori, N., Rasul, K. (2009a) Duhovnoe vospitanie v musul'manskoj sem'e. Babochki v rayu [Spiritual education in a Muslim family. Butterflies in paradise] / N.Bahadori, K. Rasul.- St. Petersburg: publishing house “DILYA”. – 192. (in Russia)
- Bahadori, N., Rasul, K. (2009b) My rastim garmonichnogo rebenka. Krasota islamskogo obrazovaniya [We raise a harmonious child. The beauty of Islamic education] / N. Bahadori, K. Rasul. – St. Petersburg: publishing house “DILYA”. – 160. (in Russia)



Benin, V.L. (2010) O religioznoj kul'ture, svetskoj etike i novyh provajderah (polemicheskie zametki po izvestnomu povodu [On religious culture, secular ethics and new providers (polemical notes on a well-known occasion] // Pedagogical Journal of Bashkortostan., No. 4 (29). – 106-117. (in Russia)

Danilyuk, A.Ya., Kondakov A.M, Tishkov V.A. (2010) The concept of spiritual and moral development and education of the personality of a citizen of Russia. – M: Enlightenment. – 23.

Gulchur, M.K. (2008) Kul'tura povedeniya v islame [Culture of behavior in Islam]/ M.K. Gulchur. – St. Petersburg: LLC publishing house "Dilya". – 184. (in Russia)

Isakhan, M., Kerim, S., Adilbayev, A., Adilbayeva, S., Suleimenov, P., & Satybaldieva, A. (2014). Smysl I istoricheskie predposylki poyavleniya "Medinskih konstitucii" [The Meaning and the Historical Prerequisites of Appearing the "Madina's Constitutions"]. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 391-395. (in Russian)

Karabanova, O.S. (2010) First of all, we form a civic identity// Educational policy. No.1-2 (39-40). – 9-14.

Koichuev, A.A.-J. (2009) Pedagogicheskij potencial islama v svetskom obrazovanii: teoreticheskie osnovy i prakticheskij opyt: monografiya [Pedagogical potential of Islam in secular education: theoretical basis and practical experience: monograph]/ A.A.-J. Koichuev. – Nizhny Novgorod: Publishing house "Medina". – 266. (in Russia)

Kojaspirova, G.M., Kojaspirov, A.Yu. (2005) Pedagogicheskij slovar' [Dictionary of Pedagogy]/ G.M. Kojaspirova, A.Yu. Kojaspirov. – M.: ICC "March"; Rostov n/A: publishing center "March". – 39. (in Russia)

Kondakov, A.M. (2010) It is important to preserve spiritual national values // Educational policy. №1-2 (39-40). – 15-18.

Zuheyli, V. (2009) Musul'manskaya sem'ya v sovremennom mire [Muslim family in the modern world] (Al-usra al-Muslim fi al-alam al-muasir. – Moscow: Al Kitab. – 504. (in Russia)

#### **Information about authors:**

*Zeinesh Merey – PhD student, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, (Astana, Kazakhstan, e-mail: mereykazakhstan@yahoo.com).*

*Dosmagambetova Jamila Jambylkyzy – Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Foreign Languages Department of the Faculty of Philology, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: ddd\_dos@mail.ru).*

*Aimbetova Ulbossyn Otegenkyzy – PhD, Associate Professor, Kazakh National Academy of Choreography (Astana, Kazakhstan, e-mail: Aim\_bat@mail.ru).*

*Khalykov Kabyly – Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor, Vice-Rector for Research at Temirbek Zhurgenov Kazakh National Academy of Arts, Member of International Academy Concord (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: kabylykh@gmail.com).*

#### **Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**

*Зейнеш Мерей – Л.Н. Гумилев атындағы Еуразия ұлттық университетінің PhD докторанты (Астана қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: mereykazakhstan@yahoo.com).*

*Досмағамбетова Жамиля Жамбылқызы – философия ғылымдарының кандидаты, қауымдастырылған профессор м.а., ал-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті филология факультеті шет тілдері кафедрасының меңгерушісі (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: ddd\_dos@mail.ru).*

*Аймбетова Улбосын Өтегенқызы – PhD, қауымдастырылған профессор м.а. Қазақ ұлттық хореография академиясы (Астана қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: Aim\_bat@mail.ru).*

*Халықов Қабыл Збекұлы – философия ғылымдарының докторы, профессор, Темірбек Жүргенов атындағы Қазақ ұлттық өнер академиясының ғылыми жұмыстар жөніндегі проректоры, Халықаралық Конкорд академиясының мүшесі (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: kabylykh@gmail.com).*

*Registered: April 1, 2024.*

*Accepted: June 11, 2024.*

**A.-F. Bolatzhan\*** , **K. Bishmanov** 

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: [farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru](mailto:farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru)

## PREVENTION OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SECULARISM AND RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM

This article examines the problem of the relationship between the model of secularism and religious symbolism in the context of the risk of religious radicalization in Kazakhstan. This topic is especially relevant at the present time in conditions of geopolitical turbulence in the Eurasian region. Due to the complex nature of the problem, three main components are distinguished: 1) consideration of the features of the French model of secularism applied in Kazakhstan; 2) analysis of external destructive religious influence on Kazakhstan; 3) the alleged religious and ideological risks existing in Kazakhstan. Summarizing these three components, a general conclusion is drawn about the necessary measures that should be taken to relieve the «degree of tension» between secular principles and religious symbolism, which can reduce and/or neutralize the risks of extremist, and, as a consequence, terrorist actions on the territory of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, measures are being taken to counter the so-called destructive religious movements/organizations (abbreviated as DRM/DRO). However, there is no legal definition for this concept. In public discourse, DRM/DRO are contrasted with «traditional religions», the definition of which also does not exist in domestic legislation. Legally, there is only a list of prohibited (extremist, terrorist) organizations and a list of registered religious associations on the territory of Kazakhstan. One way or another, realities dictate to the state and society the need to counteract destructive religious influence. It should be noted that destructive behavior comes from a destructive ideology. The purpose of the work is to identify ideological risks for the religious situation in Kazakhstan, as well as to apply preventive measures to eliminate religious and ideological threats. The article describes the existing risks for the state in the field of ideological prevention of religious extremism and terrorism, and provides appropriate recommendations that are of theoretical and practical benefit.

**Key words:** extremism, terrorism, laicism, religion, securitization.

Ә.-Ф. Болатжан\*, К. Бишманов

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: [farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru](mailto:farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru)

### Зайырлылық пен діни символизмнің арасындағы қарсыластық жағдайында діни экстремизм мен терроризмнің алдын алу

Бұл мақалада Қазақстандағы діни радикалдану қаупі контекстінде зайырлылық моделі мен діни символизмнің арақатынасы мәселесі қарастырылады. Бұл тақырып әсіресе қазіргі уақытта Еуразия аймағындағы геосаяси турбуленттілік жағдайында өзекті болып отыр. Мәселенің күрделі сипатына байланысты үш негізгі құрамдас бөліктер ажыратылады: 1) Қазақстанда қолданылатын француздық зайырлылық үлгісінің ерекшеліктерін қарастыру; 2) Қазақстанға сыртқы деструктивті діни ықпалды талдау; 3) Қазақстандағы болжамды діни және идеологиялық тәуекелдер. Осы үш құраушыны қоса келе, зайырлы қағидаттар мен діни символизм арасындағы «шиеленіс дәрежесін» жеңілдету үшін қабылданатын қажетті шаралар туралы жалпы қорытынды жасалады, бұл болса Қазақстан аумағында экстремизм көріністерінің, соның нәтижесі ретінде террористік әрекеттердің пайда болу қауіптерін азайтуға және/немесе бейтараптандыруға мүмкіндік беретін. Қазақстанда деструктивті деп аталатын діни ағымдарға/ұйымдарға (қысқартылғанда – ДДА/ДДҰ) қарсы шаралар қабылдануда. Алайда бұл ұғымның заңдық анықтамасы жоқ. Қоғамдық дискурста ДДА/ДДҰ «дәстүрлі діндерге» қарсы қойылады, соңғының анықтамасы да отандық заңнамада жоқ. Заңды түрде Қазақстан аумағында тыйым салынған (экстремистік, террористік) ұйымдардың тізімі мен тіркелген діни бірлестіктердің тізімі ғана бар. Қалай болғанда да, мемлекет пен қоғамға деструктивті діни ықпалға қарсы тұру қажеттілігін талап етеді. Жұмыстың мақсаты – Қазақстандағы діни ахуалға төніп тұрған идеологиялық тәуекелдерді анықтау, сондай-

ақ діни және идеологиялық қатерлерді жою үшін алдын алу шараларын қолдану. Мақалада діни экстремизм мен терроризмнің идеологиялық алдын алу саласындағы мемлекет үшін орын алып отырған қауіптер сипатталып, теориялық және практикалық пайдасы бар тиісті ұсыныстар берілген.

**Түйін сөздер:** экстремизм, терроризм, лаицизм, дін, секьюритизация.

А.-Ф. Болатжан\*, К. Бишманов

Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, г. Алматы, Казахстан

\*e-mail: farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru

### **Профилактика религиозного экстремизма и терроризма в условиях противостояния светскости и религиозного символизма**

В данной статье рассматривается проблема соотношения модели светскости и религиозного символизма в условиях риска религиозной радикализации в Казахстане. Данная тема особо актуальна в настоящий момент в условиях геополитической турбулентности в евразийском регионе. В связи с комплексным характером проблемы выделяются три основные компоненты: 1) рассмотрение особенностей французской модели светскости, применяемой в Казахстане; 2) анализ внешнего деструктивного религиозного влияния на Казахстан; 3) предполагаемые религиозно-идеологические риски, имеющиеся в Казахстане. Суммируя данные трех компонентов делается общий вывод о необходимых мерах, которые следует предпринять для снятия «градуса напряженности» между светскими принципами и религиозным символизмом, что может снизить и/или нейтрализовать риски проявления экстремистских, и, как следствие, террористических действий на территории Казахстана. В РК принимаются меры по противодействию так называемым деструктивным религиозным течениям/организациям (сокращенно, соответственно – ДРТ/ДРО). Однако, юридически нет определения данному понятию. В общественном дискурсе ДРТ/ДРО противопоставляются «традиционные религии», определения которым также не существует в отечественном законодательстве. Юридически есть только список запрещенных (экстремистских, террористических) организаций и список зарегистрированных религиозных объединений на территории Казахстана. Так или иначе, реалии диктуют государству и обществу необходимость противодействия деструктивному религиозному влиянию. Следует отметить, что деструктивное поведение исходит от деструктивной идеологии. Целью работы является определение идеологических рисков для религиозной ситуации в Казахстане, а также применение превентивных мер по исключению религиозно-идеологических угроз. В статье описываются существующие риски для государства в сфере идеологической профилактики религиозного экстремизма и терроризма, и даются соответствующие рекомендации, которые несут теоретическую и практическую пользу.

**Ключевые слова:** экстремизм, терроризм, лаицизм, религия, секьюритизация.

## **Introduction**

According to paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Constitution, the Republic of Kazakhstan is proclaimed as a secular, legal and democratic state in which the highest values are the person, his life, rights and freedoms. Accordingly, the country has established freedom of religion and prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. A clear indicator of the pluralism of Kazakhstani society is that representatives of more than 130 ethnic groups and 18 registered religious denominations live in the state. If unregistered ones are taken into account, the number of denominations will increase even more. In this regard, the preservation of

interfaith and interethnic peace and agreement is a vital condition for the existence of the state. Work in this vein does not lose its relevance. The Law «On Countering Terrorism» has been in force in the Republic of Kazakhstan since 1999, and in 2005 the Law «On Countering to Extremism» was also adopted. The latest Law defines religious extremism: «incitement of religious discord of strife, as well as related with violence or incitement to violence, as well as use of any religious practice, causing a threat to security, life, health, morality or rights and freedoms of citizens (religious extremism)» (The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2005). As is known, extremism and terrorism are interrelated phenomena; the former

can give rise to the latter: a call to incite religious hatred can lead to terrorist acts. In this regard, it is extremely necessary to suppress extremist manifestations. However, at the same time, what can often be missed is that extremist behavior is a consequence of extremist ideology. It is necessary to nip extremism and terrorism in the bud – by neutralizing destructive ideology.

### **Justification of the choice of articles and goals and objectives**

One of the urgent tasks of the modern world, and Kazakhstan, in particular, is the prevention of religious extremism and terrorism. In conditions of confrontation between secular principles and religious foundations, this issue may become even more heated. The issue of security is also important at the regional level. Kazakhstan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The CSTO has «The List of organizations recognized as terrorist and extremist in the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization», and the SCO has «The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Countering Extremism». The security of an individual state largely depends on regional security. This is especially noticeable in the period of globalization, when the issue of information security is acute, since at the moment there are practically no obstacles in the world to the dissemination of information, including destructive information. It can be mentioned that the Law «On National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan» mentions «information security» among six types of security. Thus, the lack of measures to prevent destructive informational ideological influence can cause significant damage to the security of a particular state. Every year, Muslim representatives raise the issue of schoolgirls wearing the hijab in schools, despite the secular nature of school education and Order No. 26 of the Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 14, 2016, which declares the inadmissibility of including religious symbolics in school uniforms. Also, there is a request from Muslims to open prayer rooms within the walls of government institutions, military units, public schools, colleges and universities, despite the official ban prescribed in the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan «On Religious Activities and

Religious Associations» dated October 11, 2011 No. 483-IV. In this regard, the authors set a goal to comprehensively study this problem. It is not uncommon for destructive religious organizations and movements to hide behind Islam, but, of course, not only this religion. However, the authors focus on extremism and terrorism under the guise of Islam, due to the relevance of this topic in the region. Due to the complexity of the topic, the following tasks were set: 1) analyze the features of the French model of secularism used in the Republic of Kazakhstan; 2) consider the current (!) external destructive religious influence exerted on the Republic of Kazakhstan; 3) identify religious and ideological risks for Kazakhstan. Together, these three components provide a comprehensive vision of the problem of preventing religious extremism and terrorism in the context of confrontation between secularism and religious symbolism. Accordingly, the main part of the article is divided into these three components.

### **Scientific research methodology**

Modern scientific methods of cognition are used in the research, including the comparative method, source analysis, the principle of historicism, complex analysis, systematization method, and deduction. The comparative method is necessary to identify correspondences and contradictions between the legal systems of different states and different eras. Analysis of the historical background of a phenomenon can help to identify further trends in the development of this phenomenon. At the same time, a comprehensive analysis of all factors (socio-political, historical, ideological, geographical) influencing the religious situation allows us to form the most complete picture of reality.

### **Results and discussions**

#### *The relationship between the French model of secularism and religious symbolism*

Despite growing geopolitical tensions, Kazakhstan remains an oasis of stability. In the Eurasian space, accumulating contradictions (including religious ones) often result in armed clashes. There is an escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, which has political and religious overtones. External actors also intervene in the conflict. For Central Asia, the

«Taliban» (from Pashto طالبان – students), those «who studying in madrasah; the organization's activities on the territory of Kazakhstan were prohibited by a decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated March 15, 2005; however, on December 29, 2023, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan announced a decision to exclude the «Taliban» from the list of prohibited organizations) movement that has gained power in Afghanistan is causing concern. One of the conditions for maintaining stability is adherence to the principle of secularism. This term needs to be defined.

Secularism (from the Latin «saecularis» meaning «century-old, hundred-year-old; worldly») is a government system in which the state is separated from religion. The state does not interfere in the affairs of religion, and religion does not interfere in the affairs of the state, in contrast to theocratic or clerical government systems, where a particular religion officially dominates. At the same time, this is not an atheistic system, since there is no official propaganda of atheism and there is freedom of choice of religion. In general, there are two models of secularism – Anglo-Saxon and French (Kuznetsov, 2013: 44). The Republic of Kazakhstan uses the French model known as laicism (from the French «laïcité» – «secularism»). This model is different in that it seeks to exclude religious symbolics in government institutions: schools, military installations, municipal buildings, et cetera, as well as from public space (Kuru, 2009: 103). Thus, religious neutrality and equality are achieved, and the dominance of any religious denomination is excluded.

Based on this vision, paragraph 13 of Article 2 of «The Requirements for compulsory school uniforms for secondary education organizations», approved by Order of the Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 14, 2016 No. 26, states the following: «Inclusion of elements of clothing of religious affiliation of various religious denominations in school form is not allowed» (Qazaqstan Respublikasy Bilim zhane gylym ministrigi, 2016).

A similar rule, but at the legal level, exists in France. In 2004, the French Republic passed a law prohibiting the wearing of religious clothing in school (République française, 2004). In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) received six complaints against France alleging that

the Law was discriminatory and infringed on freedom of religion, but the ECtHR rejected these complaints as unfounded. Thus, such legislative practices in Europe are not considered discriminatory (Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, 2009).

Also, from September 4, 2023, the wearing of abaya and qamis in public schools is separately prohibited in France.

Abaya (colloquially and more commonly in Arabic: عباءة 'abayah, especially in literary Arabic: عباءة 'abā'ah; plural عبايات 'abayat, عباآت 'abā'āt), sometimes also called aba, is a simple, free new outerwear, essentially a robe-like dress worn by some women in parts of the Muslim world, including North Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and much of the Middle East. (Yarwood, 1978)

Qamis (from Arabic قَمِيصٌ) is men's Muslim traditional clothing in the form of a long shirt. Semantically, the word قَمِيصٌ means «shirt» (Lane, 1885).

Previously, the abaya and qamis were considered primarily traditional clothing, rather than religious, as a result of which their wearing in French schools was not prohibited.

Also, the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan «On Religious Activities and Religious Associations» dated October 11, 2011 No. 483-IV stipulates a ban on religious services within the walls of military units, government institutions, schools, universities, colleges and universities, et cetera.

Thus, in «Chapter 3. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN», «Article 7. Religious rites and ceremonies», the following is stated:

«3. Conduct (commission) public worship, religious rites, ceremonies, and (or) meetings, as well as the implementation of missionary activity are not allowed in the territory and buildings of:

- 1) state bodies, organizations, except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Article
- 2) the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations, judicial and law enforcement agencies, and other services related to public safety, protection of life and health of individuals;
- 3) the organizations of education, except for the spiritual (religious) educational institutions» (The Republic of Kazakhstan, 2011).

A similar situation is observed in France. Thus, in 2023, it became known that in some schools in France, schoolchildren performed namaz (Muslim

prayer), as a result of which the French Minister of National Education and Youth Affairs, Pape Ndiaye, and the mayor of Nice, Christian Estrosi, condemned such an act, despite the fact that in the legislation The Republic does not have a literal ban on prayer within the walls of schools. A joint appeal was published by the minister and the mayor of Nice:

A similar situation is observed in France. Thus, in 2023, it became known that in some schools in

France, schoolchildren performed salah (Muslim prayer), as a result of which the French Minister of National Education and Youth, Pap Ndiaye, and the Mayor of Nice, Christian Estrosi, condemned such an act, despite the fact that in the legislation The Republic does not have a literal ban on prayer within the walls of schools. On June 17, 2023, a joint appeal was published by the Minister and the Mayor of Nice (Ndiaye, 2023):



Paris, le 16 juin 2023,

**DÉCLARATION COMMUNE DE PAP NDIAYE, MINISTRE DE L'ÉDUCATION NATIONALE ET DE LA JEUNESSE, ET CHRISTIAN ESTROSI, MAIRE DE LA VILLE DE NICE**

Des atteintes très graves au principe de laïcité se sont déroulées dans trois écoles élémentaires de Nice, un collège et un lycée des Alpes-Maritimes.

Quelques élèves ont organisé des temps religieux et de prières pendant la pause méridienne.

Dès que les faits sont survenus, les parents ont été convoqués par les directeurs des écoles concernées et les équipes académiques valeurs de la République immédiatement mobilisées. Des séquences spécifiques sur la laïcité ont été organisées dans le cadre de l'enseignement moral et civique à l'attention de tous les élèves des écoles concernées.

De tels faits sont intolérables dans l'École de la République et doivent faire l'objet d'une réponse ferme, collective et résolue. L'École de la République est un sanctuaire pour tous nos enfants, il est de notre devoir de la protéger de tout entrisme religieux.

Une enquête de l'Inspection générale est diligentée pour établir précisément les faits et en tirer les conclusions utiles. Par ailleurs, les équipes valeurs de la République resteront mobilisées dans toutes les écoles concernées pour assurer de manière pérenne le plein respect du principe de laïcité.

Le Ministère de l'Éducation nationale et de la Jeunesse et la Ville de Nice rappellent que le principe de laïcité s'impose sur le temps de classe comme sur le temps périscolaire.

C'est pourquoi, en plus des formations déjà organisées par l'éducation nationale d'une part et la ville de Nice d'autre part, à destination de leurs personnels respectifs, sur le sujet de la laïcité et de ses enjeux à l'école, le Ministre de l'Éducation nationale et le Maire de Nice ont décidé conjointement que les formations « laïcité et valeurs de la République » feront désormais l'objet d'un module commun réunissant l'ensemble des personnels.

Au niveau national, des mesures complémentaires seront concertées avec les associations d'élus locaux dès la prochaine instance de dialogue avec les collectivités territoriales qui se tiendra le 3 juillet prochain. Gouvernement et élus locaux partagent tous une même boussole : le principe de laïcité n'est pas négociable dans notre République.

**Figure 1** – Text of a joint appeal from the French Minister of National Education and Youth, Pape Ndiaye, and the Mayor of Nice, Christian Estrosi.

Translation of the appeal:

«JOINT DECLARATION BY PAP NDIAYE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION AND YOUTH, AND CHRISTIAN ESTROSI, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NICE

Very serious attacks on the principle of secularism took place in three elementary schools in Nice, a middle school and a high school in the Alpes-Maritimes. Some students organized

religious and prayer times during the lunch break. As soon as the facts occurred, the parents were summoned by the directors of the schools concerned and the academic teams of the Republic were immediately mobilized. Specific sequences on secularism were organized as part of moral and civic education for all students in the schools concerned. Such facts are intolerable in the School of the Republic and must be the subject of a firm,

collective and resolute response. The School of the Republic is a sanctuary for all our children, it is our duty to protect it from any religious entryism. An investigation by the General Inspectorate is carried out to precisely establish the facts and draw useful conclusions. Furthermore, the Republic's values teams will remain mobilized in all the schools concerned to ensure full respect for the principle of secularism in the long term. The Ministry of National Education and Youth and the City of Nice point out that the principle of secularism applies to both classroom and extracurricular time. This is why, in addition to the training already organized by the national education system on the one hand and the city of Nice on the other hand, for their respective staff, on the subject of secularism and its challenges to school, the Minister of National Education and the Mayor of Nice have jointly decided that the «Secularism and values of the Republic» training courses will now be the subject of a common module bringing together all staff. At the national level, additional measures will be coordinated with associations of local elected officials from the next instance of dialogue with local authorities which will be held on July 3. Government and local elected officials all share the same compass: the principle of secularism is non-negotiable in our Republic».

In the Republic of Kazakhstan, there is a request from some Muslim representatives to open prayer rooms within the walls of military units, government institutions, schools, universities, colleges and universities, et cetera, despite the official ban. Moreover, recommendations to allow the wearing of the hijab in schools and to open prayer rooms within the walls of government institutions are made both by representatives of the republican religious association «Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan» (RRA «SAMK»); the only registered Muslim religious association on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan) officially registered in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and by civil activists, human rights activists, and Salafis. So, specifically in the case of the hijab, on September 11, 2023, the press service of the SAMK reported that it had given appropriate recommendations to the authorized body on the issue of the hijab. The recommendations of this organization are as follows: to allow the wearing of scarves in blue and white colors («Qazaqstan musulmandary dini basqarmasy» respublikalyq dini birlestigi, 2023).

That is a case when both representatives of the official Muslim religious association and representatives of the informal part of Muslim society agreed on a common position – to allow students to wear clothes with religious paraphernalia within the school walls (it does not matter what color the clothes are, the very fact of the recommendation about permission is important). In essence, there is a confrontation between the principles of the French model of secularism and religious symbolism.

### *The influence of external power on Central Asia*

The situation is gradually heating up. There is a risk of further religiously motivated radicalization, which is vital for the state to consider, and preventive measures are necessary. It should add here the unstable international situation and geopolitical turbulence. There is an influence of the «Deoband» school in Central and South Asia.

«Deobandism» or the «Deobandi» movement (Urdu دیوبندی) is a revivalist movement in Sunni Islam that adheres to the Hanafi madhhab (school of fiqh) Islamic jurisprudence (Commins, 2006; Ingram, 2018). It was formed at the end of the 19th century around the Muslim educational center «Darul Uloom Deoband» (Urdu دارالعلوم دیوبند, which means «Abode of Knowledge»), in the city of Deoband (Saharanpur district, Uttar Pradesh, Republic of India), from which the name came (Puri, 2009: 19-22; Syed, 2016: 139; Asthana, 2009: 66). The movement was founded by Muhammad Qasim Nanawtawi, Rashid Ahmad ibn Hidayat Ahmad Ayyubi Ansari Gangohi and other figures after the Indian Rebellion of 1857-8 (Lewis, 1991: 205). The movement called for the abandonment of grave worship, idolatry/polytheism (the Arabic تشرک), and sought to protect «orthodox» Sunni Islam from innovation (the Arabic بدعة), as well as Sunni Muslims of South Asia from non-Muslim influence. At the same time, it sought to «protect» conservative Muslim teachings from modernist, secular ideas.

The movement was heavily funded by Saudi Arabia from the early 1980s to the early 2000s (Sareen, 2005: 282). As a result, Salafist Sunni ideas penetrated «Deobandi». Pakistan also strongly supported the Mujahideen movement in the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It should be mentioned that many well-known leaders of the «Taliban» terrorist organization

studied in «Deoband» schools (Abbas, 2011: 33-34). A «Deoband» figure like Sami-ul-Haq is called the «Father of Taliban» because his seminary «Darul Uloom Haqqaniya» has produced many «Taliban» leaders and commanders. Also, a graduate of Darul Uloom Deoband is Maulana Ilyas Kandhlawi, the founder of the now extremist organization «Jamaat Tabligh» (Urdu تبلیغی جماعت – «Society of Preachers»), the organization's activities are prohibited in Kazakhstan by the decision of the Saryarka District Court of Astana on February 26, 2013. The organization was founded in Delhi, India in 1926 (Ahmad, 1994: 512). The headquarters of the organization is in the city of Raiwind in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The propaganda activities of the founder and organization are focused primarily on «ethnic» Muslims rather than on representatives of other religions. This is explained by the fact that the slogan of the founder of the organization was the words: «اے مسلمانو! مسلمان بنو!», which means in Urdu: «O Muslims! Become Muslims [for reals]!» Thus, the organization aims to increase the religiosity of Muslims in their understanding. The organization's proselytizing activities in the post-Soviet space and, in particular, in Kazakhstan began after the collapse of the Soviet Union of Socialist Republics in 1991. Filling the ideological vacuum, this transnational organization actively carried out its destructive activities on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan until its ban in 2013. The organization is prohibited in the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with the exception of the Kyrgyz Republic, where the organization officially operates. Members of the organization from different countries periodically organize meetings in countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia. Speaking about the connection between «Jamaat Tabligh» and extremism, a number of researchers highlight the rejection of secularism by members of this organization (Silber, 2011: 37-38), as well as the fact that the organization's teachings are fertile ground for further radicalization (Burki, 2013), since an impressive number of Islamist extremists were previously members of «Tablighi Jamaat» (Alexiev, 2005).

The following notable individuals were involved or were official members of the organization: former Presidents of Pakistan Farooq Leghari, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, former President of India Dr. Zakir Hussain, former Minister of

Punjab Province of Pakistan – Pervaiz Elahi and others.

There are also cases where the activities of this organization jeopardized biological safety. Thus, during the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, the organization organized an international mass religious gathering in a mosque in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from February 27 to March 1, 2020. This congregation of «Jamaat Tablighi» has been linked to more than 620 cases of COVID-19, making it the largest known epicenter of virus transmission in Southeast Asia. Also, «Jamaat Tablighi» has emerged as one of the major coronavirus hotspots in India after it was found that nearly 20% of the positive cases out of over 2000 cases detected in India originated from «Jamaat Tablighi». The «Jamaat Tablighi» organization became India's first coronavirus «superspreader»: as of April 4, 2020, 1,023 positive coronavirus cases were associated with the «Jamaat Tablighi», which is 30% of positive cases. On April 18, 2020, the central government stated that 4,291 cases, representing 29,8% of India's total 14,378 confirmed COVID-19 cases, were linked to «Jamaat Tablighi». Thus, in the region there is a significant influence of the large Deoband movement, which has a destructive influence and is a generator of various dangerous organizations. This movement also created the following organizations: «Ulema-I-Hind», «Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam», «Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam», «Lashkar-e-Jhangvi», «Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan», «Sipah-e-Sahaba». Deoband's jihadist interpretation of Islam poses a danger to the region. Also, one should take into account the fact that in Pakistan and India many high-ranking officials are in one way or another connected with this movement.

### ***Religious and ideological risks***

The extremist-radical ideas generated by the theologians of the «Deobandi» movement have a risk for Central Asia, and particularly Kazakhstan. Such formal characteristics as adherence to the Hanafi school of fiqh, the Maturidi aqeedah (creed) and the Naqshbandi order make Deobandis formally indistinguishable from adherents of the so-called «traditional Islam», which makes it easier for Deobandis to mimic the local religious context. This provides fertile ground for religiously motivated radicalization. In addition, religious sources can be used for radicalization. For example, in the classical Hanafi book «Mukhtasar



al-Quduri», there are the following lines in the section «كتاب السير» (Book of Military Campaigns) on page 231:

الجهاد فرض على الكفاية إذا قام به فريق من الناس سقط عن  
الباقين وإن لم يقم به أحد أثم جميع الناس بتركه وقتال الكفار

واجب وإن لم يبدؤنا (Al-Quduri, 1997: 231):

Translation: «Jihād is a collective obligation; when a group of the people establish it, [the obligation] lapses from the rest, but if none of them establish it, [then] all of the people are guilty of wrongdoing by its omission. Fighting unbelievers is obligatory, even if they do not initiate it against us» (Kiani, 2010: 542).

There are other lines that will not be given in this article. It is not difficult to predict what can happen in the mind of a practicing Muslim when reading these lines literally. There is no information about the official reinterpretation of these lines by modern domestic theologians. This work has not been fully translated into Kazakh and Russian but is taught in the original language in religious educational institutions, including in Kazakhstan. All over the world, and in Kazakhstan, there is a problem of stagnation of theology, although it is recognized as a secular science. And any secular science must have stages of its development. As we know, the Republic of Kazakhstan allocates grants from the state budget for such a group of educational programs as «Religion and Theology». Further, there is a risk that radicals will take advantage of the position of the Hanafi madhhab, about which the following is written in the Preamble of the Law «On Religious Activities and Religious Associations»: «This Law... recognizes the historical role of Hanafi Islam and Orthodox Christianity in the development of culture and spiritual life of the people...». Moreover, in practice there are cases of Salafis calling themselves Hanafis. Oddly enough, theoretically there is no contradiction in this, since Salafism relates primarily to Aqedah (creed), and Hanafism relates to fiqh (jurisprudence). Thus, a practicing religious person can recite prayer according to Hanafi fiqh and believe, like the Salafis, that, for example, God is literally in heaven. That is, he may be a Hanafi without being a Maturidi, as is traditionally found. Due to the radicalization of religious people, the securitization of Islam may increase. Securitization is a process in which a certain object is recognized as a threat to security (in our case, state security) (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998: 25).

## Conclusion

An analysis of the internal political and social situation in Kazakhstan, as well as the geopolitical situation, helps to identify a number of specific problems: 1) the problem of the relationship between the French model of secularism and religious demonstrative behavior in the context of growing conservative religiosity; 2) the growing influence of the «Deobandi» movement in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan; 3) the risk of Deobandis mimicking the religious context of Kazakhstan in conditions of coincidence of their formal religious identity with representatives of local «traditional Islam»; 4) the absence or low level of a renovationist approach in Islamic theology as a basis for the growth of radical-conservative ideas. It should be noted that any radical orthodox religious discourse is distinguished by the fact that it rejects any renewalist approaches in religion (as was mentioned above with the example of the «Deobandi» movement). It is easy to predict that with the growth of radical-conservative religiosity, the question of the relationship between the French model of secularism and demonstrative religious behavior in government institutions and secular educational institutions will become increasingly acute. In this regard, the current situation naturally leads to the conclusion that in order to balance and/or prevent radical conservative religiosity, it is necessary to develop modern approaches in theological science. If we talk about international experience, then similar developments can be found in such works of prominent world scientists as «Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition» (author: professor, philosopher, theologian Fazlur Rahman), «Коранический гуманизм. Толерантно-плюралистские установки» (author: professor, Doctor of Philosophy, Islamic scholar T. K. Ibragim) and other works. Among domestic works, one can note the translation of the Quran into Russian performed by S. B. Ryzhanov using a new approach. At the same time, it should be noted that in fact, the bearers of the «radical-conservative», «fundamental» Muslim worldview often, in practice and in theory, contradict the primary source of Islam. As is known, certain banned organizations call for abandoning national, including Kazakh, self-identification, and calling

themselves the nation of Islam, building a worldwide theocratic/clerical caliphate. This is even though this concept directly contradicts the primary source of Islam – the Quran. The 22nd verse of the 30th surah of the Quran says that the division of people into nations, the difference of languages and skin color is the idea and sign of God (Al-Quran al-Karim, 2007: 406). Also, in verse 92 surah 4 of the Quran it is clearly shown that believers can be representatives of different nations, that is, faith does not determine a nation – these are different categories. In addition, adherents of destructive ideology call for unconstitutional actions, for example: hatred on religious grounds, the construction of a state where they will kill «infidels», «apostates» (in their narrow understanding), et cetera. This is all even though in verse 256 of surah 2 of the Quran clearly proclaims freedom of religion (Al-Quran al-Karim, 2007: 42). In the same vein, one can look at the issue of religious demonstrative behavior and the issue of «Muslim clothing» (consider the original social function of this or that clothing among the pre-Islamic Arabs, analyze the nature of the use of this

or that type of clothing mentioned in the original source of religion). Thus, on the one hand, the bearers of the «radical conservative», «fundamental» worldview do not accept the renovationist approach, and on the other hand, they contradict the basic source, the foundation of their religion. Thus, for radicalization and for destructive, extremist religious ideology, fertile ground is nescience of the primary source of the Islamic religion, religious illiteracy, in a word – ignorance, retrograde. Accordingly, everything opposite to the above is a kind of «antidote» for such a destructive ideology. Only an ideology can effectively counter another ideology. If religious scholars, Islamic scholars and theologians develop at the academic level a renovationist and at the same time fundamental approach based on the original source of Islam, then we can expect effective ideological opposition to extremist-terrorist ideology hiding behind Islam, and effective work on deradicalization. As a result, the tension between secularism and religious symbolism can be relieved.

#### References

- «Қазақстан мұсылмандары діни басқармасы» республикалық діни бірлестігі (2023) Мектептегі киім үлгісіне қатысты ҚМДБ мәлімдемесі – URL: <https://www.muftayat.kz/kk/news/resmi-kuzhattar/2023-09-11/42800-mekteptegi-kiim-ulgisine-katysty-kmdb-mlindemesi/> (Өтінім берілген күні 22.01.2024 ж)
- Abbas T. (2011) «Islamic political radicalism: origins and destinations». *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience*. – London: Routledge. – 324.
- Ahmad M. (1994). *Fundamentalisms Observed*. 8. *Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press – 888.
- Alexiev A. (2005). *Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad's Stealthy Legions*. *The Middle East Forum*. – URL: <https://www.meforum.org/686/tablighi-jamaat-jihads-stealthy-legions>
- Al-Quduri (1997) *Muhtasar al-Quduri fi-l-fiqhi-l-hanafi*. Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiyah. – 255 (in Arabic)
- Asthana N. C.; Nirmal A. (2009) *Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities*. – Jaipur: Shashi Jain for Pointer Publishers. – 359.
- Burki S. K. (2013). *The Tablighi Jama'at: Proselytizing Missionaries or Trojan Horse?* *Journal of Applied Security Research* – URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19361610.2013.738407>
- Buzan B., Wæver O., de Wilde J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. – Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. – 240.
- Commins D. (2006) *The Mission and the Kingdom: Wahhabi Power behind the Saudi throne*. – London: I.B.Tauris – 304.
- Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (2009) CEDH 30 juin 2009: six requêtes: Aktas (n° 43563/08), Bayrak (n° 14308/08), Gamaleddyn (n° 18527/08), Ghazal (n° 29134/08), J. Singh (n° 25463/08) and R. Singh (n° 27561/08)
- Ingram B. D. (2018) *Revival from Below: The Deoband Movement and Global Islam*. – Oakland: University of California Press. – 322.
- Kiani T. M. (2010) *The Mukhtasar of Imam Abu'l-Husayn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Ja'far ibn Hamdan Al-Quduri*. – London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd. – 735.
- Kuru A. T. (2009) *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion. The Unated States, France, and Turkey*. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 334.
- Lane E. W. (1885) *An Arabic-English Lexicon*. Book I. Part 7. – London: Williams and Norgate. – 2749.
- Lewis B.; Pellat Ch.; Schacht J., eds. (1991) *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Vol. 2 (2nd Ed.). – Leiden: Brill Publishers. – 205.
- Metcalf B. D. (2002) *Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (third impression. edited). –N ew Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press. – 1227.
- Ndiaye P. (2023) X (social network) – URL: [https://twitter.com/PapNdiaye/status/1669664164879519744?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etwetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1669664164879519744%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_&ref\\_url=](https://twitter.com/PapNdiaye/status/1669664164879519744?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etwetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1669664164879519744%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=) (Date of the application 22.01.2024)

Puri L. (2009) «The Past and Future of Deobandi Islam». CTC Sentinel. West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center. – 22.

République française (2004) Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. Journal officiel de la République française. Lois et décrets (version papier numérisée) n° 0065 du 17/03/2004 (in French)

Sareen S. (2005) *The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making*. – New Delhi: Har Anand Publications. – 352.

Silber M. D. (2011). *The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots against the West*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. – 368.

Syed J.; Pio E.; Kamran T.; Zaidi A., eds. (2016) *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*. – Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. – 546.

The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2011) The Law «On religious activities and religious associations» – URL:<https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z1100000483#:~:text=Activities%20of%20religion%2Dbased%20parties,to%20violence%20and%20other%20illegal>

The Republic of Kazakhstan (2005) The Law «On Countering to Extremism» – URL:[https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z050000031\\_](https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z050000031_)

Yarwood D. (1978) *The Encyclopedia of World Costume*. – New York: Bonanza Books. – 471.

Әл-Қурән әл-Қәрім (2007) – Мәдина: Муджәммә' әл-Мәлик Фәһд ли-тәбә'әт әл-Мусхаф әл-Шәриф – 604.

Кузнецов, В. А. (2013) Проблема светскости в странах «Арабского пробуждения»: Тунисская версия. Вестник Московского университета. Сер. 25. Международные отношения и мировая политика. 2013. № 4. – 44.

Қазақстан Республикасы Білім және ғылым министрлігі (2016) Орта білім беру ұйымдары үшін міндетті мектеп формасына қойылатын талаптарды бекіту туралы – URL:<https://adilet.zan.kz/kaz/docs/V1600013085>

## References

«Qazaqstan musulmandary dini basqarmasy» respublikalyq dini birlestigi (2023) Mekteptegi kiim ulgisine qatysty QMDB malimdemesi [Statement of the SAMK regarding school uniforms] – URL:<https://www.muftyat.kz/kk/news/resmi-kuzhattar/2023-09-11/42800-mekteptegi-kiim-ulgisine-katysty-kmdb-mlimdemesi/> (Date of the application 22.01.2024) (in Kazakh)

Abbas T. (2011) «Islamic political radicalism: origins and destinations». *Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: The British Experience*. – London: Routledge. – 324.

Ahmad M. (1994). *Fundamentalisms Observed*. 8. *Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press – 888.

Alexiev A. (2005). *Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad's Stealthy Legions*. *The Middle East Forum*. – URL: <https://www.meforum.org/686/tablighi-jamaat-jihads-stealthy-legions>

Al-Quduri (1997) *Muhtasar al-Quduri fi-l-fiqhi-l-hanafi*. Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiyah. – 255 (in Arabic)

Al-Quran al-Karim (2007) – Madinah: Mujamma' al-Malik Fahd litaba'at al-mushaf al-sharif [King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Quran] (in Arabic). – 604.

Asthana N. C.; Nirmal A. (2009) *Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities*. – Jaipur: Shashi Jain for Pointer Publishers. – 359.

Burki S. K. (2013). *The Tablighi Jama'at: Proselytizing Missionaries or Trojan Horse?* *Journal of Applied Security Research* – URL:<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19361610.2013.738407>

Buzan B., Wæver O., de Wilde J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. – Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. – 240.

Commins D. (2006) *The Mission and the Kingdom: Wahhabi Power behind the Saudi throne*. – London: I.B.Tauris – 304.

Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (2009) CEDH 30 juin 2009: six requêtes: Aktas (n° 43563/08), Bayrak (n° 14308/08), Gamaleddyn (n° 18527/08), Ghazal (n° 29134/08), J. Singh (n° 25463/08) and R. Singh (n° 27561/08)

Ingram B. D. (2018) *Revival from Below: The Deoband Movement and Global Islam*. – Oakland: University of California Press. – 322.

Kiani T. M. (2010) *The Mukhtasar of Imam Abu'l-Husayn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Ja'far ibn Hamdan Al-Quduri*. – London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd. – 735.

Kuru A. T. (2009) *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion. The United States, France, and Turkey*. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 334.

Kuznetsov V. A. (2013) Problema svetskosti v stranah «Arabskogo probuzhdeniya»: Tunisskaya versiya. [The problem of secularism in the countries of the «Arab Awakening»: Tunisian version] *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*. Ser. 25. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika. 2013. № 4. – 73.

Lane E. W. (1885) *An Arabic-English Lexicon*. Book I. Part 7. – London: Williams and Norgate. – 2749.

Lewis B.; Pellat Ch.; Schacht J., eds. (1991) *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Vol. 2 (2nd Ed.). – Leiden: Brill Publishers. – 205.

Metcalf B. D. (2002) *Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (third impression, edited). – New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press. – 1227.

Ndiaye P. (2023) X (social network) – URL:[https://twitter.com/PapNdiaye/status/1669664164879519744?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1669664164879519744%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_&ref\\_url=](https://twitter.com/PapNdiaye/status/1669664164879519744?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1669664164879519744%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=) (Date of the application 22.01.2024)

Puri L. (2009) «The Past and Future of Deobandi Islam». CTC Sentinel. West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center. – 22.

Qazaqstan Respublikasy Bilim zhane gylym ministrлігі (2016) Орта білім беру ұйымдары үшін міндетті мектеп формасына қойылатын талаптарды бекіту туралы [On approval of the Requirements for compulsory school uniforms for secondary education organizations] – URL: <https://adilet.zan.kz/kaz/docs/V1600013085> (in Kazakh)

République française (2004) Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. Journal officiel de la République française. Lois et décrets (version papier numérisée) n° 0065 du 17/03/2004 (in French)

Sareen S. (2005) *The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making*. – New Delhi: Har Anand Publications. – 352.

Silber M. D. (2011). *The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots against the West*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. – 368.

Syed J.; Pio E.; Kamran T.; Zaidi A., eds. (2016) *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*. – Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. – 546.

The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2011) *The Law «On religious activities and religious associations»* – URL:<https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z1100000483#:~:text=Activities%20of%20religion%2Dbased%20parties,to%20violence%20and%20other%20illegal>

The Republic of Kazakhstan (2005) *The Law «On Countering to Extremism»* – URL:[https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z050000031\\_](https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z050000031_)

Yarwood D. (1978) *The Encyclopedia of World Costume*. – New York: Bonanza Books. – 471.

**Information about authors:**

*Bolatzhan Al-Farabi Nurbekuly – PhD student of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: [farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru](mailto:farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru)).*

*Bishmanov Kakimzhan Muratshanuly – Candidate of Law, Acting Professor of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: [bkm58@mail.ru](mailto:bkm58@mail.ru)).*

**Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**

*Болатжан Әл-Фараби Нұрбекұлы – әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті дінтану және мәдениеттану кафедрасының PhD докторанты (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: [farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru](mailto:farabi.nurbekuly@inbox.ru)).*

*Бишманов Кәкімжан Мұратжанұлы – заң ғылымдарының кандидаты, әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті дінтану және мәдениеттану кафедрасының профессоры м.а. (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: [bkm58@mail.ru](mailto:bkm58@mail.ru)).*

*Registered: January 22, 2024.*

*Accepted: June 13, 2024.*

A. Mukan\* , N. Mukan , M. Juzey 

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: aigerimmukan@narxoz.kz

## RELIGIOUS INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION FUNCTIONS: THE EXAMPLE OF KAZAKHSTANI STUDIES

The article delves into the examination of the integration and disintegration functions of religion within Kazakh society. Authors endeavor to address this issue by drawing upon the research conducted by domestic scholars. To delineate the role of the evolution of Tengrianism and Islam in Kazakhstan's history and the formation of the religious worldview of the Kazakh people, the perspectives of 19th-century and contemporary scholars are scrutinized. Employing comparative historical and structural-functional methods, the study unveils the potential impact of these religions on the socio-spiritual development of society. The article poses inquiries regarding the conflicting perceptions of traditional Islam's authority, precipitated by the actions of contemporary politicized radical Islamic factions, the proliferation of Islamophobia, and the low levels of education and religious literacy within society. Additionally, emphasis is placed on the activities of Neotengrians seeking to alter the tenets of Tengrism and the missionary endeavors of neo-Protestant religious associations. Throughout the investigation, the authors assert that the activities of religions in Kazakhstan have contributed to an elevation in the religiosity of the populace, prompting shifts in the ethno-confessional landscape, and fostering trends in the dissemination of Islamophobias and Islamic radical ideologies. To safeguard religious stability and spiritual cohesion within the nation, the State is urged to incorporate education about religion into secondary schools, specialized, and higher educational institutions, alongside the development of scientific frameworks aimed at reconciling the tensions between traditionalism and innovation within society.

**Key words:** religion, Kazakh society, religious integration, disintegration, Tengrianism, Islam, tradition.

А. Мұқан\*, Н. Мұқан, М. Жүзей

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: aigerimmukan@narxoz.kz

### Діннің интеграциялық және дезинтеграциялық функциялары: қазақстандық зерттеулер мысалында

Мақалада қазақстандық қоғамдағы діннің интеграциялық және дезинтеграциялық функциялары талданады. Авторлар бұл мәселені отандық ғалымдардың зерттеулеріне сүйене отырып ашуға тырысады. Қазақстан тарихындағы тәңіршілдік пен исламның эволюциясының қазақ халқының діни дүниетанымының қалыптасуындағы орынын анықтау мақсатында XIX ғасырдағы ағартушылардан бастап, қазіргі кезеңдегі ғалымдардың көзқарастары сарапталды. Зерттеуде салыстырмалы тарихилық және құрылымдық-функционалдық әдіс арқылы аталған діндердің қоғамның әлеуметтік-рухани дамуына әсер ету әлеуеті анықталады. Мақалада қазіргі саясиленген радикалды исламдық бағыттардың әрекеттерінің салдарынан дәстүрлі исламның беделіне қатысты қайшылықты көзқарастардың болуы туралы, елдегі исламофобияның өсуі, қоғамдағы білім мен діни сауаттылықтың төмен деңгейі туралы мәселе көтеріледі. Сондай-ақ, қоғамда қазақтардың ежелгі сенімі тәңіршілдікті ғылыми таныммен сабақтастырып оның мазмұнын өзгертуге тырысқан топтардың және неопротестанттық діни бірлестіктердің миссионерлік қызметтерінің белсенділік танытуы атап көрсетіледі. Зерттеу барысында авторлар Қазақстандағы діндердің қызметтерінің нәтижесінде халықтың діндарлық деңгейі өсіп, этноконфессионалды құрылымы өзгеруде және исламофибиялық, исламдық радикалды идеологиялардың таралу үрдістері бар деген қорытындыға келеді. Еліміздегі діни тұрақтылық пен рухани бірлікті сақтау үшін мемлекет дін туралы білімді орта мектепте, арнаулы және жоғарғы оқу орындарында беруді іске асыруы керек және де қоғамдағы дәстүршілдік пен

жаңашылдық арасындағы қайшылықтарды шешудің жолдарын беретін ғылыми концепциялар жасақтау ұсынылады.

**Түйін сөздер:** дін, қазақ қоғамы, діни интеграция, дезинтеграция, тәңіршілдік, ислам, дәстүр.

А. Мукан\*, Н. Мукан, М. Жузей

Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, г. Алматы, Казахстан

\*e-mail: algerimmukan@narxoz.kz

### **Интеграционные и дезинтеграционные функции религии: на примере казахстанских исследований**

В статье анализируются интеграционные и дезинтеграционные функции религии в казахском обществе. Авторы пытаются раскрыть эту проблему, опираясь на исследования отечественных ученых. С целью определения роли эволюции тенгрианства и ислама в истории Казахстана и в формировании мировоззрения казахского народа анализируются взгляды ученых XIX века и современного периода. В исследовании с помощью сравнительно-исторического и структурно-функционального методов выявляется потенциал влияния указанных религий на социально-духовное развитие общества. В статье поднимается вопрос о наличии противоречивых взглядов на авторитет традиционного ислама вследствие действий современных политизированных радикальных исламских направлений, о росте исламофобии в стране, о низком уровне образования и религиозной грамотности в обществе. Вместе с тем, подчеркивается активность неотенгрианцев в обществе пытающихся изменить содержание древней веры казахов тенгрианства и миссионерской деятельности неопротестантских религиозных объединений. В ходе исследования авторы приходят к выводу, что в результате деятельности религий в Казахстане повысился уровень религиозности населения, меняется этноконфессиональная структура и существуют тенденции распространения исламофобий и исламской радикальной идеологии. Для сохранения религиозной стабильности и духовного единства в стране государству необходимо осуществлять передачу знаний о религии в средней школе, специальных и высших учебных заведениях, а также разрабатывать научные концепции, позволяющие разрешить противоречия между традиционализмом и инновациями в обществе..

**Ключевые слова:** религия, казахское общество, религиозная интеграция, дезинтеграция, тенгрианство, ислам, традиция.

#### **Introduction**

Religion and its societal impacts serve as the subject of study for scholars across various disciplines. Textbooks in religious studies introduce theories and concepts explaining the social functions of religion, as proposed by representatives of diverse philosophical and sociological schools. A comprehensive analysis of these interpretations and theories regarding the social functions of religion, put forth by different researchers in various historical epochs, proves highly beneficial for illustrating the influence of religion on specific societies and individuals. Simultaneously, it enables the illumination of previously unexplored facets of religion's functioning in society. Within the realm of scholarly inquiry, numerous functions of religion are contemplated, including its role in shaping worldviews, providing compensation, facilitating communication, regulation, integration, and disintegration, as well as nurturing cultural practices. In this discourse, we particularly focus on the integrative and disintegrative functions of religion in society, drawing conclusions

predominantly through an analysis of the works of Kazakhstani scholars.

#### **Justification of the choice of articles and goals and objectives**

A significant amount of literature is now dedicated to the subject of religion. Despite its complexity, the issue of religion has garnered interest from the general public, including believers and religious scholars. Religion serves as a vital spiritual source that shapes social identity, corrects behavior, and enhances human responsibility. In the context of modern social relations, where diverse ideas and worldviews are presented, individuals are tasked with determining their own paths. Disagreements regarding the role of religion in society, particularly the role of Islam, and the absence of a unified stance between the people and the state concerning the activities of non-traditional religious movements highlight the existence of numerous unresolved issues. While Kazakhstan has developed a normative and legal framework for the operation of religious

associations to some extent, the status of religion, its true role in societal life, and its impact on the socio-political and spiritual spheres remain subjects of ongoing debate, characterized by conflicting perspectives (Borbassova, 2010: 49). Our objective is to analyze the uncertainty surrounding the role of religion in Kazakhstan, particularly the negative consequences associated with religion and the scientific conclusions related to emerging trends in the current religious landscape of our country.

To comprehend the root causes and repercussions of these issues, it is imperative to ascertain the position of religion in the lives of Kazakhstan's people as a whole, focusing on the positive or negative influence of religious worldviews on societal development. Additionally, the task involves evaluating the status of traditional religion alongside new religious trends and tendencies in modern religious consciousness, drawing insights from the works of domestic scholars.

### Research methodology

The article employs a comparative historical method to analyze the integration and disintegration functions of religion within Kazakh society. This method enables the examination of the varying levels of influence exerted by religions prevalent in Kazakhstan at different periods on the Kazakh society. Consequently, an evaluation is provided regarding the distinctive features of the religious worldview of the Kazakh people, as well as the types of religious practices and missionary endeavors.

Furthermore, the structural and functional method allows for the consideration of religious phenomena and processes within society as an interconnected system, thereby illuminating the specific functional purposes of each element of religion. This entails an analysis of the influence of norms and values propagated through religious ideology on individuals, including the extent to which religion fosters social cohesion or engenders deviant behavior.

### Main part

The encyclopedic Dictionary of religious studies defines the "Integrative-disintegrative function of religion" as the ability of religion to unite individuals, groups, and institutions while also distinguishing them from one another. Integration facilitates stability and cohesion at both the individual and societal levels, whereas disintegration undermines

these aspects, leading to weakening. The integrative function operates in contexts where a shared religious faith is recognized, promoting unity. Conversely, religion serves a disintegrative function when conflicting tendencies exist within religious consciousness and behavior, or when diverse and conflicting denominations emerge within social groups and society.

The evolution of philosophical and sociological thought has further elucidated the concept of the integration-disintegration function of religion by exploring religion's impact on society. This development has allowed for an examination of the factors contributing to either the stabilization or disintegration of society (Baitenova, Sakbaeva, 2017: 7).

The social perspective on religion has played a significant role in shaping the field of Religious Science, particularly among Soviet-era domestic researchers. Scholars of the XIX century, such as Sh. Ualikhanov, made substantial contributions to the advancement of Religious Science by studying religion and its various components.

Sh. Ualikhanov's research sheds light on Tengrism as an ancient belief system among the Kazakh people, which held a significant place in the worldview and customs of the ancient Turks. He observed that the Kazakhs worshipped both Allah and Tengri equally, even before they were acquainted with the teachings of Muhammad. They practiced rituals such as sacrificing to Muslim saints and honoring Khojas, while also venerating fire and calling upon both Muslim angels and shamanistic spirits. Ualikhanov viewed this syncretism positively, seeing it as a harmonious blending of religious traditions within Kazakh society (Ualikhanov, 1985: 48).

This perspective on religious syncretism in Kazakh society finds resonance with the views of Academician A. Nysanbayev.

The traditional Turkic worldview is characterized by syncretism, encompassing various forms of folk thought that transcend religious or philosophical categories. This syncretism represents an initial compromise between diverse worldviews, embodying rationality and folk wisdom within people's minds. During the era of Al-Farabi, the traditional worldview of Turks epitomized this syncretic fusion, blending Islam with ancient rituals and cults, a phenomenon known as "Double faith." Ritual complexes deeply ingrained in daily life fostered the interaction of diverse perspectives, fostering constant spiritual revitalization. Al-Farabi's works serve as evidence of this cultural synthesis (Nysanbayev, 2016: 64).

Academician Garifolla Yessim argues that Islam and Tengrianism lack qualitative opposition in terms of worldview. He suggests that the simultaneous worship of Allah and Tengri by the Kazakh people reflects a synthesis of Islamic and Tengrian worldviews in their minds (Garifolla, 2006: 9). This notion resonates with the thoughts of Shokan, who contends that countries embracing Islam and Muslim culture uphold Quranic values in public life, legal systems, and international relations.

Shokan emphasizes Islam's pervasive influence across political, social, and economic spheres, including its role in shaping spiritual life within society. In analyzing the religious landscape of East Turkestan, Beisenov observes a unique phenomenon: despite the presence of Islam, its influence, advantages, and prestige in this region pale in comparison to other Muslim countries. This assessment sheds light on the religious dynamics and societal implications in East Turkestan during that period (Beisenov, 2011: 86).

Shokan Ualikhanov's perspectives on Islam evoke varied interpretations among contemporary scholars. P. Suleimenov's work, "Muslims in the Steppe," articulates concerns about the social, cultural, and spiritual evolution of Kazakh society under Islamic influence. He notes a perceived lack of deep penetration of Islam into the Kazakh psyche, warning of potential societal divisions. Suleimenov underscores the persistence of traditional Shamanic practices alongside Islamic rituals, drawing parallels to Russia's historical period of dual religion. He emphasizes the increasing assimilation of Kazakh identity into a broader Muslim framework, a trend that resonates with contemporary Kazakhstan (Suleimenov, 2015: 88). Suleimenov also suggests that Russia viewed the strengthening of Islam in Kazakhstan as disadvantageous, aligning with Shokan Ualikhanov's opposition to the spread of Islam in the Kazakh steppes, which he believed served Russia's colonial interests by hindering Kazakh-Russian unity (Sairanuly, 2023).

Islam gained traction among the Kazakh population towards the late 18th century, a period notably marked by the reign of Catherine II. Historical documents indicate state funding for mosque construction and school openings during this time, as highlighted by Kenzhaliyev and Dauletova. Shokan Ualikhanov offers contrasting views on Islam's societal role during this era. He acknowledges state support for Islamic education in 1822, which included the establishment of schools and madrasas. However, he also warns of the potential negative consequences of

Islam's influence, attributing them to the actions of illiterate mullahs and the corrupt policies of Tsarist authorities, which he predicts could lead to societal disintegration in the future (Borbassova, 2023: 50).

Ualikhanov further delineates the origins of Islam in Siberia, where Tatars from Kazan and Central Asian pilgrims played pivotal roles. He critiques the influx of Tatar seminarians for propagating what he perceives as dogmatic beliefs and steering Kazakhs towards religious devotion.

It's worth noting the dual nature of the concept of "Brought by the Tatars." One perspective highlights the positive impact of Islam, such as the promotion of literacy among Kazakhs through Arabic and the proliferation of books printed in Arabic script. Shokan Ualikhanov recognized the progressive influence of the Arabic alphabet on literacy and knowledge-seeking among Kazakhs. He emphasized its broader cultural significance beyond the Quran, including its connection to ancient Greek culture and Arabic literature. Ualikhanov noted that access to Tatar literature allowed Kazakh youth to engage with various literary works in the Chagatai dialect of Turkish (Gabdullin, 1988: 25).

Conversely, Ualikhanov criticized certain Tatar mullahs for their regressive interpretation of Islam and their imposition of fanaticism on the Kazakh people. He condemned their narrow-minded approach and their focus solely on economic gain. Ualikhanov warned of the dangers posed by the spread of Tatar Islam in Kazakhstan, likening it to the Byzantine era's influence on Russian civilization. He advocated for the establishment of Russian schools to counteract the influence of Tatar schools and mullahs, suggesting that the Kazakh people needed to move beyond the limitations imposed by Tatar religious ideas to achieve progress and enlightenment (Gabdullin, 1988: 31).

In the article "A Muslim in the Steppe," Shokan Ualikhanov also criticizes the arbitrary spread of Christianity in Kazakhstan through missionaries and priests. He describes how the local population feared Orthodox believers to the extent that they abandoned areas abundant in resources, such as the banks of the Ob River, due to the oppressive behavior of Christian missionaries and priests. Kazakhs even complained to Prince Shcherbatov about the robberies and corrupt practices of these missionaries and priests. (Gabdullin, 1988: 49).

Furthermore, Shokan highlights the blind devotion of some Kazakhs to their rulers, believing them to possess sacred qualities regardless of their sinful actions. This blind allegiance was akin to the vene-



ration of the pope by Catholics (Ualikhanov, 1980: 170).

Shokan's critique of religious leaders who distorted the essence of Islam earned him the title of an anticlerical warrior, as described by O.A. Segizbayev, who saw him as an open fighter against such corruption within the clergy (Segizbayev, 1996: 201).

Despite the challenges posed by external religious influences, Islam remained deeply ingrained in Kazakh customs, traditions, and way of thinking. M.S. Orynbekov emphasizes that Islam has been an integral part of Kazakh life for over thirteen centuries, shaping their culture, worldview, and philosophy (Orynbekov, 2005: 17).

Indeed, the religious system of the Kazakhs cannot be viewed as interchangeable types, as they have evolved through syncretism and interaction with each other over specific historical periods. Professor T. Gabitov provides compelling examples to support this notion. He suggests that Tengrianism and the veneration of ghouls incorporated Muslim content and formed a comprehensive and complex cultural phenomenon. This perspective aligns with the views expressed by Shokan, as mentioned earlier (Gabitov, 2013: 115).

## Results and discussion

Scientists also hold differing assessments of Islam and Tengrism in the contemporary era. Z. Nauryzbayeva highlights that "at the spiritual level, the National idea for Muslims signifies that our secular state is committed to the principle of monotheism. Essentially, it calls for a great Jihad—a holy war against the internal forces of darkness. Simultaneously, the National idea mandates that Muslims exhibit boundless respect for the history and culture of our ancestors, acknowledging that the spiritual tradition of the steppe—Tengrism—is not pagan but a branch of the divine tradition" (Nauryzbayeva, 2010), underscoring the role of Tengrism in the modern Kazakh worldview. On the other hand, I. Mukan and E. Mukatai argue that "after the adoption of Islam, the significance of Tengri faith for the Turks is merely historical. In other words, the indigenous faith of our ancestors held importance only in the pre-Islamic era, and its significance was diminished after the adoption of Islam" (Mukan, Mukatai, 2023: 156). They also cite researchers such as D. Kydyrali, E. Ongarov, D. Kenzhetai, and A. Abilgazy who subscribe to this viewpoint.

"In their recent book 'Tengrianism in the Religious Knowledge of the Kazakh People,' K. Zatov, A. Ryskiewa, and T. Abylov examine the perspectives of Kazakh scholars on Tengrianism and the roles of Tengrianism and Islam in contemporary Kazakh society" (Zatov, Ryskaliyeva, Abylov, 2023: 164). Without delving into all the analyses provided, we chose to focus on the authors' conclusions. It is undeniable that divine faith and archaic culture hold significant positions in the mythological worldview of the Kazakh people. However, valid questions arise regarding the appropriateness of reviving ancient layers of national consciousness and making them the nucleus of the National Bregei, and whether this process can facilitate the socio-cultural, political, and economic modernization of contemporary Kazakhstan. Conversely, such extensive theological discussions undoubtedly contribute to the development of Kazakh society, intertwining its consciousness and mental capacities in perpetual contradictions" (Zatov, Ryskaliyeva, Abylov, 2023: 169).

The authors present objective critical observations regarding the contemporary Divine reconstruction in their study. "It is worth noting that initially, Tengri groups placed significant emphasis on traditional Kazakh values and customs. However, Tengri's pronouncements are rife with hateful and notably anti-Islamic sentiments" (Zatov, Ryskaliyeva, Abylov, 2023: 170). Utilizing social networks, Tengri propagates its own ideologies through the International Research Foundation in Russian, disseminating scientific and academic information about Tengri. Furthermore, the authors expose various methods by which groups operating through the Kazakh Internet pollute the consciousness of the population. Toktar conducts a scholarly evaluation of Beisenbinov's book "The Sacred Kazakh system Akikat" and delivers lectures on both the Youtube channel and Arman Nurmukhanbetov's channel "Areke Neonomad".

Regarding the issue of religious literacy in modern society, in the latter half of the 19th century, the problem of literacy resurfaced in the Kazakh steppe. While schools assisted in teaching reading and letter recognition, religion tainted the pure consciousness of the people, and missionary activities were conducted through schools as part of the colonial policy of the Tsarist authorities. The education provided in these schools was rooted in "fiction and scholasticism," devoid of truth, as noted by the educator.

In his critique of religious fanaticism in Kazakh society, Ybyrai Altynsarin's views closely align with those of Shokan. Ybyrai also highlights the futile attempts of shamans in his time to perform feats like flying, healing illnesses by knocking on the chest, or providing protection through amulets. He remarks:

“For headaches, shamans,  
Will you bring it,  
Killing an innocent animal,  
So that the demon will flee  
Obtain the amulet.  
In ignorance of the matter,  
Without understanding.”

Under the guise of Islam, religious leaders who consider themselves educated – mullahs, engage in disputes with the Masters. Ibrai launches an open attack on them, boldly asserting to their faces that they are slaves of the kulyn, malicious, and evil:

“Mullah from a degenerate land,  
You're a big one.  
Don't pretend to be too important,  
You're not the true God.  
Without seeing someone firsthand,  
You must testify.”

“Mullahs not only exhibit unique human “qualities” but also violate the natural Kazakh language,” emphasizes the spiritual wealth of the people. They are perpetrators of language violation. Meanwhile, Moldovans remark that Kazakhs are encountering increasing difficulty in dealing with such individuals. This is because they are deeply troubled by the encouragement they receive from dominant figures, and by the swift punishment meted out by the “honor of the mold” to “infidels” as soon as Kazakhs or fellow countrymen.

Abai's critique extends beyond religion, the clergy, and religious educational institutions. He recognized that the primary focus of educational efforts should be to liberate people's consciousness from darkness and the influence of religion. “The most crucial aspect of this,” says Ibrai, “is to prevent the imposition of Tatar fanaticism (Islam) on the Kazakhs.” According to the educator, the primary means of emancipating people's consciousness from the influence of religion is education. This is why Abai placed greater emphasis on the establishment of schools than other reformers (Gabdullin, 1988: 104). The teachings of Khoja Ahmed

Yasawi, adeptly blending Islamic principles with traditional Turkic beliefs, gave rise to the doctrine of “Khal,” which enables individuals to maintain their spiritual unity and existence in the “alimsak” even in this world, despite linguistic and religious differences (Nurmuratov, Diyarbek, 2015: 123). The dissemination of Yasawi's Islamic worldview in Kazakhstan has made a significant contribution to the society's spiritual development. Through the celebration of love for God, Yasawi's teachings have instilled in people a profound love for the world and for one another. It is natural, therefore, that thinkers such as Abai and Shakarim, who subscribe to this viewpoint, are dissatisfied with the manifestation of Islam in Kazakhstan.

Abai understands that the role of religion in society is to unify all of humanity. He values a person's attitude towards their surroundings, judging it based on their capacity for love and justice:

“Love gave birth to mankind  
So love God, sweeter than life itself.  
This is the essence of religion, and upon careful consideration, one can anticipate  
Two worlds; this is the assurance of truth – Haq.  
However, three factors disrupt this harmony:  
Greed, arrogance, and love for falsehood”  
(Nurmuratov, Diyarbek, 2015: 124)

According to Abai, since faith forms the foundation of religion, he placed particular emphasis on the faith of individuals. He recognized that the future of Kazakh society hinges greatly on public religious consciousness. With a profound understanding of Islamic teachings, Abai delineates Muslim faith into two categories. “Yakini Iman” denotes true, genuine faith, which emerges from reasoning, evidence, and knowledge. In contrast, “Taklidi Iman” represents faith based on imitation, devoid of rationality or evidence, but rather reliant on blind adherence to what the clergy dictate..

After examining two forms of faith, Abai asserts that true faith is synonymous with knowledge. Furthermore, he suggests that faith, when combined with ethical and moral principles, embodies conscience and shame. Abai states, “He who has shame—there is faith; he who has no shame, he has no faith.” Additionally, Abay engages in debates with Muslim scholars, aiming to demonstrate their lack of true understanding of faith. According to Abai, the faith of the clergy is characterized by deceit and dishonesty. He criticizes them for swearing false oaths and manipulating truth, declaring, “White is

black, or black is white, lies are true.” Abai expresses resentment towards mullahs, portraying them as two-faced merchants of their religion who seek to maintain the populace in ignorance.

Abai criticizes the tradition of pilgrimages during his era. He suggests that the main goal of pilgrims in his time was to present themselves as superhuman, “a person on the path of peace, rather than a person on the path of God.” Furthermore, upon their return, working people should be referred to not by their former title “bayeken,” but by the title “Aulie kazheken.” The issues Abai addressed a century ago are recurring in Kazakh society today. Mass pilgrimages by individuals who do not fully uphold their religious duties, coupled with the actions of groups exploiting these religious journeys for profit, have led to mistrust and suspicion towards Islam among the population.

In Shakarim’s perspective, the lines “religion is one brother to man” and “those who break it and create hostile weapons are not adherents of religion” continue to hold their significance. Specifically, Shakarim Kudaiberdiuly expressed these sentiments in the collection “Imanym”:

«All religions at that time were bad,  
None of them are straight  
The Origins of World Religions  
In three things hugging  
God is there, conscience is true, Judgment Day is true»

The root cause of the wars during that period is traced and correctly identified in conflicts masked by religion. Indeed, the country and its lands have been stained with blood and massacres due to tumultuous religious tensions. Achieving peace among representatives of different religions within one country remains an elusive dream for humanity (Nurmuratov, Diyarbek, 2015: 123). It is evident that the activities of extremist religious movements emerging in Kazakhstan in recent years serve as a prime example of this ongoing issue.

These movements advocated for absolute submission to Islam and urged adherence to the lifestyle and beliefs of the early Muslim community. They encouraged Kazakh people to abandon or disregard values that aligned with their national identity, asserting that the “local” Islam passed down from generation to generation had undergone significant alterations. Similar to practices in Arab countries, these movements insisted on adherence to Sharia law, which contradicted local customs. Consequently, they promoted a foreign way of life and culture that

was alien to the Kazakh people. The consequences of such misguided religious ideology among some young individuals are evident in the recent events in Aktobe and Almaty. A series of terrorist attacks occurred in 2011-2012, followed by further incidents in 2016 in Almaty and Aktobe, resulting in loss of life and injuries to many individuals.

In modern Kazakh society, the perception of Islam is highly contentious and politicized, serving as a focal point in the ideological struggle for power. The limited theoretical understanding of Islam has contributed to a negative portrayal of the religion, often associated with aggression and animosity. Bakhytzhan Satershinov noted the increasing prevalence of Islamophobia in his writings (Satershinov, 2014: 89). Islamic scholar Askar Sabdin and political scientist Rasul Zhumaly also observe the widespread presence of Islamophobia in Kazakhstan. They argue against linking terrorist attacks in the country with traditional Islam, emphasizing the need to differentiate between legitimate religious practices and criminal activities masquerading as religious acts. The growth of Islamophobia, they assert, can be attributed to the inadequate state of education and religious literacy in the nation (Kosenov, 2011).

The transition period witnessed deep and radical transformations across all sectors of society, including the spiritual realm and religious consciousness. The collapse of the Soviet totalitarian system and atheistic ideology triggered profound shifts in societal values. Ideological uncertainty and social upheaval during this period fostered feelings of fear and confusion among the populace. Additionally, religious illiteracy, gaps in the law regarding religious faith and associations established in 1992, shortage of religious experts and qualified theologians, and the vigorous missionary activities of religious movements collectively contributed to a negative impact on the religious landscape of the country and the formation of religious consciousness.

Since the 1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church and neoprotestant religious associations have actively pursued missionary “evangelization” efforts in Kazakhstan. This phenomenon has been the subject of special scientific research projects, resulting in publications led by scholars such as N.Zh. Baitenova, K.M. Borbassova, and A. D. Kurmanaliyeva (Baitenova, 2009: 45). These works not only analyze the teachings and religious practices of new religious movements in Kazakhstan but also document the presence of proselytism in their missionary activities.

Through the examination of diverse catalysts and motivations prompting the establishment of religious movements during that era, as well as their capacity to draw followers (including instances of departure due to deception), it was demonstrated that the underlying reasons for this phenomenon were shaped by socio-political, economic, and psychological factors.

The majority of members in new religious movements comprise isolated elderly individuals and young people seeking companionship and community. Younger members often express interest in opportunities such as learning a foreign language at no cost, experiencing modern music during worship, traveling to countries like Korea or the United States sponsored by the organization, and obtaining exemptions from military service obligations (Kurmanaliyeva, Utebaeva, Askenuly, 2018: 104).

Kazakhstan is assuming a new, often politically charged status. Within the expert community, there exist mutually exclusive perspectives regarding its role and functions as a social institution, the legalization of religious organizations, and consequently, the formulation of State-confessional policies.

Religion in contemporary Kazakhstan serves as a significant factor in socialization, fostering both the resurgence of traditional ethno-confessional identities and the broadening of avenues for transitioning to different religious denominations. This duality underscores its prominent role as one of the evident directions in religiosity (Borbassova, 2009: 103).

Despite the demonstrated stability of these trends and the rise in new religious organization neophytes (GDO), experts tend to avoid discussing the scale of these processes. Issues pertaining to the criteria for classifying GDO as religious entities, within the expansive interpretation of international law norms, and the utilization of Political Technologies as a potent tool, remain largely unaddressed (Burova, 2014: 85). Leaders of these new movements and religious organizations swiftly capitalize on fluctuations in public sentiment, promptly critiquing the perceived vices of the “sinful” world, while positioning themselves as advocates of monotheistic saviors and purveyors of profound wisdom and morality.

Religion in contemporary Kazakhstan serves as a significant factor in socialization, facilitating both the revitalization of traditional ethno-confessional identities and the broadening of avenues for adopting religious affiliations. This dual role underscores its importance as one of the most prominent facets of religiosity in the country.

Despite the demonstrated stability of prevailing trends and the increasing number of new religious organization adherents, experts refrain from quantifying the scale of these processes. Issues surrounding the criteria for categorizing these organizations as religions, within the broader interpretation of international law norms, and the utilization of Political Technologies as effective tools remain largely unexplored (Burova, 2014: 178). Leaders of these new movements and religious organizations swiftly capitalize on fluctuations in public sentiment, critiquing the perceived vices of the “sinful” world while positioning themselves as advocates of monotheistic saviors, purveyors of profound wisdom, and morality.

### Conclusion

Through historical and comparative analysis of the works of Kazakhstani researchers, we have reached several conclusions regarding the integration and disintegration functions of religions prevalent in Kazakh society. These conclusions shed light on the roles these religions play in shaping social cohesion and fragmentation.

They delve deeply into various aspects of Tengrianism, including its philosophy, history, and shamanistic practices. Notable scholars in this field include S. Akatai, N. Ayupov, A. Kodar, M. Orynbekov, Z. Nauryzbayeva, tracing back to the works of Sh. Ualikhanov. These researchers posit that Tengri faith underwent syncretism with the advent of Islam, resulting in a reinterpretation and evolution of its beliefs and practices.

Simultaneously, there emerged groups within modern society attempting to redefine the concept of divinity by integrating it with scientific understanding. Consequently, “Tengrianism” evolved into a natural philosophical worldview. Contemporary Tengrianism endeavors to merge these natural philosophical concepts with Islamic rituals such as fasting, prayer, and funeral rites, thereby shaping a novel religious framework. Adherents to this movement often reject the positive influence of Islam on Kazakh spirituality, viewing it instead as a foreign religion imposed on Kazakh people to maintain subjugation (Zatov, Ryskaliyeva, Abylov, 2023: 183).

Some researchers acknowledge Tengrism’s historical significance in Kazakh culture but argue against its relevance in the contemporary Kazakh worldview. They propose a perspective suggesting that Kazakh people willingly embraced Islam upon

its introduction to the Kazakh steppes. Research in this area encompasses the broader scope of Islamic history, Islamic studies, Islam's impact on the Kazakh steppe, the perspectives of intellectuals on Islamic religion in Kazakh territory, the current state of Islam, and the necessity for its ongoing enhancement.

When analyzing the religious and psychological climate within the collective consciousness of the population, it's essential to consider the spectrum of religious beliefs. With over 70% of the country identifying as Muslims, distinct groups emerge:

1. Those who embrace fervent or fanatical interpretations of Islam.

2. Individuals who align with a more secularist interpretation of Islam, emphasizing a separation of religion from state affairs.

3. Those who identify as Muslim but do not strictly adhere to religious practices or teachings.

4. People who maintain a neutral stance towards Islam or outright reject its principles.

These diverse perspectives reflect the multifaceted nature of religious belief within the society, each contributing to the overall religious and psychological landscape of the nation..

Following the collapse of atheistic ideologies, Kazakhstan witnessed the emergence of various religious educational institutions, ranging from small boarding schools to universities. This development highlights the divergence between the educational system's approach to religion and the prevailing religious and psychological climate. The former, rooted in religious philosophy, focuses on disseminating Islamic teachings, preaching, and promoting religious ideals. In contrast, the latter, grounded in the philosophy of religion, rejects the propagation of secularism, fanaticism, and the exaggerated glorification of religious beliefs (Gabitov, 2013: 116).

Another significant concern revolves around the missionary endeavors of emerging religious groups. Presently, the missionary efforts of Protestant organizations represent a direct cultural and social influence stemming from Western civilization. This activity is reshaping the ethno-confessional landscape across various regions, prompting the formation of ethno-political stances that endorse states fostering the growth of non-traditional religious entities. Consequently, it becomes imperative to scrutinize

missionary activities within the broader framework of national security maintenance (Kurmanaliyeva, Utebaeva, 2015: 235).

Religious values deeply ingrained in individuals' minds shape their behavior. Consequently, by introducing pseudo-religious doctrines into the collective consciousness of citizens in independent nations, it becomes feasible to manipulate these countries in the future using the classic strategy of controlled conflict. Simultaneously, there's also the exertion of pressure through the dissemination of radical religious movements with historical roots. Terrorism rooted in religious ideologies serves as a distinct manifestation of certain effects stemming from geopolitical processes.

Islamic ideologies encompass a spectrum of political views, ranging from radicalism to positions and values that emphasize faith in Allah, obedience, moderation, compromise, loyalty to authorities, and tolerance. While radicals often co-opt and distort these ideologies, they can also serve as the foundation for countering extremism and terrorism. Drawing from the teachings of Imam Abu Hanifa, there's an opportunity to oppose radical Islamic ideology by promoting the principles of Sunnism within the Hanafi School of thought. This approach aims to reclaim and redirect Islamic ideologies towards peace, moderation, and cooperation, countering the extremist interpretations that threaten the stability and harmony within Muslim communities and beyond (Burova, 2013: 87).

In conclusion, the integration of religious literacy into mainstream education is essential. This involves equipping individuals with the knowledge to recognize and understand various world religions, both traditional and emerging, alongside the ability to discern pseudo-religions and extremist groups. By doing so, individuals can develop what has been termed 'information immunity' against radical ideologies (Baitenova, 2017: 5). Hence, the implementation of a 'Religious Studies' course becomes pertinent, serving as a primary tool for cultivating religious literacy among young people. However, it's imperative to extend religious education beyond schools to encompass specialized and higher educational institutions. This broader approach ensures that individuals continue to deepen their understanding of religion, fostering critical thinking and resilience against extremist ideas.

## References

- Байтенова Н.Ж., Сақбаева А.Қ (2017) Діни терроризм мен экстремизмнің алдын-алу шаралары. ҚазҰУ Хабаршысы. Дінтану сериясы. 4 (12), 5-8.
- Байтенова Н.Ж. және т.б. (2009) Қазіргі дәстүрден тыс діни қозғалыстар мен культтер. – Алматы: Әрекет Принт. – 275.
- Бейсенов Б.Қ., Игисенова А.Р. (2011) Шоқан Уәлихановтың діни ізденістері. ҚазҰУ хабаршысы. Философия сериясы. Мәдениеттану сериясы. Саясаттану сериясы. 1 (36), 85-89.
- Борбасова К.М. (2009) Діни бірлестіктер және ұлттық қауіпсіздік мәселесі. Монография. – Алматы: Әрекет Принт. – 212.
- Борбасова Қ., Мұқан А., Исаева Л. (2023) Дәстүрлі ислам және оның қоғамның ұлттық бірегейлігінің интеграциялық және дезинтеграциялық үдерістерінің динамикасына әсері. ҚазҰУ хабаршысы. Дінтану сериясы 3 (35), 48-57.
- Борбасова Қ.М. (2010) Қазіргі жастар өміріндегі діннің рөлі. Журнал Поиск. 4. 46-51.
- Бурова Е., Косиченко А. (2013) Актуальные проблемы развития религиозной ситуации в Республике Казахстан. Под общ. ред. З.К. Шаукеновой. – Алматы: ИФПР КН МОН РК. – 137.
- Бурова Е.Е. (2014) Тренды новой религиозности в современном Казахстане (опыт социогуманитарного измерения). Монография. – Алматы: ИФПР КН МОН РК, – 200.
- Габитов Т. (2013) Духовность и толерантность как ориентиры религиозной культуры казахов. Материалы научно-практической конференции, Влияние религии на современный мир./ Под. общ. Ред. З.К. Шаукеновой. Сборник статей. – Алматы: ИФПР КН МОН РК. – 115-116.
- Ғабдуллин Б. (1988) Шоқан, Ыбырай және Абай дін туралы (Шаманизм, ислам, атеизм, деизм, антиклерикализм). – Алматы: Қазақстан. – 104.
- Ғарифолла Е. (2006) Дін өркениеті. ҚазҰУ Хабаршысы, Философия сериясы. Мәдениеттану сериясы. Саясаттану сериясы. 2 (26), 6-16.
- Затов Қ., Рыскиева А., Абылов Т. (2023) Қазақ халқының діни танымындағы тәңіршілдік. – Алматы: «Нұр-Мұбарак» баспасы. – 224.
- Косенов Алдияр. (2011) Эксперт: Исламофобия в Казахстане это не боязнь ислама. [https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan\\_news/ekspert-islamofobiya-v-kazahstane-eto-ne-boyazn-islama-202165/](https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/ekspert-islamofobiya-v-kazahstane-eto-ne-boyazn-islama-202165/)
- Құрманәлиева А.Д., Утебаева Д.С. (2015) Адамзат тарихындағы миссионерліктің қалыптасу ерекшеліктері. ҚазҰУ Хабаршысы, Философия сериясы, Мәдениеттану сериясы, Саясаттану сериясы. 1 (50), 230-236.
- Құрманәлиева А.Д., Утебаева Д.С., Әскенұлы Е. (2018) Миссионерлік әдістері: оқу құралы. – Алматы: Қазақ университеті. – 178.
- Құрманәлиева А.Д., Рысбекова Ш.С., Бейсенов Б.Қ. және т.б.; жалпы ред.басқ. Байтенова Н.Ж. (2018) Дінтану энциклопедиялық сөздік. 1 том (А-И) – Алматы: Қазақ университеті баспасы. – 495.
- Мұқан И., Мұқатай Е. (2023) Тәңіршілдік ұғымы мен мәні, тарихи сипаттамасы, бүгінгі проблемалары. – Алматы: «Нұр-Мұбарак» баспасы. – 228.
- Наурызбаева З. (2010) Изначальный ислам – тенгрианство в наследии жырау и национальная идея. <https://otuken.kz/iznachalnyj-islam-tengrianstvo-v-n/>
- Нұрмұратов С.Е., Дариябек Д.С. (2015) Қазақ және түрік акын-жыраулар шығармашылығындағы толеранттылық қағидасы. ҚазҰУ Хабаршысы, Философия сериясы. Мәдениеттану сериясы. Саясаттану сериясы. 2, 121-126.
- Нысанбаев А. (2016) Наследие Аль-Фараби как связующая нить тюркской, иранской и казахской культуры. Вестник КазНУ, Серия Философия, Культурология, Политология. 2. «Аль-Фараби и современность» Материалы Международного Фарабийского форума.
- Орынбеков М.С. (2005) Генезис религиозности в Казахстане. – Алматы: ИФПР КН МОН РК. – 204.
- Сайранұлы С. (2023) Кезінде Ресей үшін қазақтың Исламға берік болуы өте қауіпті болған. Мұны Шоқан да ашық айттып кеткен...» <https://islam.kz/kk/articles/islam-jane-gylym/kezinde-resei-ushin-qazaqtyn-islamga-berik-boluy-ote-quipti-bolgan-muny-shoqan-da-ashyq-aityp-ketken-4212/#gsc.tab=0>
- Сатершинов Б. (2014) Ислам фобиясы және стереотиптер. Монография. Жалпы ред. басқ. З.К. Шаукенова, С.Е. Нұрмұратов. – Алматы: ҚР БҒМ ҒК ФСДИ. – 158.
- Сегизбаев О.А. (1996) Казахская философия XV- начала XX века. – Алматы: Ғылым. – 472.
- Сүлейменов П.М. (2015) Қазақстандағы діни сананың эволюциясы. ҚазҰУ Хабаршысы, Философия сериясы. Мәдениеттану сериясы. Саясаттану сериясы. 4 (53), 84-89.
- Уәлиханов Ш. (1985) Бес томдық шығармалар жинағы, Қазақ ССР Ғылым Академиясы. Том 4, – Алма-Ата: Ғылым. – 459.
- Уәлиханов Ш. (1980) Таңдамалы. – Алматы: Жазушы. – 198.

## References

- Baitenova N.Zh. (2009) Kazirgi dasturden tys dini kozgalystar men kul'tter [Religious movements and cults outside the current tradition]. – Almaty: Areket Print. – 275. (in Kazakh)
- Baitenova N.Zh., Sakbaeva A.K. (2017) Dini terrorizm men ekstremizm aldyn-alu sharylary [Measures to prevent religious terrorism and extremism]. Bulletin KazNU, Religious Studies Series. 4(12). – 5-8. (in Kazakh)

- Beisenov B.K., Igisenova A.R. (2011) Shokan Ualikhanovtyn dini izdenisteri [Religious searches of Shokan Valikhanov]. Bulletin KazNU, Philosophy Series, Cultural Studies Series, Political Science Series.1 (36), 85-89. (in Kazakh)
- Borbassova K.M, Mukan A.B, Isayeva L. (2023) Dastuli Islam zhane onyn kogamnyn ulttyk biregeiliginin integratsiyalyk zhane dezintegratsiyalyk uderisterinin dinamikasya aseri [Traditional Islam and its impact on the dynamics of integration and disintegration processes of the national identity of society] Bulletin KazNU, Religious Studies Series, 3(35). – 48-57. (in Kazakh)
- Borbassova K.M. (2009) Dini birlestikter zhane ulttyk qauipsizdik maselesi [Religious associations and national security issues]. Monografiya. – Almaty: Areket print. – 212. (in Kazakh).
- Borbassova, K.M. (2010) Qazirgi zhastar omirindegi dinnin' roli [The role of religion in the life of modern youth]. – Jurnal Posik, 4, 46-51. (in Kazakh)
- Burova E., Kosichenko A. (2013) Aktual'nye problemy razvitiya religioznyi situatsyi v Respublike Kazakhstan [Actual problems of the development of the religious situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan]. – Almaty: Institute for Philosophy, Political Science and Religion Studies CS MES RK. – 137. (in Russian)
- Burova E.E. (2014) Trendy novoi religioznosti v sovremennom Kazakhstane (opyt tsosio-gumanitarnyi izmirenie [New religious trends in modern Kazakhstan]. Monograph. – Almaty: Institute of Philosophy, Politics and Religion CS MES RK. – 200. (in Russian)
- Gabdullin B. (1988) Shokan, Ybyrai zhane Abai din turaly (Shamanizm, Islam, ateizm, deizm, antiklarizm [Shokan, Ibrai and Abai on religion (Shamanism, Islam, Atheism, Deism, Anticlericalism)]. – Almaty: Kazakhstan. – 104. (in Kazakh)
- Gabitov T. (2013) Duxovnost' i tolerantnost' kak orentiry religioznyi kultury kazakhov [Spirituality and tolerance as the orientation of the religious culture of the Kazakhs]. Materials of the scientific and practical conference on the religion of the modern world. – Almaty: Institute for Philosophy, Political Science and Religion Studies CS MES RK. – 115-116. (in Russian)
- Garifolla E. (2006) Din orkeniyeti [Civilization of religion] Bulletin KazNU Philosophy Series, Cultural Studies series, Political Science Series. 2 (26). – 6-16. (in Kazakh)
- Kosenov A. (2011) Expert: Islamafobiya v Kazakhstane eto ne boyazn' Islama [Expert: Islamophobia in Kazakhstan is not the fear of Islam. [https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan\\_news/ekspert-islamofobiya-v-kazakhstane-eto-ne-boyazn-islama-202165/](https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/ekspert-islamofobiya-v-kazakhstane-eto-ne-boyazn-islama-202165/) (in Russian)
- Kurmanaliyeva A.D, Utebaeva D.S., Askenuly E. (2018) Missionerlik adisteri, oqu kuraly [Missionary activity]. – Almaty: Kazakh University. – 178. (in Kazakh)
- Kurmanaliyeva A.D., Utebaeva D.S. (2015) Adamzat tarihindagy missionerliktin kalyptasu erekshelikteri [Features of the formation of missionary work in the history of mankind]. Bulletin KazNU, Philosophy series, Culture Series, Politics Series, 1(50). – 230-236. (in Kazakh)
- Mukan I. Mukatay E. (2023) Tanirshildik udymy men mani,tarihi sipattamasy,bugungu problemalary [The concept and essence of Tengrism, historical characteristics, prolemas of today]. – Almaty: Nur-Mubarak. – 228. (in Kazakh)
- Nauryzbayeva Z. (2010) Iznachal'nyi Islam – tengriansvo v nasledi zhyrau i natsionalnaya idea [The original Islam – tengrianism in the legacy of Zhyrau and the National idea] <https://otuken.kz/iznachalnyj-islam-tengrianstvo-v-n/>. (in Kazakh)
- Nurmuratov S.E., Dariybek D.S. (2015) Kazakh zhane turik aqyn-zhyraular shygarmashylygyndagy toleranttylyq qagidasy [The principle of tolerance in the work of Kazakh and Turkish Poets-Zhyrau]. Bulletin KazNU, Philosophy Series, Cultural Studies Series, Political Science Series, 2. – 121-126. (in Kazakh)
- Nysanbayev A. (2016) Naslediye Al'-Farabi kak svyazushya nit' turkskoi, iranskoi i kzakhskoi kultury [Al-Farabi is associated with the Turkic, Iranian and Kazakh cultures]. Bulletin KazNU, Philosophy, Culturology, Politicology. "Al-Farabi and modernity" Material of the International Farabi forum. 2. – 62-70. (in Russian)
- Orynbekov M.S. (2005) Genesis religioznosti v Kazakhstane [The Genesis of religiosity in Kazakhstan. – Almaty: Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies CS MES RK. – 204. (in Russian)
- Sairanuly S. (2023) Kezinde Resei ushin kazaktyn' Islamga berik boluy ote qauipti bolgan. Muny Shoqanda ashiq aityp ketken. [At one time, it was very dangerous for Russia for the Kazakh to adhere to Islam. This is what Shokan said openly.] <https://islam.kz/kk/articles/islam-jane-gylym/kezinde-resei-ushin-qazaqyn-islamga-berik-boluy-ote-qauipti-bolgan-muny-shoqan-da-ashyq-aityp-ketken-4212/#gsc.tab=0> (in Kazakh)
- Satershinov B.M. (2014) Islam fobiasy zhane steortipter [Islamic phobia and stereotypes]. Monograph / General Ed. other. Z.K. Shaukenova, S.E. Nurmuratov., Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies. – Almaty: Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies CS MES RK. – 151. (in Kazakh)
- Segizbayev O.A. (1996) Kazakhskaya Filosofiya XV nachala XX veka [Kazakh philosophy XV – the beginning of XX century]. – Almaty: Gylym. – 472. (in Russian)
- Suleimenov P.M. (2015) Kazakhstandagi dini sananyn evolutsiyasy [Evolution of religious consciousness in Kazakhstan]. Bulletin KazNU, Philosophy Series, Cultural Studies Series, Political Science Series, 4 (53), 84-89. (in Kazakh)
- Ualikhanov Sh. (1980) Tandamaly [Selective]. – Almaty: Jazushy. – 416. (in Kazakh)
- Ualikhanov Sh. (1985) 5 tomdyq shygarmalar jinagy [Collected works in five volumes]. – Alma-Ata: Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR. Vols 4. – 459 (in Russian)
- Zatov K., Ryskueva A., Abylov T. (2023) Qazaq halkinyn dini tanymyndagi tanirshildik [Tengrism in the religious knowledge of the Kazakh people.] – Almaty: Nur-Mubarak. – 224. (in Kazakh)

**Information about authors:**

*Mukan Aigerim – PhD student of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: aigerimmukan@narxoz.kz).*

*Mukan Nurzat – PhD, Senior Lecturer of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: Mukan.nurzat@gmail.com).*

*Juzei Myrzakhmet Amankululy – PhD, Senior Lecturer of the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: mirza1806@mail.ru).*

**Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**

*Мұқан Әйгерім – әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті дінтану және мәдениеттану кафедрасының PhD докторанты (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: aigerimmukan@narxoz.kz).*

*Мұқан Нұрзат – PhD, әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті дінтану және мәдениеттану кафедрасының аға оқытушысы (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: Mukan.nurzat@gmail.com).*

*Жүзей Мырзахмет Аманкұлұлы – PhD, әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті дінтану және мәдениеттану кафедрасының аға оқытушысы (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: mirza1806@mail.ru).*

*Registered: March 25, 2024.*

*Accepted: June 8, 2024.*



**A. Akimkhanov** , **B. Abdilkhakim\*** , **A. Janenuly** 

Nur-Mubarak Egyptian University of Islamic Culture, Almaty, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: burhanhakim01@gmail.com

## THE BELIEF SYSTEM OF THE DEOBAND SCHOOL AND ITS POSITION TOWARDS SALAFISM

The Deoband school, which emerged in India, has become one of the topical issues recently. Groups are emerging in Kazakhstan who believe that Deobandism is correct and adhere to it. Spread of this ideology in our country was mainly due to the people who studied at the centers of this ideology, which are mainly Pakistan. Muslims in countries such as Pakistan, India and Afghanistan often follow Abu Hanifa school, Maturidi creed and are conservative in religious issues. In turn, the Kazakh people throughout the history combined religion and traditions. Therefore, the spread of Deobandi religious concepts in the Kazakh land creates certain misunderstandings. This is probably due to the fact that the religious views of the Deobandis are contrary to the Kazakh worldview. Research is needed to determine how and why these contradictions are emerging. Despite the relevance of the problem, there are almost no research on this topic in our country. The skeleton of any religious ideology is a matter of faith, therefore for this article as a research topic has been chosen Deobandi's faith. The purpose of the article is to determine what belief system the Deoband school adhere to and how they relate to Salafism. This is because research has revealed that the Deoband school representatives are close to Ash'arism and Salafism in their beliefs. The article contains a brief history of Deobandism, its belief system and the views of Deoband scholars on the prominent scholars of Salafism like Sheikh Ibn Taymiyyah. Also, the influence of Maturidi and Ash'ari belief systems on the Deobandis and generally their views on Wahhabism are analyzed.

**Key words:** Deoband, Islam, Salafism, India, Iman.

А. Әкімханов, Б. Абдилхаким\*, Ә. Жәненұлы

Нұр-Мұбарак Египет ислам мәдениеті университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: burhanhakim01@gmail.com

### Деобанд мектебінің сенім жүйесі және сәләфизмге қатысты ұстанымы

Түбі Үндістанға барып тірелетін Деобандия мектебі соңғы уақытта өзекті тақырыптардың біріне айналып отыр. Себебі елімізде Деобандия бағытын дұрыс санайтын және ұстанатын топтар пайда болды. Бұл идеологияның жайылуына негізінен Пәкістан секілді Деобандия идеологиясының ошақтарында оқып келген азаматтардың мұрындық болғаны белгілі жәйт. Пәкістан, Үндістан және Ауғанстан секілді елдердегі мұсылмандар көбіне Әбу Ханифа мәзһабын, Матуриди ақидасын ұстанады және діни мәселелерде консервативті болып келеді. Өз кезегінде қазақ халқы тарих бойынша дін мен дәстүрді қатар алып жүрген ел. Сондықтан табиғатынан консервативті Деобандия пайымының қазақ жерінде таралуы белгілі бір олқылықтар мен түсінбеушіліктер туғызып отыр. Бұған деобандықтардың діни көзқарастарының қазақ дүниетанымына қайшы келетіні себеп болса керек. Қайшылықтардың қайдан және не үшін туындап жатқанын анықтау үшін ғылыми зерттеулер қажет. Мәселенің өзектілігіне қарамастан елімізде осы тақырыпқа қатысты зерттеулер жоқтың қасы. Бұл жәйт осы бағыттағы ғылыми жұмыстардың маңызын арттырады деген сөз. Кез келген діни идеологияның қаңқасы сенім мәселесі болып саналатындықтан, осы мақалада Деобандияның сенім жүйесі қолға алынып отыр. Мақаланың мақсаты Деобандия мектебінің ақидасының қандай бағытта екенін айқындау және оның сәләфизмге қаншалықты қатысы бар екенін ашу. Себебі деобандықтардың сенімі әшғарилік пен салафизмдікке жақын екені зерттеу барысында анықталып отыр. Мақалада Деобанд мектебінің сенім жүйесі, қысқаша тарихы, деобандық ғұламалардың Ибн Тәймия секілді сәләфизмнің белді өкілдеріне қатысты көзқарастары қамтылады. Сондай-ақ деобандықтардың матуриди мен әшғариліктен алған әсерлері, уахабизмге қатысты ой-пікірлері сарапталады.

**Түйін сөздер:** Деобанд, ислам, сәләфизм, Үндістан, иман.

А. Акимханов, Б. Абдилхаким\*, А. Жаненулы

Египетский университет исламской культуры Нур-Мубарак, г. Алматы, Казахстан

\*e-mail: burhanhakim01@gmail.com

### Система верований деобандийской школы и ее отношение к салафизму

Деобандийская школа берущая свое начало в Индии, в последнее время стала одной из актуальных тем. Это связано с тем, в что в нашей стране есть группы, которые верят и следуют этому направлению. Известно, что распространением этой идеологии руководили в основном граждане, обучавшиеся в центрах деобандийской идеологии, таких как Пакистан. Мусульмане в таких странах, как Пакистан, Индия и Афганистан, в основном следуют школе Абу Ханифы, вероучению Матуриды, и консервативны в религиозных вопросах. В свою очередь, казахский народ исторически является страной, где сосуществуют религия и традиции. Поэтому распространение консервативного по своей сути деобандийского направления на казахской земле вызывает определенные проблемы. Вероятно, это связано с тем, что религиозные взгляды приверженцев деобандийской школы противоречат казахскому мировоззрению. Необходимы научные исследования, чтобы выяснить, как и почему возникают эти противоречия. Несмотря на актуальность проблемы, исследований на эту тему в нашей стране практически нет. Этот факт повышает значимость научных работ в этом направлении. Поскольку основа любой религиозной идеологии – это вопрос убеждений, в этой статье рассматривается система убеждений деобандийской школы. Цель статьи – выявить направленность вероучения деобандийской школы и рассмотреть ее связь с салафизмом. В ходе исследования выявилась связь в вопросах акыды деобандизма с ашаризмом и салафизмом. В статье представлена система вероубеждений деобандийской школы, краткая история и взгляды ученых-деобандитов таких видных представителей салафизма, как Ибн Таймия. Также анализируется влияние матуридизма и ашаризма на приверженцев деобандийской школы и их мнение по вахабизму.

**Ключевые слова:** Деобанд, ислам, салафизм, Индия, иман.

#### Introduction

After the fall of the Great Mughal Empire in 1858, India became a British colony. At this point, Muslims in India were considered the second largest group after Hindus who followed the traditional Hindu religion. As a result of the religious and cultural expansion and colonization of the British, which began in the second half of the 19th century, among the Muslims of India and Sindh (today's India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), conservative religious leaders began to appear who were against colonialism and the Christian propaganda and modernism (Hamid, 2005: 39). In 1857-1859 there were uprisings against the colonial power. But public upheavals and armed uprisings failed. In 1866, Dar al-Ulum Deoband madrasah was founded in Deoband village, which was located 150 kilometers from Delhi, under the leadership of Muhammed Qasim Nanautawi (Özcan, 1993: 554). Because after the fall of the Great Mughal Empire, which ruled over India and Sind for more than 3 centuries and was founded by Muslim Turks, the power passed completely into the hands of the British, the local Muslims who followed the Hanafi madhab realized that their spiritual and religious identities were in danger. Thus, in order to protect themselves from the religious and cultural expansion of the colonial British and local In-

dians, who began to surround them from all sides, as well as to resist the delusions, negative beliefs and heresies that began to spread among the local Muslim community, they founded the Deoband school which taught Islamic sciences on the basis of a conservative, classical education system (Al-Qasimi 2000: 33). A researcher of Deobandism Atif Suhail says: "When Darul Uloom Deoband was founded by Nanautawi some claimed that it is merely "attempt to foster traditional religious imaginaries." Others insisted that Deobandism "has inspired modern revivals of Islamic fundamentalism." But the reality is that the Deoband movement sought to revive the community of Sunni orthodoxy, strongly opposing non-Islamic elements in Islamic culture and society and fostering tendencies of selfassertion" (Siddiqui, 2020: 43). It is worth to mention that Darul Uloom Deoband, instead of collecting funds from royal or noble families (like madrasahs did before), preferred to receive public donations, which had a twofold effect: it allowed the madrasah to make its own decisions, on the other hand, the general public to identify themselves with him (Akhtar, 2022: 88).

The motto of Dar al-Ulum Deoband was "firm adherence to religion, including strict adherence to the Hanafi School, preservation of antiquity (old traditions) and protection of the Sunnah (from heresies)." Muhammed Ubaidullah al-Qasimi from

Deoband states the most important principle and mission of the academic policy of Dar al-Ulum Deoband as follows: “The main result expected from the subjects studied by our students is the formation of scholars and society who guide Muslims, especially in religious matters and in general worldly affairs... All this is realized on the basis of the Quran and the Sunnah, and on the basis of pure Islamic faith, which is free from all types of error and heresy. That is why this University is based on teachings that help Islamic subjects to understand the Qur’an and Sunnah and their meaning. And, does not pay much attention to technical, that is modern sciences (Metcalf, 1982: 32). Because in the Indian subcontinent there are more and more institutes and universities that teach modern sciences. Those educational institutions are producing many generations who compete with each other to achieve trivial worldly goals such as prestige, fame and position. Because those educational institutions produce intellectuals whose appearance and appearance are Indian, but whose thinking and knowledge and experience are western. This is as the member of the commission that oversees the field of education during the British colonial period openly stated the goal of his government, saying: “Our duty is to produce intellectuals who are Indian in appearance and English in mind.” Here, opposition to this in the path of Islam took place through the founding of this University by the scientists and scholars of our country. Their goal there was to produce an intelligentsia whose appearance and color were Indian, whose mind and heart were Hijaz, and whose goals and life skills were Mohammedan”.

Politically, the Deobandis generally supported the Ottoman Empire against the British. Because they saw the Ottomans as the last bastion of Muslims. Therefore, when the Ottoman Empire was defeated by the Entente countries in the First World War, Indian Muslims were greatly disappointed (Reetz, 2007: 142). In general, it can be said that the Deobandis were politically active. For example, Deoband intellectuals founded political organizations such as Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam. While one faction supported the Muslim League’s demand for a separate Muslim region, the other collaborated with the Indian National Congress to oppose subcontinental partition (Momen, Ebrahimi, Hassan, 2023: 68). Also the Indian subcontinent and East Bengal, between the late 1910s and early 1920s, saw the emergence of the Khilafat Movement, led largely by the scholars of Deoband. The Khilafat Movement aimed to preserve the Ottoman Empire and the symbolic Turkish

Caliphate after World War I (Nazrul, 2022: 183). Deoband scholars accepted politics as an important component of life and considered it necessary to engage in it purposefully. If we pay attention to the political aspect of the Deobandian system in general, it can be seen that the category of ulama was more active than Daru-l Uloom Deoband as an institution (Abdilkhakim, 2022: 149).

### **Justification of the choice of article and goals and objectives**

At the present time, the study of religious currents and directions in the region of Kazakhstan is becoming an urgent issue. One of them is the direction of Deobandism, which is gaining influence in Central Asian countries. Deobandism, which appeared in India in the second half of the 19th century, was active in our country in the form of the Tablighi Jamaat. Although tablighs are banned in the current Republic of Kazakhstan, it is known that there are Muslim communities that follow the Deobandian ideology. After the seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban movement, which is related to Deobandism, the relevance of this topic has increased. In this regard, we believe that it is very important to conduct research on the circumstances and prospects of this direction, which has not yet lost its influence in Central Asia and has a strong position in neighboring countries such as Kyrgyzstan.

The purpose of this article, “The Belief System of the Deoband school and its Position towards Salafism” is to analyze the belief system, ideological direction and principles of Deobandism, and to determine how much it corresponds to the traditional Maturidi or ‘Ashari schools of faith. At the same time, it is said that although Deobandis adhere to Hanafi in Islamic law, they are close to Salafism in faith, we aim to determine how true this is. In order to achieve this goal, the article briefly discusses the history of the Deoband school, as well as the fundamentals and creedal positions of the Deoband school, the positions of the Deoband scholars regarding prominent representatives of Salafism.

The object of the research is to make a theological analysis and clarify the belief system of the Deoband school and its position in relation to Salafism.

### **Scientific research methodology**

The article provides a theological analysis of the Deoband school’s religious belief system and

positions on Salafism. In order to determine and clarify the theological positions of this school, first of all, it is very important to study the scientific genealogy of Deoband scholars and to find out the religious consciousness formed on its basis. Because the religious and theological conclusions of any religious school originate from a certain religious consciousness. From this point of view, in the article, based on the scientific genealogy of the scholars of Deoband, after studying the influence of the Ahl al-Hadith school on them, we concluded that the belief system of the Deoband school is based on theocentrist religious consciousness typical of the Ahl al-Hadith school. That is why the later representatives of the Deoband school, which was formed and developed on the platform of the Hanafi madhhab, in general accept the creedal positions of the Salafi direction as well as the Maturidi and Ash'ari beliefs. We determined these conclusions based on the thoughts and views of the main scholars of the Salafi direction in the works of Deoband scholars. In addition, through theological analysis and differentiation, we demonstrated that the later Deoband scholars accepted the Salafi religious doctrine as correct, but did not succumb to Takfiri consciousness. Theological analysis and differentiation, hermeneutic method, retrospective and comparative analysis methods are used in this study. In the article, Islamic terms are given on the basis of the original.

### **Main part**

Although the religious concept and educational system of the Deoband madrasahs was formed on the basis of the Hanafi school, it was greatly influenced by the Ahl al-Hadith (the people of hadith) school in India. Because the Deoband scholars trace their scientific genealogy to the spiritual leader of the school of hadith in the Indian subcontinent, the famous muhaddith scholar Shah Waliullah al-Dahlawi, his son Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Dahlawi and Sheikh Abdulaziz's great-nephew Sheikh Muhammad Ishaq, his brother's son al-Allama, Muhi as-Sunna as-Sayyid Ismail al-Shahid and his student al-Said Ahmad ibn Irfan al-Shahid. At the same time, the group known as "Ahl al-Hadith" or known as "Ghair Muqallidin" by the Deobandis, who are recognized as non-sectarian in Indian land, claim that their teachings originate from Shah Waliullah al-Dahlawi and his grandson Muhi al-Sunna al-Said al-Shahid Ismail ibn Abdulghani (An-Nadui, 1950: 109). Thus, Deobandis and representatives of the Indian "Ahl al-Hadith" who came from the same scientific genealogy

are opposed to each other in the matter of adherence to madhhab, while Deobandis call their opponents "ghair muqallidin" (non-madhhabians), their opponents label them as taqlidists, i.e. followers of Abu Hanifa, not directly of the Prophet. Even the first-generation scholars of ghair muqallidin from India, leaving aside the Deobandis who followed the school of Abu Hanifa, denounced Najdi Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab himself as a Taqlid follower of the Hanbali school (Al-Qasimi, 2000: 19). And it can be said that the dealings of the later non-Muqallids with the Salafis were not bad, probably because of the influence of Salafi Albanianism. However, for the Deobandis, who hated bid'a (new religious thing in shariah) and religious khurafa (unfounded stories, legends, false beliefs), it is better to fight with heretical Barelwis, Indo-Pakistani Shi'as, and Ahmadis, even though they are Hanafi in their madhhab, rather than fighting with a small number of non-madhhabian people. For both of these groups, who are descended from the same scientific genealogy, but are in conflict with each other in the issue of adherence to madhabs, opposing shirk, bid'a and religious khurafa is considered one of the main goals in the path of religion. The Deobandis were obsessed with the concept of bid'a. Although in Islam, bid'a is generally divided into good (bid'a hasana) and bad bid'a (bid'a sayyia'), there are no such concepts for the Deobandis, who consider all actions contrary to the Sunnah as bid'a in a negative sense (Tariq Moj, 2007: 170).

The religious activity of Shah Waliullah al-Dahlawi and his sons, grandsons and their students who continued his scientific path is to appeal to follow the Islamic religion in accordance with Arab religious consciousness and knowledge, to fight against religious beliefs that are not Islamic, and heresies that arose among Muslims under the influence of other religions and cultures. It consisted of such goals as fighting against foreign beliefs, opposing modernism and western thinking brought by the colonialists, not imitating and not being similar to those of other religions, sticking to the Qur'an and the Sunnah as much as possible, keeping the religion as it was held by the first generation of Muslims, and purifying it of bid'as and khurafas. These principles can be said to be common to all Muhaddith scholars of the Indian subcontinent, whether they belong to the Deoband school or not, who were guided by the teachings of Shah Waliullah al-Dahlawi.

Therefore, considering that the Salafi-Wahhabis came from the "Ahl al-Hadith" school, which is based on the theocentric and irrational religious consciousness, specifically from the Hanbali school,

there is no need to be surprised at the emergence of believers from the Deoband school, whose religious consciousness and understanding are similar to the Salafis, even though the name is Hanafi. Because it is known that radical religious views and positions arise from a certain religious-cognitive consciousness. For example, it is known that the religious consciousness common to all radicals is irrational and literalist religious consciousness. In other words, radicalization is a natural phenomenon of any religions that have the mentioned religious consciousness, regardless of the traditional madhab. It is undeniable that this religious consciousness is common to all Salafi-Wahhabis.

So the problem is the religious-cognitive consciousness that plays a big role in understanding religion and religious texts in general. Accordingly, as a result of the more or less influence of the representatives of “Ahl al-Hadith” who are distinguished by their irrational, theocentric and literalist religious consciousness, as well as their own hadith methodology, it can be said that the emergence of groups with radical religious views such as the Taliban, Tablighi Jamaat, and Inkar Yaqin among the Hanafis in the Indian subcontinent is a natural phenomenon. No radical views or groups emerged from the Hanafi-Maturidis, who were guided by the rational and anthropocentric (human-centered) religious teachings, the theory of taweel (explanation and elucidation of the religious text) and hadith methodology of Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Maturidi. Each of these religious-cognitive consciousness and concepts contributes in its own way to the scientific methodology and concept of religious belief and jurisprudential schools, respectively, to the formation of religious concepts and positions of believers. This is especially relevant in the doctrine of creed, which forms the basis of religious ideology.

## Results and discussion

Since the Deobandis are generally representatives of the Hanafi madhab, it may immediately come to mind that they adhere to the Maturidi creed in their faith. However, Indian scholar Sheikh al-Muqri Muhammad Taib (1897-1983), former rector of the Islamic University “Dar al-Ulum Deoband” in his book “Religious Orientation and Sectarian Positions of Deoband Scholars” says “Deoband scholars are neither Ash’ari nor Maturidi, they only follow the middle path (between the two)” and he describes the methodology and positions of the Deobandis in the creed as follows: “And now, as for the Kalam issues, the Deoband scholars had a moderate and compre-

hensive position in those issues as well. Instead of complaining, criticizing, rejecting and abandoning others in matters of the creed, they chose the way of maximum coordination and elimination of contradictions. So in this matter, a legitimate question arises whether Deoband scholars first follow Abu al-Hasan Ali al-Ash’ari (324/936 AD) or Abu Mansur Muhammad al-Maturidi (333/944 AD). The answer is that Deoband scholars are generally recognized as Maturidis, although some of them consider themselves to be Ash’arites. First of all, Shah Waliullah Ahmad ibn Abdurrahim al-Dahlawi, whose religious discourse is clearly Ash’arite, is their greatest teacher who left them a scientific legacy. That is why they consider themselves to be Ash’arites. Secondly, Deoband scholars base their lectures, writings and religious discourses on Ash’ari positions. However, (looking at their position of trying to combine the two schools and maintain the middle of both) it is better to describe them as Maturidis who are inclined towards Ash’arism, which they themselves admit (Al-Muqri, 2012: 253). As such, they are followers of Ash’ari and Maturidi combined. After studying all their research on this issue, it is clear that the differences of opinion between Ash’aris and Maturidis are ultimately differences of form (“Khilafat Surya”)...”. Al-Muqri shows how to reconcile the two schools of faith on the example of disputed topics between the Maturidis and Ash’aris, such as “husn-qubh” (good and bad), the rise and fall of faith, and human strength (istitaghat).

In fact, the tendency to harmonize the creedal concepts of Maturidi and Ash’aria schools of faith began in the Middle Ages. From “al-Qasida al-Nuniya” of Tajuddin al-Subki (771/1370 AD), a prominent representative of the Shafi’i madhhab and Ash’ari school, as well as from the commentaries of Ash’ari and Hanafi-Maturidi scholars on each other’s texts, such as Imam al-Taftazani’s “Commentary on the Nasafi creed”, the tendency to harmonize the two schools can be clearly seen. Scholars have called this period in the history of Kalam teaching “markhalatul-majj” (the period of fusion of two schools) (Ayub Ali, 1983: 305-306). As a result, the representatives of the two schools, who during the period when they were just getting to know each other (markhalatu-t-taaruf) strongly criticized each other’s religious positions and even accused each other of bid’a, understood each other’s logic and views, and agreed that the differences between them are only on branch issues and that most of them are “verbal” differences, that is, there is no reason to accuse each other of bid’a and delusion (Akimkhanov, 2019: 109). In this way, Maturidism and Ash’arism

were formed on the platform of the four fiqh madhabs of Ahl al-Sunnah direction and were adopted as a developed dual faith school. However, today's Salafis want to prove that they are the only Ahl al-Sunnah by putting forward a number of creedal issues that are the basis for the principled scientific debate between the Maturidis and the Ash'aris, arguing that "both of them do not belong to the direction of Ahl al-Sunnah, because there is a contradiction in creedal issues between them." Of course, from a purely scientific point of view, this is an unfounded and too incorrect conclusion. Because when we do a theologically deep comparative analysis of the fundamental issues between the two schools, such as "husn-qubh" (good and bad), "recognition of God by reason", "state of a person in Judgment Day whom the religion did not reach", "the attribute of takwin (creating)", in the end, it can be seen that two schools are more closer to each other than other directions. However, we cannot say that Deoband scholars' acceptance of Maturidism and Ash'arism as equals and reconciliation of controversial issues between the two is based on pure theological, comparativist in-depth analysis made by Kalam Scholars such as al-Fanhari, Sadru Shari, and Ibn Qutluba. Because the Deobandis mainly give priority to fiqh, hadith and Qur'anic teachings and treat creed/kalam as an additional teaching. This can be clearly seen in the educational programs in Deoband Madrasahs and Higher Education Institutions.

*The positions of the Deoband scholars regarding prominent representatives of Salafism*

Deoband scholars especially praise Ibn Taymiyyah and his distinguished disciple Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, valuing their place in science and addressing their religious views. For example, al-Asghadi al-Qasimi writes about Ibn Taymiyyah as follows: "As for Ibn Taymiyyah, we have determined and studied his condition and found that he is well-versed in the Book of God, linguistic and Shariah meanings, also we found that he is a memory keeper of the Sunnah of the Messenger of God and the scientific heritage of the Salaf-Salih, and has a good knowledge of their linguistic and Shariah meanings..., he is a defender of the creed of Ahl as-Sunnah, and there is no information about him committing any sin (fisq) or bid'a. Of course, he did not mention the known issues that caused him to be oppressed, although he had evidence from the Qur'an, Sunnah and the words of the Salaf-Salih regarding all those issues...". It is known that one of the issues that caused Ibn Taymiyyah to be oppressed is the issue of Mutashabih (ambiguous) at-

tributes related to Allah, including "Istawa 'ala al-Arsh" ("He established Himself above the throne", Surah Sajda, 4) and "Nuzul" (to descend). Because of his own beliefs about Mutashabih attributes, had some discussions with Ash'ari scholars who were his contemporaries, and finally, because he did not back down from his position, he was brought to the Shariah court in Egypt by the judges of the Maliki, Hanafi and Shafi'i schools and imprisoned. Then his creed is strictly prohibited by law. It is known that Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya had "shazz" (unusual) views from the framework of the four madhabs on many issues related to creed, fiqh and Sufism, apart from the mentioned mutashabih attributes. Scholars of Deoband have also said this. Initially many Deoband scholars also had a critical opinion about the mentioned sheikh and his disciple, as well as Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab and his followers, but the later Deobandis argued that the previous Deobandi scholars had an excuse to criticize. Because Deobandis were not aware of the books of Ibn Taymiyyah and his students. They learned their views and messages mainly through Sheikh Ahmed ibn Hajar al-Makki (974 AH). However, they heard the positions of Ibn Taymiyyah not directly from his books, but only based on the narrations that reached them. In the past, there was no opportunity to establish a close relationship between India and Arab countries, and the books of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim were not widely printed and distributed as they are today. And later, the works of these scientists spread widely to Muslim countries, and it can be said that Deobandis got hold of them and read them, they justified, defended, and even glorified them. We can clearly see this from the words of Muhammad al-Qasimi: "In their works and studies, Deoband scholars called Sheikh Ibn Taymiyyah a "flag bearer against bid'as" and glorified him and his wise student Sheikh Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya according to their greatness and spoke with special respect. These are the famous scientists of the first generation and legendary figures in the annals of knowledge of this community. Our scientists who follow them still use the books and researches of these two Sheikhs and refer to the works and scientific findings of both of them in their speeches" (Al-Qasimi, 2000: 728)

Sheikh Muhaddith Abdulaziz al-Dehlawi, one of the spiritual teachers who stood at the beginning of the history of knowledge of Deoband scholars, when he heard bad words of his students about Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab, he disliked their behavior and said: "Sheikh (Muhammad ibn Abdulwah-

hab) is a true, perfect Muslim and a follower of the Sunnah. Also Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim were also true and perfect Muslims. However, they are human and can make mistakes. We can't say a bad word about them."

Also, Sheikh Rashid Ahmad al-Kankuhi (d. 1905), one of the two scholars who founded Darul Uloom Deoband, was asked about the Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab, he replied: "He was a good person. I heard that he was a follower of the Hanbali madhab, followed the hadith and strictly forbade bid'a and shirk, but he was a strict person by nature." In another word: "Indeed, those who follow Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab are called Wahhabis. Their beliefs were correct and good. The schools of jurisprudence are Hanbali. However, there was hardness (tashaddud) in his nature. Those who follow him are good people, but those who go beyond the limit are different, they have gone astray. All of them have the same creed, the difference between them is only in the actions related to the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali madhhabs."

Originally, in India, the name Wahhabi/Wahhabist was given to non-madhabian groups, later this name was given to the Hanafis (Deobandis) who strongly adhered to the Sunnah, opposed to bid'a, religious rituals not approved by the Shariah, and visiting the graves of saints. From this we understand that those who call the Deobandis Wahhabi are Barelwi who are identified with extreme Sufism. A similar situation is happening in our country today. It is known that even spiritualist sufi tariqats (the Sufi doctrine or path of spiritual learning) in Kazakhstan consider imams and preachers who are not like them, who do not follow their pirs as Wahhabis.

The reason why many Deoband scholars have a critical position about Muhammad ibn Abdulwahab and his followers is that, as mentioned in the previous topic, in the past, the works of Najd scholars were not as widely published as they are today, on the contrary, the books of scholars such as Sheikh ibn Dahlan, who mostly rejected the Wahhabi doctrine, and commentaries of Sheikh ibn Abidin on Al-Durr al-Mukhtar was widely distributed among the Deoband scholars. Even in the past, when the Deoband scholars went to Mecca and Medina to perform the Hajj, they would find works written mainly against Muhammad ibn Abdulwahab and his followers. This is how the later Deobandis, citing the above-mentioned reasons, say that the first generation of Deobandis were indecisive on this issue. And then, after the works of Najd scholars spread widely, after accessing and reading them, the attitude of Deoband

scholars towards Najd scholars changed radically. This tendency can be clearly seen in the letters and articles of a number of Deoband scholars. For example, Muhaddith Khalil Ahmad al-Saharanfuri (d. 1927), who was one of the famous scholars of Darul Uloom Deoband, wrote to Zafar Ali Khan, editor-in-chief of "Zamindar" newspaper from Medina, saying that Sheikh Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim were great imams recognized by Deoband scholars. He praised Shaykh Abdullah ibn Balhid, a neighbor and chairman of the local court, who read the books of the two imams a lot, as a great religious scholar who acted on hadith (bi zahir al-hadith), was against bid'a, and held monotheism and prophethood as the basis of his creed, and said about the Najdis following: "According to my observation, in general I did not notice anything that deviated from the creed of Ahl al-Sunnah..." he also said that the situation of the Najdis is very good in religious practice" (An-Nughmani, 1980: 62). And in his letter to Sheikh Muhammad Yaqub, saying that the Saudi government, especially Sultan Ibn Saud, is a very religious and reasonable person, he welcomed the destruction of all the graves and mausoleums in the country, and even said that it was obligatory to do so, and it was carried out by the fatwa of the scholars there. From these letters, it can be clearly seen that the author attaches great importance to the concepts of "bid'a", "amal bi zahir al-hadith" (to act according to the external meaning of the hadith), "tawheed" (oneness of God), "shirk" (idolatry or polytheism), as well as that he is against the construction of graves and mausoleums.

Prominent scholars of the Deoband school, such as Muhammad Manzoor al-Nugmani and his teacher Karim Bakhsh al-Sanbahli, claim that there is a great similarity between the spiritual leader of the Najdis, Muhammad ibn Abdulwahab al-Najdi, and one of the leaders of the Deobandis, Sheikh Ismail Abdulghani al-Shahid al-Hindi, in terms of their religious views and positions. Particularly, the main works of both of them, the books "Kitab al-Tawheed" and "Taqwiyat al-Iman" are considered to be very similar, even identical, in terms of their purpose and content. It is said that the main reason that prompted religious leaders, one from Najd and the other from India, to write these works was the period in which they lived and the religious situation in society and the condition of Muslims. Both of them were especially glorified by the people of Najd and Deoband as individuals who raised the banner of "true Tawheed and Sunnah" and opposed the religious superstitions and bid'a prevalent among the Muslims (especially sufis), as well as grave wor-

shipping and worshiping ghosts. As a result, some Deobandis, who read extensively about the life, religious personality and religious positions of Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab, and read his works and those of his followers, found out that there are many similarities between him and the religious personality and positions of their spiritual leader, such as Ismail al-Shahid, and generally favored the Najd school (Al-Qasimi, 2000: 743).

Because of the above-mentioned religious figures and positions of the spiritual leaders and scholars who founded the Deoband school, the Deobandis were nicknamed “Wahhabis” by the extreme sufis of Badayun and Barelwi. Barelwi leader Ahmad Rida Khan criticized founder of the Deoband school Muhammad Qasim al-Nanautawi (1833-1880), Rashid Ahmad al-Kankuhi (1829-1905), Khalil Ahmad al-Saharanfuri (1853-1920) and Ashraf Ali al-Thawi (1863-1943). He argued that these were the followers of Muhammad ibn Abdulwahab, who raised the banner of Wahhabism in the Indian subcontinent, and therefore they were unbelievers who had left the religion, and those who did not call them unbelievers and who doubted their unbelief were just as unbelievers as them. In this regard, he issued a fatwa and even made a special trip to Mecca and Medina in 1905 and confirmed this fatwa to the scholars there (Al-Mubarakfuri, 2021: 37). Later, his murids named that fatwa as “Husamu-l-Haramain” (Sword of the Two Holy Mosques) and distributed it in India. At that time, scholars in Mecca and Medina believed Ahmad Rida Khan’s words and accepted him as a religious figure fighting against the Wahhabis in India. Such support of the scholars of the Holy Land probably arose from the opposition to the Wahhabi rebellion that had stirred up the land of Arabia exactly one century before that time.

The British colonialists at that time were also interested in the further development of such irreconcilable enmity and hatred among the Indian Muslims. Because from the day when the British declared India as their colony, the first people who opposed them and organized an armed uprising were mostly local Muslims. In this way, the British tried to use the religious situation effectively for their own interests by creating a division among the Muslims who threatened their imperial goals and political plans. The British, who supported the Saudi tribe of Najd and the “religious reformer” Muhammad ibn Abdulwahab from Najd against the caliphate in Arabia facing the Ottoman caliphate, called the Muslims who rebelled against them in India, including the religious figures who were

at the beginning of the Deoband school and their supporters, as Wahhabis and pitted the sufis against them. Unfortunately, there is still a rift between the Barelwi and the Deobandis in Pakistan and India. While the Barelwi label the Deobandis as Wahhabis, the Deobandis accuse them of grave/ghost worshipers and heretics.

At this point, a very important difference between the Deobandis and the Wahhabis of Najd can be observed. No matter how much the Deobandis accuse the extreme sufis who accuse them of heresy, as grave/ghost worshippers, superstitious and heretical, they do not accuse them of heresy, because the Deoband scholars doesn’t consider any Muslim or group of Muslims who face the Qibla (ahl al-Qibla) as a disbeliever until they utter a word of clear disbelief (al-kufr al-sarih) or commit a clear disbelief. For example, Sheikh Khalil Ahmad al-Saharanfuri said: “We do not charge Muslims who commit bid’a with kufr until they reject any ruling on religious duties. We exercise utmost caution in passing judgment on them (i.e., their faith). This is our steadfast position, the usual position of our great scholars!” (As-Saharanfuri, 2004: 14). Also, Sheikh al-Thawi (1863-1943) in the Delhi-based Huda magazine (November, 1995 issue) said: “Although they (Barelwi) accuse us of kufr, we do not accuse them of same. Our position is to show utmost caution and prudence in judging someone as a disbeliever, because if someone is actually a disbeliever, and yet we do not condemn him as a disbeliever, so what?! And if we call someone a disbeliever, but the truth is the opposite, then it is very dangerous! That is why we did not accuse the Qadiyani themselves of kufr. And they would accuse us of blasphemy. However, when their situation was clarified and the truth was revealed, that is, when it became clear to us that they consider Mirza Ahmad a prophet, we issued a fatwa regarding them as infidels. Because this is clearly kufr. As for their other religious views, we have tried to interpret them as much as possible. As for the Barelwi, we consider them to be misguided (from the path of Ahl al-Sunnah). All those who go astray (from the path of Ahl al-Sunnah) are not disbelievers” (Al-Thawi, 2015: 348). Once, when one of disciples wanted to blaspheme the Barelwi, Sheikh al-Tahanawi stopped him, saying: “We accept the accusations they made against us because they said them only because of their great love and passion for the Prophet, and we treat them with forgiveness.”

The teaching of Najd Wahhabis is ultimately based on Takfiri consciousness, which is why they are called Neo-Kharijites. On the basis of the triple



“tawheed” concept, which originated from Ibn Taymiyyah and was later revived by Muhammad ibn Abdulwahab, the Muslim ummah was accused of blasphemy, such as associating partners with God and denying the names and attributes of God, and as a result, the lives and property of Muslims who did not adhere to the mentioned triple “tawheed” creed were allowed to be taken away. Also, at the root of mass accusations of blasphemy against Muslims who do not adhere to the Wahhabi creed is the Hashwi concept of faith, including the principle that “faith and deed are one” and the principle of being guided only by divine judgments and laws in the affairs of this world and the hereafter, based on the slogan of the early Muhakkims, “la hukma illa lillah.” On the basis of these radical religious theories and principles, Najd scholars were distinguished by their radical views against other Muslims. Deoband scholars accepted the religious teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abdulwahab as correct, but they did not succumb to the Takfir mentality like them.

### Conclusion

As we seen from the research, the Deobandis adhere to the Abu Hanifa Madhhab in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), but they do not follow a certain classical schools in the matter of creed (aqeedah). Even the Deobandis do not seem to care much about it; the main thing is not to leave the circle of Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama’ah (АҒЫЛШ МАҒЫНА). It seems like for them, whether someone is Maturidi or Ashari is a secondary issue. As Salafism, if we consider the position of Deoband scholars towards the Wahhabi leaders and their religious teachings from a historical point of view, we can see that the Deoband scholars who lived at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century were mainly against the Wahhabi doctrine, and their position from the second half of the 20th century to the present is clearly the opposite. Today, some scholars claim that the religious-ideological

evolution of the Deoband school consists of two periods, and divide these two periods into two, before and after Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf al-Binuri (Binuri, 1978: 7-61). From this it can be understood that Deobandis (especially today’s Deobandis) determine their position, including their position on religious-ideological issues, according to the religious-ideological positions of Hijaz, that is, Haremein scholars. In other words, the religious and ideological conjuncture in the holy Mecca and Medina is important for them. That is probably why the Deobandis generally do not look at the Salafi school and consider their religious convictions to be correct at their level.

In today’s Salafi/Wahhabi direction, especially among the representatives of extremist groups such as “Takfir wal-Hijra” and “ISIS” who openly adhere to the takfir creed, there is a tendency to issue creedal rulings on faith and disbelief on the issue of the relationship between faith and action, as well as on the issue of obedience to Shariah laws and secular laws. Strictly speaking, calling Muslims who do not fulfill the obligations of Islam, especially those who do not pray, as infidels by considering “action as a condition for the correctness of faith,” accusing Muslims who consider Shariah laws as legitimate as well as secular laws with taghutism and blasphemy, is a characteristic of all radical and extremist groups that are guided by Salafi ideology today. Even those who call themselves serious Salafis have this takfir mentality at the root of their religious beliefs. And in the religious positions and views of Deoband scholars, such takfiri consciousness is not visible.

### Acknowledgement

The article was prepared within the framework of the implementation of the grant funding research project of the Committee of Science of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan (AP19174944 “The Influence of the Religious and Political Ideology of the Deobandian school on Central Asia”).

### Әдебиеттер

- Akhtar, Muhammad Naveed (2022) Darul Ulum Deoband: Preserving Religious and Cultural Integrity of South Asian Muslims through Structural and Strategic Innovations. *Hamdard Islamicus*, Vol. 45, No: 3. – 79-100.
- Ат-Таһанауи, Өшраф Али (2015) Малфузат кәмәләт Өшрафия. – Карачи: Мәктәбәти әл-Бүшра баспасы. – 517.
- Hamid, Мура (2005) The Political Struggles of the Ulama of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband: Identifying and operationalizing the traditionalist approach to politics. Master of Arts thesis. – Maryland: University of Maryland. – 90.
- Metcalf, Barbara Daly (1982) *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900*. – Princeton: Princeton University Press, NJ. – 386.

- Momen, A., Ebrahimi, M., Hassan, A. (2023) Identifying the Role of the First 'Qawmi Madrasah' Darul Uloom Deoband in the Indian Subcontinent. The 3th Islamic Management Development Conference, 21-22 June. – Kedah. – 71.
- Nazrul, Islam Md. (2022) Faithful Participation: The 'Ulama in Bangladeshi Politics // Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 23, No: 2. – 177-203.
- Reetz, D. (2007) The Deoband Universe: What Makes a Transcultural and Transnational Educational Movement of Islam? Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 27, No: 1. – 139-159.
- Siddiqui, Atif Suhail (2020) Theological and Intellectual Roots in Deobandi Thoughts. American Journal of Islam and Society, Vol. 37, № 1-2. – 41-66.
- Tariq Moj, Muhammad (2007) Deoband Madrassah Movement: Countercultural Trends and Tendencies. Masters in Public Policy. – Perth: Australian National University. – 318.
- Абдилхаким Б., Қ. Құрманбаев, Мұхитдинов Р., Әкімханов А. (2022) «Дару-л Улум Деобанд ғұламаларының саяси ұстанымы» // «Адам әлемі» журналы, № 4. – 146-158.
- Ас-Саһаранфури, Шейх Халил Ахмад. (2004) Әл-Мухәннәд ала әл-муфәннәд. – Амман, Дәр әл-Фәтх баспасы. – 150.
- Әкімханов А.Б. (2019) Әбу Мансур әл-Матуриди және оның иман мәселелеріне қатысты ғылыми тұжырымдары, монография. – Алматы: Нұр-Мұбарак баспасы. – 292.
- Әл-Қасими, Мұхаммед Убайдулла әл-Әсғәди (2000) Дәр әл-улум Деобанд. – Деобанд: Шейх әл-Һинд академиясы баспасы. – 839.
- Әл-Мубаракфури, Мұхаммед Ариф әл-Қасими (2021) Маусуғат Уләмә Диубанд. – Деобанд: Шейх әл-Һинд академиясы баспасы. – 414.
- Әл-Мукри, Мұхаммед Таиб (2012) Улама Диубанд Иттижаһиһум әд-Дини уә Мизәжухум әл-Мәзһәби. – Деобанд. – 354.
- Ән-Нәдуи, Шейх Масғуд Алим (1950). Тәрих ад-дағуа әл-исләмия фи әл-Һинд. – Бейрут: Дәр әл-Арабия баспасы. – 332.
- Ән-Нүғмани, Мұхаммед Манзур (1980) Диғаят мукәссәфә диддә әш-Шейх Мұхаммед ибн Абдулаһһаб. – Бейрут. – 149.
- Әюб Али М. (1983) Ақидат әл-Ислам уәл-Имам әл-Матуриди. – Дакка: Муассаса исламия баспасы. – 306.
- Бинури, М. Юсуф (1978) Маариф әс-Сунән. – Карачи: Жамиғат улум әл-исламия баспасы. – 61.
- Өзжан, А. (1993) «Дарул Улум», Түркия диянет ишлери Ислам энциклопедиясы. 8-том. – Стамбул: Диянет ишлери башқанлығы баспасы. – 559.

#### References

- Abdilkhakim A., Kurmanbayev K., Mukhitdinov R., Akimkhanov A. (2022) «Darul Ulum Deoband gulamalirinin sayasi ustanimi» [The Political Position of Ulemas of Daru-l ulum Deoband] // «Adam Alemi» journal, № 4. – 146-158. (In Kazakh)
- Akhtar, Muhammad Naveed (2022) Darul Ulum Deoband: Preserving Religious and Cultural Integrity of South Asian Muslims through Structural and Strategic Innovations. Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. 45, No: 3. – 79-100.
- Akimkhanov A.B. (2019) Abu Mansur al-Maturidi jane onyn iman maselelerine qatysty gylymi tujyrymdary, monografiya [Abu Mansur al-Maturidi and his scientific views on the problem of Faith]. – Almaty: Nur-Mubarak Press. – 292. (In Kazakh)
- Al-Mubarakfuri, Muhammed Arif al-Qasimi (2021) Mausughat Ulama Diuband [Encyclopedia of the scholars of Deoband]. – Deoband: Sheih al-Hind Academy Press. – 414. (In Arabic)
- Al-Muqri, Muhammed Taib (2012) Ulama Diyuband Ittijahihum ad-Dini ua Mizajuhum al-Mazhabi [Scholars of Deoband their direction in Religion and their position on madhab]. – Deoband. – 354. (In Arabic)
- Al-Qasimi, Muhammed Ubaidullah al-Asghadi (2000) Dar al-ulum Deoband [Dar al-ulum Deoband]. – Deoband: Sheih al-Hind Academy Press. – 839. (In Arabic)
- Al-Thawi, Ashraf Ali (2015) Malfuzat kamalat Ashrafiya [Sayings of the Perfection]. – Karachi: Maktabati al-Bushra Press. – 517. (In Arabic)
- An-Nadui, Sheih Masghud Alim (1950) Tarih ad-daghua al-islamiya fi al-Hind [History of the Islamic call in India]. – Beirut: Dar al-Arabiya Press. – 332. (In Arabic)
- An-Nughmani, Muhammed Manzur (1980) Dighayat mukassafa didda ash-Sheih Muhammed ibn Abduluahhab [Propaganda against Muhammed ibn Abdulwahhab]. – Beirut. – 149. (In Arabic)
- As-Saharanfuri, Sheih Muhaddis Halil Ahmad (2004) Al-Muhannad ala al-mufannad [The Sword on the Disproved]. – Amman: Dar al-Fath Press. – 150. (In Arabic)
- Ayub Ali M. (1983) Aqidat al-Islam wa-l Imam al-Maturidi [Creed of Islam and Imam al-Maturidi]. – Dhaka: Muassasa Islamiya. – 568. (In Arabic)
- Binuri, M. Yusuf (1978) Maarif As-Sunan [Knowledge of Sunnah]. – Karachi: Jamigat Ulum al-Islamiya Press. – 61. (In Arabic)
- Hamid, Myra (2005) The Political Struggles of the Ulama of Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband: Identifying and operationalizing the traditionalist approach to politics. Master of Arts thesis. – Maryland: University of Maryland. – 90.
- Metcalf, Barbara Daly (1982) Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900. – Princeton: Princeton University Press, NJ. – 386.
- Momen, A., Ebrahimi, M., Hassan, A. (2023) Identifying the Role of the First 'Qawmi Madrasah' Darul Uloom Deoband in the Indian Subcontinent. The 3th Islamic Management Development Conference, 21-22 June. – Kedah. – 71.
- Nazrul, Islam Md. (2022) Faithful Participation: The 'Ulama in Bangladeshi Politics // Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 23, No: 2. – 177-203.

Özcan, A. (1993) “Darü'lülüm”, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi [Islamic Encyclopedia]. Vol. 8. – Istanbul: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Press. – 559. (In Turkish)

Reetz, D. (2007) The Deoband Universe: What Makes a Transcultural and Transnational Educational Movement of Islam? Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 27, No: 1. – 139-159.

Siddiqui, Atif Suhail (2020) Theological and Intellectual Roots in Deobandi Thoughts. American Journal of Islam and Society, Vol. 37, № 1-2. – 41-66.

Tariq Moj, Muhammad (2007) Deoband Madrassah Movement: Countercultural Trends and Tendencies. Masters in Public Policy. – Perth: Australian National University. – 318.

**Information about authors:**

*Akimkhanov Askhar Bolatbekuly – PhD, docent of Egyptian University of Islamic Culture Nur-Mubarak (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: akimhan.ilyas@gmail.com).*

*Abdilkhakim Burkhanadin – PhD, Egyptian University of Islamic Culture Nur-Mubarak (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: burhanhakim01@gmail.com).*

*Janenuly Adil – Master student, Egyptian University of Islamic Culture Nur-Mubarak (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: adilzhanen@gmail.com).*

**Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**

*Әкімханов Асқар Болатбекұлы – PhD, Нұр-Мұбарак Египет ислам мәдениеті университетінің доценті (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: akimhan.ilyas@gmail.com).*

*Бұрхандин Әбділхакім – PhD, Нұр-Мұбарак Египет ислам мәдениеті университеті (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: burhanhakim01@gmail.com).*

*Жәненұлы Әділ – Нұр-Мұбарак Египет ислам мәдениеті университетінің магистранты (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: adilzhanen@gmail.com).*

*Registered: March 6, 2024.*

*Accepted: June 13, 2024.*

### Ш. Канафьева

Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті, Алматы қ., Қазақстан  
e-mail: kanafeva.shynar@gmail.com

## ҚАЗІРГІ ПӘКІСТАНДАҒЫ ЭТНИКАЛЫҚ ЖӘНЕ ДІНИ АЗШЫЛЫҚТАРДЫҢ ДИСКУРСЫ

Бұл зерттеу қазіргі Пәкістан мемлекетінің діни азшылықтарға қатысты саясатын анықтаудың кейбір критерийлерін зерттейді. Зерттеу діни азшылықтар мен этникалық топтарды динамикалық, процессуалдық, реляциялық, контекстік, ситуациялық ретінде қабылдау ерекшеліктерін көрсетті. Халық санағы мен олардың көрсеткіштерін талдау нәтижесінде Пәкістанның діни азшылықтарға қатысты заңнамалық базасы, олардың географиялық орналасуы қаралды. Діни азшылықтардың санына қатысты алаңдаушылық тудырған 2017 жылғы халық санағына үлкен мән берілді. Мақалада саны, шығу тегі, заңдылығы және әлеуметтік мәртебесі бойынша діни азшылықтар арасындағы және олардың ішіндегі бірнеше маңызды айырмашылықтар көрсетілген. Бұл мақала Пәкістанның Исламабад, Лахор және Пешавар қалаларындағы далалық зерттеулердің, нақты айтқанда Пешавар университетінің Пәкістанды зерттеу орталығының профессорларымен фокус-топтық сұхбат және Пенджаби Ходж Гарх зерттеу орталығының директоры Икбал Кайсермен жүргізілген жартылай құрылымдық сұхбат нәтижелеріне негізделген. Сондықтан бұл зерттеудің мақсаты Пәкістанның діни азшылықтар мен этникалық топтарға қатысты саясатын құқықтық база контекстінде ашу болып табылады. Пәкістан әкімшілігінің заңнамалық базасы мен ашық саясатын зерттеу, сондай-ақ діни азшылықтардың жағдайын талдау осы зерттеудің негізгі мақсатына айналды. Тарихнамалық талдау мен салыстырмалы тарихи дискурс әдісіне сүйене отырып, ұлттық мемлекет, демократия және халықаралық саясат концепциялары аясында діни азшылықтар категориясы мен проблемасының пайда болуына баға берілді.

**Түйін сөздер:** Пәкістан, діни азшылықтар, этникалық топтар, заңнамалық база, халық санағы.

Sh. Kanafyeva

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan  
e-mail: kanafeva.shynar@gmail.com

### Discourse of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Modern Pakistan

This study examines the Pakistani State policy towards religious minorities and some criteria for identifying ethnic groups. The study revealed the characteristics of perceptions of religious minorities and ethnic groups as dynamic, processual, relational, contextual, situational and intersectional. By analyzing the censuses and their indicators, Pakistan's legal framework for religious minorities, their geographical location is revealed. Much attention is paid to the 2017 census, which has raised issues regarding the size of religious minorities. The article cites several important differences in numbers, origins, legitimacy, and social status among religious minorities. This article is based on field research in cities of Pakistan such as Lahore, Peshawar, and Islamabad, where focus group interviews were conducted with professors at the Pakistan Study Center, University of Peshawar, and a semi-structured interview with Iqbal Kaiser, Director of the Punjabi Khoj Garh Research Center. Thus, the purpose of this study was to reveal Pakistan's policy towards religious minorities and ethnic groups in the context of the legal framework. The study of the legislative framework and overt policies of the Pakistani administration as well as analyzing the status of religious minorities were the main objectives of this study. On the basis of historiographical analysis and comparative-historical discourse method, the emergence of the category and problem of religious minorities in the context of concepts of nation-state, democracy and international politics is assessed.

**Key words:** Pakistan, religious minorities, ethnic groups, legislative framework, census.

Ш. Канафьева

Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, г. Алматы, Казахстан  
e-mail: kanafeva.shynar@gmail.com

### Дискурс этнических и религиозных меньшинств в современном Пакистане

В данном исследовании рассматриваются некоторые критерии определения политики современного пакистанского государства в отношении религиозных меньшинств. Исследование показало особенности восприятия религиозных меньшинств и этнических групп как динамичных, процессуальных, реляционных, контекстуальных, ситуативных. В результате анализа переписей населения и их показателей раскрыта законодательная база Пакистана в отношении религиозных меньшинств, их географическое расположение. Большое внимание уделено переписи населения 2017 года, в результате чего возникли проблемы в отношении численности религиозных меньшинств. В статье приводятся несколько важных различий в численности, происхождении, легитимности и социальном статусе религиозных меньшинств. Данная статья основана на результатах полевых исследований в таких городах Пакистана, как Исламабад, Лахор и Пешавар где велись фокус-групповое интервью с профессорами Пакистанского учебного центра университета Пешавар и полуструктурированное интервью с Икбалом Кайзером, директором Исследовательского центра «Пенджаби Ходж Гарх». Таким образом, целью данного исследования явилось раскрытие политики Пакистана в отношении религиозных меньшинств и этнических групп в контексте законодательной базы. Изучение законодательной базы и открытой политики администрации Пакистана, а так же анализ статуса религиозных меньшинств явились основными задачами данного исследования. На основе историографического анализа и метода сравнительно-исторического дискурса дана оценка возникновению категории и проблемы религиозных меньшинств в контексте концепций национального государства, демократии и международной политики.

**Ключевые слова:** Пакистан, религиозные меньшинства, этнические группы, законодательная база, перепись населения.

#### Кіріспе

Қазіргі Пәкістанның тарихы отаршылдық саясаттан кейінгі құбылмалы құрылымдары бар ұлттық мемлекет құруға бағытталған күрделі кезеңдерден өтті. Бүгінгі таңда Пәкістанға қызығушылық географиялық тұрғыдан Қазақстанға жақын болу позициясынан, отандық тауарлардың экспорттық нарығына шығарудан, көптеген дәстүрлі ресми және бейресми діни институттардан, көршілес мемлекеттердің идеологиялық құрамына әсер ететін азшылықтардың бар болуымен сипатталады. Пәкістандағы діни институттар мен азшылықтардың жағдайын талдай отырып, бұл мақала дәстүрлі діни институттардың қарым-қатынасы мен өзара ықпалы және жалпы дінді саясиаландыру мәселелері шеңберінде қарастырады.

Пәкістанда бес негізгі этно-аймақтық қауымдастық бар: пенжабилер, пуштундар, синдилер, белуджилер және мухаджирлер, сондай-ақ бірнеше шағын топтар бар. Сонымен қатар, ахмадилер, христиандар, индустар, қалаштар, парсылар және сикхтер сияқты діни және секталық топтар, олар исмаилиттер мен бохралар сияқты шииттерден құралған (Fuchs

Maria-Magdalena, Fuchs Simon Wolfgang, 2020: 18). Пәкістан қоғамының бұл құрылымы бүкіл халықтың ішкі қатынастарына, сондай-ақ ішкі саяси тұрақтылығына, ұлтаралық және дінаралық қатынастарға үлкен әсер етеді. Мұны Азаматтық және саяси құқықтар туралы Халықаралық пакт пен Экономикалық, әлеуметтік және мәдени құқықтар туралы халықаралық пактіні, сондай-ақ адам құқықтары жөніндегі басқа да құжаттарды ратификацияламаған Пәкістанның ұстанымы дәлел бола алады (Комитет по ликвидации расовой дискриминации, 2010).

Пәкістан өзінің діни, көпконфессиялық және этнотілдік әртүрлілігімен ерекшеленеді, мұнда халықтың санасы мен өзіндік айырмашылығы ресми және бейресми діни институттардың ықпалында екені анық. 2023 жылғы халық санағы елдің халқының санын 241,49 миллион деп бағалайды, бұл халықтың 90 пайызы мұсылман және олар бірнеше доктриналық топтарға жататын Пәкістан қоғамының күрделілігі мен динамизмін айқындай түседі (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2023). Елде сүнниттік мұсылмандар жетекші орындарды иеленсе, шиіт пен зікіршіл мұсылмандар қандай да бір кемсітушілікке ұшырап тұрады. Өздерін Пәкістанның мұсылман емеспіз деп санайтын

қалаш, парсы және сикхтер де мемлекеттің негізгі этникалық-діни тобы болып табылады. Сонымен қатар, пәкістандықтардың көпшілігі урду тілінде сөйлейтінін немесе түсінетінін атап өту керек, бірақ урду тілін халықтың 10 пайызы ғана пайдаланады, қалғандары аймақтық тілдерде сөйлейді, сонымен қатар диалектикалық ерекшеліктері бар, олардың арасында белуджилер, пенджабилер, пуштундар, синдхилер және т.б (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2023). Урду тілінде сөйлейтіндер негізінен Үндістаннан келген иммигранттар немесе 1947 жылы бөліну кезінде қалған индустар ұрпақтары. Осылайша, бөліну және кейінгі жылдары белең алған көші-қон салдарлары Пәкістанның әлеуметтік-мәдени және этникалық плюрализміне айтарлықтай үлесін қосты (Вайнрайх, 2014: 34). Бұл діни және тілдік әртүрлілік бүгінгі күні Пәкістанның ұлттық бірегейлігіне ұмтылатын мозаикалық мемлекет екенін, сонымен бірге ресми және бейресми институттардың рөлі ұлт құру немесе жалпы этникалық сәйкестік процесінде маңызды аспект болып табылатынын тағы бір рет көрсетеді, әсіресе пенджабилер арасындағы үдерістерді мысал ретінде атауға болады.

Осыған байланысты бұл ғылыми зерттеу далалық жұмыстарға, діни мекемелердің өкілдерімен сұхбаттарға және Пәкістан Конституциясы, декларациялар мен қабылданған заңдар сияқты ресми құжаттарды зерттеуге негізделген, сонымен бірге ресми институттарға қатысты сипаттамаларды ашуға бағытталған. Соның ішінде діни азшылықтардың позициясына баса назар аударылатын «пәкістан ұлтының» бірігуі мен ұлттық бірегейлігі мәселелері бойынша діни институттардың айырмашылықтары зерттеу нысаны болып табылды.

Зерттеу мақсатты түрде Пәкістан сияқты көпұлтты мемлекеттің құрылуының тарихи аспектілері туралы жалпы мәліметтерді қамтымайды, тек оның демократиялық және зайырлы мемлекет ретінде ресми қалыптасуының аспектілерін талдауға, соның нәтижесінде әртүрлі конфессияаралық және этникалық проблемалардың мазмұндық сипатын ашуға бағытталады. Бұл тәсіл ресми институттар мысалында діни және этникалық азшылықтардың жағдайын зерттеу мәселелерін қамтитын зерттеудің нақты міндеттерін қоюға көмектесті. Жағдайын анықтау; екінші: ресми діни институттардың Пәкістанның ұлттық бірегейлігі мәселелеріне әсерін талдау болып

табылды. Мақалада Пәкістанның заңнамалық актілері негізінде діни азшылықтардың орны мен рөлі және олардың ресми мәртебесі қарастырылады.

Мақаланың мақсаты қазіргі Пәкістандағы діни-этникалық азшылықтарға қатысты заңнамалық актілерді талдау мысалында діни-этникалық саладағы ресми институттардың ерекшеліктерін зерттеу болып табылады. Негізгі мәселе – қолданыстағы құқықтық инфрақұрылымның Пәкістанның негізгі діни-этникалық топтарының, атап айтқанда пенджабтардың діни-этникалық сәйкестілік процесіне қаншалықты әсер ететінін анықтауды және ұлттық мемлекет құру мен тұрақтылық үдерісін түсіну үшін маңызды болып саналады.

### Ғылыми зерттеу әдіснамасы

Алға қойған мақсатты жүзеге асыру үшін әдіснамалық тұрғыдан Дуглас Норттың (американдық экономист, тарихшы және экономика саласы бойынша Нобель сыйлығының лауреаты) тәсілі қолданылды, осыған сәйкес «бейресми институттар конвенциялар немесе мінез-құлық кодекстері түріндегі бейресми шектеулер болып табылады, ал ресми институттар, адамдардың өздері әзірлейтін ережелер түріндегі ресми шектеулер» деген ойды алға тартқан (North, 1990: 92). Рационалды таңдау теориясын пайдалана отырып, Дуглас Норт институттарды адам таңдауындағы шектеулер деп түсінеді. Осы бағытты ұстана отырып, ол ресми саяси институттарды саяси мінез-құлықты шектейтін ресми ережелер деп, ал бейресми саяси институттарды саяси мінез-құлықты шектейтін бейресми ережелер деп анықтайды. Басқаша айтқанда, ресми институттар «ресми деп кеңінен танылған арналар арқылы құрылған және берілетін мағынада ашық кодификацияланған» ережелер болып табылады (Lowndes, 1996: 184).

Осылайша, ресми және бейресми институттардың ортақ белгілері бар: олар адамның мінез-құлқын шектейді, заңдылыққа ие және өзара әрекеттесудің құрылымы болып табылады. Бұл бағытта салыстырмалы саясаттағы бейресми институттарды концептуализациялауға және оларды салыстырмалы саясаттанудың негізгі ағымына енгізуге тырысқан Хельмке мен Левицкий өте маңызды үлес қосқан (Helmke, Levitsky, 2003). Барлық осы зияткерлік күш-жігер институттар туралы неғұрлым жағдайды

түсінуге мүмкіндік береді, ол қазір ресми және бейресми институттарды айқын ажыратады.

Зерттеушілер қатарында Р. Николс (Nichols, 2008: 266) пен Ф. Уоткинс (Watkins, 2003: 59-63) Пәкістандағы бейресми институттарға байланған этникалық және діни азшылықтардың мәртебесіне, олардың тілдік айырмашылықтары мен өзара әрекеттесу мәселелеріне үлкен көңіл бөлген. Бұл авторлар өз еңбектерінде пуштундардың тұрмыс-тіршілігіне, олардың қайталанбас мәдениетіне, діни азшылықтармен қарым-қатынасына ерекше көңіл бөлген. Пуштундардың көші-қон саясатының тарихын зерттей отырып, бір ғана мысалды келтіре отырып, Р. Николс нақтылап, далалық зерттеулер негізінде Пешвар мен Лахордағы ресми және бейресми діни мекемелер арасындағы қарым-қатынастың аспектілерін зерделеген. Ал Герман Крейтцман діни және тілдік айырмашылықтар мәселелеріне ерекше назар аударып, Пәкістандағы діни азшылықтарға қатысты заңнамалық базаның проблемаларын өзара байланыстырған (Kreutzmann, 2005: 24).

Мақалада сандық және сапалық зерттеу әдістері де өз деңгейінде қолданылды. Негізгі дереккөздерге 2017 жылғы ұлттық санақ материалдары, 2023 жылғы цифрлық санақ, статистикалық деректер, Пәкістанның мемлекеттік органдарының есептері, заңнамалық актілер, атап айтқанда Пәкістан Конституциясының ережелері (1973) және басқа да дереккөздер кіреді. Сапалық зерттеу әдістеріне автордың 2023 жылдың мамыр айында Лахор мен Пешаварда өткізген сұхбаттары нәтижелері мен далалық экспедиция материалдары кіреді.

Сұхбаттың екі түрі жүргізілді: 1) қатысушы сұхбаты 2) тереңдетілген жартылай құрылымдық сұхбат. 2023 жылдың 14 сәуірінде Пешавар университетінің Пәкістанды зерттеу орталығының профессорларымен фокус-топтық сұхбат жүргізілді (өткізу орны: Пешавар қаласы, сұхбаттың ұзақтығы: 60 минут). 2023 жылғы 16 сәуірде жергілікті ұйымдар мен партиялардың жетекшілерімен фокус-топтық сұхбат жүргізілді (өткізу орны: Пешавар, Чарсаддин ауданы, Хаштангар, Шакур Кале ауылы, әңгімелесу ұзақтығы – 120 минут) (Afzal Shah Khamosh – Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan party, Amil Wali Khan – Awami National Party, Hayat Roghani-Mafkora Research center, Barrister Hasham Babar advocate – Qomi Wattan Party). 2023 жылдың 3 мамырында журналист Джавид Ахмедпен (Kuwait times аға журналисті) жартылай құрылымдық сұхбат жүргізілді (өткізу орны – Исламабад ауданы,

Бани Гала ауылы, сұхбат ұзақтығы – 45 минут). Пенджаби Ходж Гарх зерттеу орталығының директоры Икбал Кайзермен (орналасқан жері – Лахор ауданындағы Кахна ауданының орталығы, әңгімелесу ұзақтығы – 60 минут). Сұхбат жоба қатысушысы әл-Фараби атындағы ҚазҰУ Шығыстану факультетінің 2 курс магистранты Н. Жарбосыновамен бірлесіп, жоба жетекшісі профессор Л.Г. Ерекешевамен алдын ала әзірленген сауалнама негізінде жүзеге асырылды. Пәкістандағы ұлтаралық және дінаралық қатынастардың негізгі тенденцияларын жан-жақты қамтитын сұрақтарды қамтыды.

Ауызша материалдың негізгі бөлігі тікелей сұрау арқылы алынды, осы тұста жинақтау әдістемесін қысқаша таныстыруды жөн көрдік. Далалық зерттеулердің көпшілігі тікелей урду тілінде жүргізілді. Жұмыстың негізгі мақсаты алдын ала қойылған сұрақтарға жауап табу үшін мүмкіндігінше көп әңгімелесушілермен сұхбат алу болды. Бірнеше рет болған бұл сұхбаттар ешқандай сауалнаманы тікелей қолданбай, қарапайым әңгімелесу түрінде жүзеге асырылды. Әңгімелесушінің негативті ойы мен теріс пікір қалыптастырмау мақсатында алдын ала сауалнама дайындалды. Сонымен қатар, тек қажетті ақпаратты тез алуға мүдделі адам сияқты әсер қалдырмау үшін емін еркін сұхбат жүргізу әдісі қолданылды. Материалды жинаудың бұл біршама жанама әдісі автор тарапынан жеке тәжірибесі негізінде таңдалды, ол тікелей, алдын ала тұжырымдалған сұрақтармен жұмыс істеу немесе әңгімелесушілер арасында түсінбеушілікке әкеліп соқтыруы мүмкін пиғылдан аулақ болу мақсатында жүзеге асырылды. Жалпы алғанда респонденттің авторға деген оң көзқарасын қалыптастыру және сол арқылы олардың жауаптарының сапасына әсер ету әрекеті жасалды. Осыған қарамастан, этникалық және діни көзқарастары туралы сұралған көптеген респонденттер Пәкістанның құрылуының қиын күндерін, тіпті бір діни топ өкілдерінің бір-біріне жау болғанын үнемі еске алды. Жауап беру барысында олардың қаншалықты алаңдағаны және қойылған сұрақтарға өте эмоционалды түрде жауап бергені анық көрініп тұрды. Соған қарамастан, сұхбаттасқан респонденттер осы зерттеуді құптап, әңгімелерін дыбыс жазу құрылғысына жазуға рұқсат берді. Өйткені ресми түрде алдын ала келісім жасалды. Респонденттердің жауаптары эмоционалды сезімдермен бірге қатар жүрсе де және олар осы зерттеудің объективтілігіне әсер ете алатын болса да,

фактологиялық материалдар этникалық және діни азшылықтар мәселесінің, сондай-ақ ресми және бейресми институттардың қызметінің нақты көрінісін көрсеткенін атап өткен жөн.

Зерттеуге тартылған респонденттердің аты-жөні, этникалық және тайпалық тегі, діні, кәсібі, тұрғылықты жері және отбасылық жағдайы туралы мәліметтермен қатар олардың ата-бабаларының шығу тегі, ана тіліндегі білім деңгейі, ана тілін білуі, оның тегі, дәстүрі, тегін білу туралы күрделі тақырыптар қамтылды. Сонымен бірге басқа тілдерді меңгеру деңгейі, үй жағдайында, достарымен және көршілерімен қарым-қатынас кезінде тілді қолданудағы ерекшеліктері мен басқа діни азшылық өкілдеріне деген көзқарастары да осы сауалнаманың шеңберіне тартылды. Мұндай, өте нәзік тақырыптар бойынша үстірт ақпарат алуды болдырмау үшін респонденттерге бірнеше рет бару және ашық пікір алмасу кезінде жақсы жасалатын еркін қарым-қатынас атмосферасы қажет болды. Солардың ішінде бізге аянбай көмектескен Пәкістан Ұлттық студенттер федерациясының ақпарат және хабар тарату жөніндегі орталық хатшысы Лұқман Ахмет есімді студенттің қосқан үлесін ерекше атауға болады. Кей жағдайда нағыз достыққа айналған осындай тығыз қарым-қатынастың арқасында жергілікті халықтың күнделікті өміріне араласып, олардың айтқандарын өз бақылауларымызмен салыстыруға мүмкіндік туды. Әр кеш сайын респонденттермен сөйлескеннен кейін респонденттерге контент-талдау жүргізілді және материалдар жазба түріне алынды. Өйткені, мұндай ауқымдағы зерттеуге уақыт тапшылығы басым болды. Дегенмен, соған қарамастан зерттеу жұмысының барлық кешенін қамтуға күш жұмсалды. Әрине, таңдаған әдістің де кемшілік тұстары болды. Біріншіден, бұл өте көп еңбекті қажет ететін процесс, әсіресе белгілі бір себептермен белгілі бір респондентпен жұмыс бір кездесумен шектелетін жағдайларда осы зерттеуде ізін қалдырды. Екіншіден, бұл әдіс мәтіндерді тікелей жазуға мүмкіндік бермеді, нәтижесінде осы зерттеуде келтірілген өмірлік оқиғалардың барлығы бастапқы материалдың тікелей аудармасы емес, бір немесе бірнеше жүргізілген әңгімелердің жиынтығы болып табылады.

### Нәтижелері және талқылама

*Пәкістанның этникалық және діни азшылықтар саласындағы заңнамалық базасы.*

Кезінде Пәкістан Британ империясының отары бола отырып, этникалық және діни азшылықтарға тең құқықты қамтамасыз ететін мұсылмандардың көпшілігін сақтай отырып, прогрессивті, демократиялық және толерантты мемлекет болуды көздеді. Кезінде Пәкістан басшысы Джинна әлеуметтік-экономикалық басымдықтарға үлкен мән берді және халықаралық қауымдастықты діндердің теңдігі мен ұлтаралық ынтымақты қамтамасыз ету мақсатында 1947 жылғы 11 тамызда бірінші Құрылтай жиналысында сөйлеген сөзінде: «...Сіздер тәуелсізсіздер; сіздер *ғибадатханаларыңызға баруға еріктісіздер, мешіттеріңізге немесе Пәкістан мемлекетіндегі кез келген басқа ғибадат орындарына бара аласыздар. Сіздер кез келген дінге, қастаға немесе дін өкілі болуыңыз мүмкін – оның мемлекет ісіне еш қатысы жоқ...* Біз осы негізгі қағидадан бастаймыз: біз бәріміз бір мемлекеттің азаматымыз және тең құқылы азаматымыз. Менің ойымша, біз мұны біздің алдымызда идеал ретінде сақтауымыз керек және уақыт өте келе индуистардың индуизмді, ал мұсылмандықтан бас тартуы мүмкін, бұл діни мағынада емес, өйткені бұл әр адамның жеке сенімі, бірақ саяси мағынада мемлекеттің бір азаматтары ретінде қалғанымыз абзал» (Демидов, 2020: 4-8).

Бұл құжат бүгінде Пәкістанның жарғысы болып саналады және Джиннаның дін мен мемлекеттің рөлі туралы көзқарасын көрсетеді. Алайда XX ғасырдың 70-80 жылдарында Пәкістанның ресми билігі діни азшылықтарға көзқарасын өзгертті, бұл ресми және бейресми діни мекемелердің қызметін күшейтті. Бүгінгі таңда пәкістандықтардың ресми және қоғамдық көзқарастарындағы бұл өзгеріс туралы бірнеше ғылыми пікірлер бар. Олардың кейбіреулерінің пікірінше, Пәкістанға сұраныс негізінен мұсылмандар тұратын провинцияларға негізделген және исламдық рәміздерді қолданды, осылайша мұсылмандарға қатысты мажоритарлық көзқарасты сақтады. Мұсылман лигасының азшылықтарға берген кепілдіктеріне қарамастан, оның мұсылмандық сенімі отаршылдық және қазіргі кезеңдерде де айтылды. Басқа көзқарас ұлтшылдыққа қатысты діни және либералдық ұстанымдар арасындағы тұрақты қайшылықты қарастырады. Мұсылман лигасы және Джамаат-е-Ислами сияқты басқа да исламдық партиялар сияқты, Үндістанның ұлттық конгресі индуизмнің Махасабасына және басқа да осыған ұқсас фундаменталистік



топтарға қарсы шықты. Модернистік күштердің инерция, сарқылу және бытыраңқылық арқылы әлсіреуі бәсекелес күштердің билікке жетуіне мүмкіндік берді. Үндістандағы индустардың Бхаратия Жаната партиясы сияқты Пәкістандағы исламшыл күштер осылайша Оңтүстік Азияның тарихын өздерінің діни сенімдеріне сәйкес қайта жазды (Белокреницкий, 2015: 15-34). Басқа зерттеушілер болса біржақтылықтың плюрализмнен жоғары болуы экономикалық және саяси себептерге байланысты деп санайды. Мұндай сарапшылардың пікірінше, бұқараның жалғасып жатқан экономикалық және саяси құқықтарынан айырылу қарсы күштерге онсыз да «батыстанып кеткен» элементтерге жеңілдетілген болса да балама ұсынатындықтан, оларды жеңуге мүмкіндік берді (Moaddel, 2022: 188). Келесі сарапшы топ болса ксенофобияның тамыры Оңтүстік Азиялық орта таптың мінезі мен ұмтылысында жатыр деп санайды, олар үшін аймақтық және секталық бірегейлік бірінші кезекте қалады.

Кемшіліктер мен стигматизацияны ескере отырып, бейресми институттардың бөлігі болып табылатын қауымдастықтар азшылық ретінде танылғысы келмейді, сондықтан олар өздерінің этникалық немесе діни тиістілігін көрсетпеуге тырысады деп айтуға болады. Пәкістандағы азшылықтар елдің жалпы халқының шамамен 8% құрайды деп айтуға болады және оларға ахмадийлер, бахайлар, буддистер, христиандар, индустар, джайндер, қалаштар (читральдан), парсылар мен сикхтер кіреді (Топычканов, 2009: 21). Тізімде көрсетілген этникалық қауымдастықтардың әрқайсысында азшылықтардың құқықтарын қорғайтын өздерінің бейресми институттары бар. Сонымен қатар, әрбір қауымдастық ішінде каста, тап және дін, сондай-ақ жас, этникалық, жыныс, ауыл және қала айырмашылықтары бар. Кез келген супер каста классификациясы пікірталас мәселесі болып табылады. Мысалы, христиан дінін ұстанатын 4 пайыз Пәкістан халқының арасында католиктік және протестанттық конфессиялар арасында шамамен 50/50 бөліну бар. Пешавар сияқты қалалар мен Бахавалпур, Хайдарабад, Равалпинди және Кветта аудандарында әрқашан әртүрлі салаларда жұмыс істейтін христиандардың айтарлықтай саны болған (Sookhdeo, 1999: 336).

Зерттеу нәтижесінде буддистер мен джайнилер туралы нақты деректер табу қиынға соқты, өйткені статистикалық мәліметтер ұсынылмаған және олар туралы жалпы

мәліметтер аз. Бұл этникалық топтар өздерін қоғамның ішінде көрсеткілері келмейді. Әрине оның объективті және субъективті себептері баршылық: біріншіден, Пәкістан сынды мұсылмандық басым елде өздерінің діни ерекшеліктерін алға тарту немесе көрсету әлі күнге дейін қауіпті болып табылады; екіншіден аталған діндердің ерекшеліктеріне сәйкес болуы да ықтимал. Өйткені буддистер мен джайнилер пәкістандық шарттарда сұхбатқа тартылмады және осыған сәйкес қоғамда өздерін сақтықпен ұстайды. Ахмадилер, керісінше, сенім мәселесіне байланысты көпшіліктің назарында екен. Көптеген ахмадийлер өздерінің жеке басын ашық жарияламайды және бүкіл халықтың дұшпандық назарынан аулақ болу үшін топ болып жиналмайды (Плешов, 2005: 236).

Пәкістанның құқықтық жүйесі әрдайым тұрақты болмаған және бүгінде этникалық және діни азшылықтардың жағдайын ауыз толтырып айтуға келмейді. Егер Пәкістан Конституциясының тарихына назар аударсақ, ол бірнеше рет күшін жойды және негізгі заңнаманы Пәкістанның кейінгі басшылары олардың қажеттіліктеріне сәйкес түзетіп келді. Елдің алғашқы Конституциясы он жылға жуық талқылаудан кейін 1956 жылы қабылданды, бірақ екі жылдан кейін Мұхаммед Айюб ханның төңкерісімен ол уақытша тоқтатылды (Khan, 2007: 138).

Мұхаммед Айюб хан Пәкістан әскери күштерінің бас қолбасшысы болды, содан кейін 1958-1969 жж. мемлекет президенті, оның тұсында режимнің өзі, діни және этникалық азшылықтарға қатынасы сыни болды. Содан бері 1962 және 1973 жылдары мүлдем жаңа екі Конституция жазылды. Пәкістанның Конституциясына бүгінгі өзінде Парламенттің үштен екі бөлігі ғана түзетулер енгізе алады; сайланған және әскери басшылар оны өз мақсаттарына сай салыстырмалы түрде оңай өзгерте алды. Мысалы, 1973 жылғы Конституция 17 рет өзгертілді. Осы өзгерістердің әрқайсысына әділет органдары өз келісімін берді. Ол сонымен бірге Пәкістандағы әскери төңкерістердің әрқайсысын өзінің «қажеттілік доктринасын» қолдану арқылы заңдастырды (Khan, 2005: 237). Негізгі заңнамалық база этникалық және діни азшылықтардың бейресми институттарын есепке алуды көздемейді деп айтуға болады.

Жоғарыда айтылған құрылымдық сұхбат барысында респондент Икбал Кайзердің сөзінен Пәкістанның негізгі заңы – Конституцияның

отаршыл Ұлыбритания әкімшілігі дайындаған «жемісі» екенін байқадық. Оның айтуынша, Пәкістан халқы негізгі заңдарды қолдамайды, керісінше, олар өздерінің дәстүрлі заңдарын құрметтеп, соған сәйкес өмір сүреді. Мысалы, жауап берушінің сөзіне қарағанда, олардың тайпалық заңы (пенжабилер) «Панчаят» болды, оның шеңберінде руластардың «қанды қырғынға» жол бермеу және басқа этникалық және діни азшылықтарға төзімділік танытатын дәстүрлі міндеттер бар.

Осыған қарамастан Пәкістан Бала құқықтары туралы конвенция, нәсілдік кемсітушіліктің барлық нысандарын жою, геноцид қылмысының алдын алу және жазалау, азаптауға қарсы және басқа қатыгез, адамгершілікке жатпайтын немесе ар-намысты қорлайтын қарым-қатынас немесе жазалау, экономикалық, әлеуметтік және мәдени құқықтар туралы халықаралық пакт және Азаматтық және саяси құқықтар туралы халықаралық пакт сынды құжаттарға қол қойған болатын. Алайда, Пәкістан әйелдерге қатысты кемсітушіліктің барлық нысандарын жою туралы конвенция және босқындар мәртебесіне қатысты конвенция сияқты негізгі конвенцияларға әлі қол қойған жоқ. Ал ислам дінін мемлекеттік дін деп жариялаудан бөлек, Конституция діни өкілдер мен мекемелерге ерекше мәртебе бермейді, дәстүрлі институттар оның қолданылу аясына бағынбайды (Концова, 2019: 18). Осы жағдайды саралайтын болсақ, Пәкістан сынды мемлекеттің ішінде ұлтаралық пен дінаралық арақатынастар әлі күнге дейін өз шешімін таппай келеді. Осыған қоса, зерттеу жүргізу барысында пәкістандықтардың қонақжайлылығы мен мәдениеттерінің өзара айырмашылықтары басым көрінді. Әсіресе бұл үрдіс кастааралық байланыстарда нақты байқалды. Өздерін жоғары санайтын касталар төменгі (қазіргі жағдайда кедей топ) топ өкілдеріне деген қатынасы мен діни ұстанымдары терең зерттеуді қажет етеді.

2023 жылдың 23 сәуірінде сол Икбал Кайзер сауалнама сұрақтарына эмоционалды стильде жауабын жалғастырды, мұнда Пәкістанның этникалық дамуының тарихи оқиғаларына қатысты бірінші сұрақта діни азшылықтарға қатыгездікпен қарау фактілерін келтіріп, отбасылардың бөлінуі, олардың арасындағы өзара байланыстар, отбасының бір бөлігі Үндістанда қалса, ал кейбіреулері мұсылмандық Пәкістанда қалып қалуы сынды. Мұсылмандық білім беру жүйесін және жұмыс істеп тұрған діни мекемелердің (медреселердің) себептері мен заманауи қызметін дәлелдейтін дереккөздерді

зерттей отырып, олардың танымалдығы жыл санап артып келетінін тілге тиек етті. Осы мәселені зерттей келе халықтың ең кедей топтары мен жетім балалар оларды жоғары мобильділік институты ретінде қарастырады, өйткені медреселердің көпшілігінде тегін оқу, тамақ және баспана бар. Түрлі ақпарат көздеріне сәйкес, Пәкістанда 4,1 миллионнан астам білім алушылар осы мұсылмандық медреселерде білім алып келеді екен (Butt, 2012: 387-407). Бұл медреселердің барлығы дерлік жекеменшік қаржыландырылады және үкіметтің бақылауында емес. Медреселерде ислам дінін бұрмалауды қолдайтын біліктілігі жоқ түлектер шығады деген аландаушылық көптен бері айтылып келе жатқандықтан, оларды модернизациялауға көптеген әрекеттер жасалды, бірақ нәтиже өзгеріссіз қалып келеді. Бұл исламның ресми және бейресми институттар жүйесіндегі рөлін ашады. Ал Пәкістандағы соңғы оқиғалар, мысалы, 2023 жылдың 4 мамырында алты азшылық мұғалімінің өлтірілуі, Синд штатындағы Мирпур-Хас қаласындағы Ахмадия мешітінің қирауы және Гилгит Балтистанның Асторе қаласында азшылық жастардың өлтірілуі азшылық құқықтарының басылғанын көрсетеді. Сонымен қатар, 2023 жылғы 26 сәуірде Лахор баспасөз клубының жанында жалған күпірлік істері мен мәжбүрлі дінге келуге қарсы азшылық қауымдастықтарының наразылықтары азшылықтарға қатысты кең таралған кемсітушілік мәселесін және Пәкістанның бейресми институттарының мәртебесін айқындайды (Several Teachers Killed In Outburst Of Sectarian Violence In Northwestern Pakistan).

*Пәкістанның 2017 жылғы халық санағы және туындаған мәселелер.* Мұсылман еместерге өз дініне сай дауыс беруге мүмкіндік беретін бірыңғай сайлау жүйесі Пәкістанда 2002 жылы ғана енгізілген. Осыған қарамастан, ұлттық сайлауға қатысу үшін қай дін өкілі екендігі жариялануы керек. 2017 жылы Пәкістанда халық санағы өтті, ол діни азшылықтар арасында бірқатар наразылық тудырды. Бұл санақ сайлаушыларды діни белгілері бойынша кемсітуге негіз болды. Діни азшылықтар эмиграцияға және мәжбүрлі түрде исламды қабылдауға қарамастан, санақ нәтижелері күтілгеннен төмен болды дейді. Карачиде тұратын Жоғарғы соттың заңгері Нил Кешав 1998 жылғы санақта индустар саны 2 миллионға жуықтағанын айтады. Алайда 2017 жылғы халық санағы 20 жылда оның тек

3,5 миллионға дейін өскенін көрсетті. Кешав индустардың ауылдық жерлерде тұратынын және туу деңгейі жоғары екенін ескере отырып, бұл сандар айтарлықтай төмен бағаланған деп санайды. Ол көші-қон халық санының төмен өсуін түсіндірмейді деп күдіктенеді және Джейкоб христиандар деп күдіктенгендей, аз санақ болуы мүмкін деген ойды алға тартады. Ол Пәкістанның Адам құқықтары жөніндегі комиссиясының есебіне сілтеме жасап, соңғы алты жылда Үндістанға небәрі 8 мың адам қоныс аударғанын айтты. Бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарының хабарлауынша, жүздеген пәкістандық индустар 2019 жылы Үндістанның ұлтшыл Бхаратия Джаната партиясының үкіметінің оларға виза және үнді азаматтығына жол беру туралы ұсынысын қабылдады. Алайда, олардың көпшілігі содан бері көптеген ұрпақтар өмір сүрген Синдке оралды (Wazir, Goujon, 2019: 21).

Діни азшылықтар Пәкістанның ресми үкіметіне кішігірім сайлау округтерін тартуға және ассамблеялар мен Сенатта аз орын бөлуге мүмкіндік бергендіктен, бұрынғы үкіметтер де өз сандарын аз хабарлаған деп санайды. Қазіргі уақытта діни азшылықтар тек 33 резервтік жиналыс орны мен төрт Сенат орынын талап ете алады. Сикхтер арасында көп наразылық болды, олар да лоббистік күш-жігеріне қарамастан, үкімет 2017 жылғы халық санағы кезінде олар үшін діни баған құрмағанына көңілі қалды. Оның орнына ол оларды «басқалардың» қатарына қосты. 2017 жылғы халық санағы алдында Пәкістанның Сикх кеңесінің жетекшісі Сардар Рамеш Сингх мәлімдемеде үкіметтің сикхтерді тізімге енгізуден бас тартуы «қоғамға деген құрметтің мүлдем жоқтығын» көрсетті. Пәкістанның NADRA мәліметі бойынша, елде 6146 сикх тіркелген, бұл 1947 жылы ел бөлінген кездегі 2 миллионға жуық. Құқық қорғаушылардың айтуынша, негізінен Хайбер-Пахтунхва мен Пенджабта тұратын көптеген сикхтер исламшыл содырлардың шабуылдары мен биліктің кемсітуінен құтылу үшін Пәкістаннан қашып кеткен. Сикх қауымына деген ізгі ниеттің белгісі ретінде Пәкістан 2019 жылы Картарпур дәлізін ашты, бұл Үндістанда тұратын сикхтерге Пәкістанның Пенджабындағы қажылық орындарына баруға мүмкіндік беретін визасыз бағыт болып саналады (Мир, 2019).

Сикхтер сияқты, Ахмадия қауымының кейбір жетекшілері де санақ олардың санын жете бағаламаған болуы мүмкін, өйткені көпшілігі

өздерінің діни көзқарастарын жасырады деп сендірді. Ахмадилерді 1974 жылы Пәкістан мұсылман емес деп жариялады және оларға қоғамдық орындарда исламды ұстануға тыйым салынды. Пенджабтағы Ахмадия жамағатының жетекшісі Қамар Сүлейман өз пікірін былайша ашық айтты: *«Біз қасиетті Құранның көшірмесін сақтай алмаймыз. Біз оны аударма алмаймыз немесе басып шығара алмаймыз. Біздің негізін қалаушымыз (Мирза Ғұлам Ахмад) жазған барлық кітаптар «жәк көрушілік материалы» ретінде тыйым салынған және топтың алты мүшесі (Ахмадиттер) Құран үйретуге әрекеттенгені үшін түрмеде отыр»* (Karim, 2017: 39).

Соңғы халық санағы бойынша, «діни азшылықтар» (барлық мұсылман емес қауымдар) деп аталатын халық саны 1981 жылы жалпы халықтың 3,32%-ын құраса, 1998 жылы ол 3,73%-ға дейін өсті, ал 2017 жылы олардың саны азайған. 3,52%. 2017 жылы мұсылман емес діни бірлестіктердің жалпы саны 7,32 миллионды құрады, оның ішінде христиандар (2,64 миллион), индустар (3,6 миллион), Ахмадилер (0,19 миллион), мойындалған касталар (0,85 миллион), «басқа діндер» адамдары (0,04 миллион) (Karim, 2017: 41).

Осыған сүйене отырып, 2017 жылғы халық санағының нәтижелері барлық этникалық және діни азшылықтарды алаңдатып, ресми және бейресми институттарды күшейтті. Олар бұл санақтың нәтижелерін мойындамады, керісінше Пәкістан үкіметін оларды қайта қарауға және барлық құқықтық нормаларды ескере отырып, қайталап санақ жүргізу күнін белгілеуге мәжбүрледі. Нәтижесінде 2023 жылы Пәкістанда қайталама халық санағы жүргізілді, бірақ онлайн форматта. Осыған қарамастан, 2023 жылғы халық санағы жалпы Пәкістанның этникалық және діни азшылықтардың құқықтарын өзгертуге және қайта анықтауға дайын екенін көрсетті.

### Қорытынды және тұжырымдама

Пәкістанда әртүрлі халықаралық және ұлттық үкіметтік емес ұйымдар, құқық қорғаушылар мен діни ұйымдар елдегі діни сенім бостандығының деңгейін жақсартуға және қуғынға ұшыраған қауымдастықтарды заңмен қамтамасыз етуге жұмыс істейді. Дегенмен, азаматтық қоғам өкілдері халықтың осал топтарына көмек көрсету қаупіне ұшырайды, өйткені олардың

қызметін үкімет жігі қадағалайды. Пәкістанның құқық қорғау органдары мен барлау органдары елдегі өшпенділік пен зорлық-зомбылық қылмыстарымен күресу үшін тұрақты шешімді

жүзеге асыру мүмкіндігін шектеп, құқық қорғаушылар мен азаматтық белсенділердің күштеп жоғалып кетуімен танымал. Сонымен қатар, жақында биліктен қуылған Хан үкіметі

діни топтарды тыныштандыру кезінде Пәкістанда зайырлы құндылықтарды енгізумен күресті. Хан үкіметі шетелден қаржыландырылатын көптеген үкіметтік емес ұйымдарды мемлекеттің жаулары ретінде белгілеп, олар ислам ілімдеріне қайшы келетін либералдық құндылықтарды насихаттайды деп болжайды, бұл штаттың консервативті топтарынан қабылданған әңгіме. Соңғы бірнеше жылда кем дегенде 18 халықаралық үкіметтік емес ұйым және тағы 20 ұйым жабылды, бұл гуманитарлық жұмысқа қауіп төндірді және елдегі өшпенділік пен діни төзбеушілікпен тиімді күресуге үлкен қиындық туғызды.

### *Алғыс*

Бұл мақала әл-Фараби атындағы ҚазҰУ-дың PhD докторантура бағдарламасы және ҚР ҒЖБМ ҒК негізінде қаржыландырылды (грант №AR14871064 «Оңтүстік Азиядағы (Ауғанстан, Үндістан, Пәкістан) ұлттық құрылыстың этникалық, этно-конфессиялық дискурсы»).

### **Әдебиеттер**

Butt, Tahir Mehmood (2012) Social and Political Role of Madrassa: Perspectives of Religious Leaders in Pakistan. A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2. – 387-407.

Fuchs Maria-Magdalena, Fuchs Simon Wolfgang (2020) Religious Minorities in Pakistan: Identities, Citizenship and Social Belonging, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies Volume 43, 2020 - Issue 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2020.1695075> (Date of viewing: 17.09.2023)

Helmke, Gretchen and Levitsky, Steven (2003) Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, Working Paper No 307, September, 2003 presented in the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Karim Mehtab S. (2017) The 2017 census of Pakistan: Analyses of Provisional Results, Islamabad: Social policy and development center. – 39.

Khan Hamid. (2005) Constitutional and political history of Pakistan. Oxford university press. – 237

Khan M.A. (2007) Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1966–1972 / Ed. by Craig Baxter. Oxford. – 138.

Kreutzmann Hermann. (2005) Linguistic diversity in space and time: A survey in the Eastern Hindukush and Karakoram, Himalayan Linguistics, 2005, vol. 4. – 24.

Lowndes, Vivien. (1996) Verities of New Institutionalism; A Critical Appraisal, Public Administration, 74(2). – 181-197.

Moaddel Mansur. (2022) Modalities of National Sovereignty: Territorial Nationalism versus Islamic Fundamentalism in Muslim-Majority Countries, University of Michigan, PSR Research Report, [www.psc.isr.umich.edu](http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu), pdf. – 20. (Date of viewing: 22.09.2023)

Nichols Robert. (2008) A history of Pashtun migration, 1775-2006. – Karachi, Oxford University Press. – 266.

North, Douglas C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional change and Economic performance. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 92.

Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2023) 04-04-2023: Extension in the Field Operations of 7th Population and Housing Census-2023-The First Even Digital Census. <https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/notifications-0> (Date of viewing: 19.09.2023).

Several Teachers Killed in Outburst of Sectarian Violence in Northwestern Pakistan <https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-shooting-violence-teachers-pakhtunkhwa/32396460.html> (Date of viewing: 24.09.2023)

Sookhdeo Patrick (1999) The Impact of Islamization on the Christian Community in Pakistan, School of Oriental and African Studies University of London. – 336.

Watkins Francis (2003) Save there, eat here: Migrants, households and community identity among Pakhtuns in northern Pakistan, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 2003, Vol. 37. – 59-81.

Wazir Muhammad Asif, Goujon Anne, (2019) Assessing the 2017 census of Pakistan using demographic analysis: a sub-national perspective, Vienna Institute of Demography Austrian Academy of Sciences Welthandelsplatz 2, Level 2/1020 Wien, Österreich, [www.oeaw.ac.at/vid](http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid) (Date of viewing: 24.09.2023)

Белокреницкий В.Я. (2015) Особенности национализма и наций-государств на востоке, в исламском мире (пример Пакистана), Ислам на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке, № 9, С. 15-34.

Вайнрайх М. (2014) Миграция и язык: пуштуны в Пакистанском высокогорье, Ереван: Кавказский центр иранистики. – 180.

Демидов А. (2020) Пакистан: путь к независимости, Евразийский Союз Ученых, Том 4, № 12 (81), 4-8. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31618/ESU.2413-9335.2020.4.81.1160> (Қаралған уақыты: 12.09.2023)

Комитет по ликвидации расовой дискриминации (2010) Семьдесят четвертая сессия, Краткий отчет о 1910-м заседании, Рассмотрение докладов, замечаний и информации, представляемых государствами-участниками в соответствии со статьей

9 Конвенции, 19 февраля 2009 года. <https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhslztXd5Nnh5GF9yFH9jwviiIw45o6LEy0CH5sAxsErSLBpDj4srGIx2xEWuwS47qHAtm%2BKXH%2BWWqTPfRrUXWEr6mhNK2AK8WY4xianB5SmC> (Қаралған уақыты: 17.09.2023)

Концова Е.А. (2019). К вопросу о региональном режиме беженцев в Южной Азии, *Мировая политика*, № 2. DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2019.2.29924 (Қаралған уақыты: 19.09.2023)

Мир (2019) Каргарпурский коридор между Индией и Пакистаном открыли для паломников <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4154593> (Қаралған уақыты: 16.09.2023)

Плешов О.В. (2005). *Ислам и политическая культура в Пакистане*, Москва. – 236.

Топычканов В.П. (2009) Формирование статуса религиозных меньшинств Южной Азии во второй половине XX - начале XXI веков: на примере Индии и Пакистана, автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата исторических наук, Москва. – 34.

## References

Belokranitskiy V.Ya. (2015) Osobennosti natsionalizma i natsiy-gosudarstv na vostoке, v islamskom mire (primer Pakistana) [Peculiarities of nationalism and nation-states in the East, in the Islamic world (the example of Pakistan)], *Islam na Blijnem i Srednem Vostoke*, № 9. – 15-34. (in Russian)

Butt, Tahir Mehmood (2012) Social and Political Role of Madrassa: Perspectives of Religious Leaders in Pakistan. *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2. – 387-407.

Demidov A., (2020) Pakistan: put k nezavisimosti, *Evraziyskiy soyuz uchonnyh* [Pakistan: the Road to Independence, *Eurasian Union of Scholars*], Tom 4, № 12 (81), 4-8. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31618/ESU.2413-9335.2020.4.81.1160> (Date of viewing: 12.09.2023) (in Russian).

Fuchs Maria-Magdalena, Fuchs Simon Wolfgang (2020) Religious Minorities in Pakistan: Identities, Citizenship and Social Belonging, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies Volume 43, 2020 - Issue 1*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2020.1695075> (Date of viewing: 17.09.2023)

Helmke, Gretchen and Levitsky, Steven (2003) Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, Working Paper No 307, September, 2003 presented in the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Karim Mehtab S. (2017) The 2017 census of Pakistan: Analyses of Provisional Results, Islamabad: Social polisy and development center. – 39.

Khan Hamid. (2005) *Constitutional and political history of Pakistan*. Oxford university press. – 237

Khan M.A. (2007) *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1966–1972* / Ed. by Craig Baxter. Oxford. – 138.

Komitet po likvidatsii rassovoi diskriminatsii, Semdesyat chetyvortaya sessiya (2010) Kratkiy otchot o 1910-m zasedanii, Rassmotrenie dokladov, zamechaniy i informatsii, predstavlyamyh gosudarstvami-uchastnikami v sootvetstviy so statyoy 9 Konvertzii, 19 fevralya 2009 goda [Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Seventy-fourth session, Summary record of the 1910th meeting, Consideration of reports, comments and information submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention, February 19, 2009] <https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhslztXd5Nnh5GF9yFH9jwviiIw45o6LEy0CH5sAxsErSLBpDj4srGIx2xEWuwS47qHAtm%2BKXH%2BWWqTPfRrUXWEr6mhNK2AK8WY4xianB5SmC> (Date of viewing: 17.09.2023) (in Russian).

Kontsova E.A. (2019) K voprosu o regionalnom rejime bejetejev v Yujnoi Azii [Towards a Regional Refugee Regime in South Asia], *Mirovaya politika*, № 2. DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2019.2.29924 (Date of viewing: 19.09.2023) (in Russian)

Kreutzmann Hermann. (2005) Linguistic diversity in space and time: A survey in the Eastern Hindukush and Karakoram, *Himalayan Linguistics*, 2005, vol. 4. – 24.

Lowndes, Vivien. (1996) Verities of New Institutionalism; A Critical Appraisal, *Public Administration*, 74(2). – 181-197.

Mir (2019) Kartarpurский коридор между Индией и Пакистаном открыли для паломников [Kartarpur corridor between India and Pakistan opened for pilgrims], <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4154593> (Date of viewing: 21.09.2023) (in Russian)

Moaddel Mansur. (2022) Modalities of National Sovereignty: Territorial Nationalism versus Islamic Fundamentalism in Muslim-Majority Countries, University of Michigan, PSR Research Report, [www.psc.isr.umich.edu](http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu), pdf. – 20. (Date of viewing: 22.09.2023)

Nichols Robert. (2008) *A history of Pashtun migration, 1775-2006*, Karachi, Oxford University Press. – 266 p.

North, Douglas C. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional change and Economic performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – 92.

Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2023) 04-04-2023: Extension in the Field Operations of 7th Population and Housing Census-2023-The First Even Digital Census. <https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/notifications-0> (Date of viewing: 19.09.2023).

Pleshov O.V. (2005). *Islam i politicheskaya kultura v Pakistane* [Islam and political culture in Pakistan], Москва. – 236. (in Russian)

Several Teachers Killed in Outburst of Sectarian Violence in Northwestern Pakistan <https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-shooting-violence-teachers-pakhtunkhwa/32396460.html> (Date of viewing: 24.09.2023)

Sookhdeo Patrick (1999) *The Impact of Islamization on the Christian Community in Pakistan*, School of Oriental and African Studies University of London. – 336.

Топычканов В.П. (2009) Формирование статуса религиозных меньшинств Южной Азии во второй половине XX – начале XXI

vekov: na primere Indii i Pakistana [Shaping the Status of Religious Minorities in South Asia in the Second Half of the Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries: The Case of India and Pakistan], avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchonoj stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Moskva. – 34. (In Russian).

Watkins Francis (2003) Save there, eat here: Migrants, households and community identity among Pakhtuns in northern Pakistan, Contribution to Indian Sociology, 2003, Vol. 37. – 59-81.

Wazir Muhammad Asif, Goujon Anne, (2019) Assessing the 2017 census of Pakistan using demographic analysis: a sub-national perspective, Vienna Institute of Demography Austrian Academy of Sciences Welthandelsplatz 2, Level 2/1020 Wien, Österreich, www.oeaw.ac.at/vid (Date of viewing: 24.09.2023)

Weinreich M., (2014) Migratsiya i yazyk: pushtuny v Pakistanskom vysokogorye [Migration and Language: Pashtuns in the Pakistani Highlands], Erevan: Kavkazskiy tsentr iranistiki. – 180 (in Russian).

***Авторлар туралы мәлімет:***

*Канафьева Шынар Ерланқызы – ал-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті Таяу Шығыс және Оңтүстік Азия кафедрасының аға оқытушысы (Алматы қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: kanafeva.shynar@gmail.com).*

***Information about authors:***

*Kanafyeva shynar Erlankyzy – Senior Lecturer of the Department of Middle East and South Asia of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: kanafeva.shynar@gmail.com).*

*Келіп түсті: 27 ақпан, 2024.  
Қабылданды: 4 маусым, 2024.*

M. Shumatova<sup>1\*</sup> , E. Shumatov<sup>2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup>Ualikhanov University, Kokshetau, Kazakhstan

<sup>2</sup>M. Gabdullin Academy of Civil Defense at Ministry of Emergency Situations of RK, Kokshetau, Kazakhstan

\*e-mail: akisheva\_mika@mail.ru

## SPACE AND TIME AS REPRESENTATIONS OF MYTHO-RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

After the collapse of the USSR, the worldview guidelines of a person in the post-Soviet era lost their values. Man was forced to rethink his ideological guidelines and spiritual values. What a person believed in has become worthless. Man again faced the question of establishing new ideological guidelines and spiritual values. Thus, the questions became actual – what is sacred and sacred in human existence, where are their sources. Where is the guarantee that after a certain time they will not depreciate? Consequently, issues of myth making are still relevant today. In this article, the authors have set themselves the following goal – to analyze the influence of mythological and religious worldview universals on the existence of modern man. Depending on this, a person determines his role and place in the world. The influence of these universals not only determine a person's place in the world, but also give a visual picture of the world, that is, its time and space of existence. The scientific and practical significance of this study is due to the fact that post-Soviet people, having “freed themselves” from some ideals blindly, did not believe other false ideals. Without spiritual guidelines and worldviews, a person wanders in the labyrinths of freedom. An example of this is such negative phenomena of our time as terrorism and religious extremism.

**Key words:** myth, religious consciousness, mythological time, sacred time, social space.

М. Шуматова<sup>1\*</sup>, Э. Шуматов<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ш. Уәлихнов университеті, Көкшетау қ., Қазақстан

<sup>2</sup>ҚР ТЖМ М. Ғабдуллин атындағы Азаматтық қорғау академиясы, Көкшетау қ., Қазақстан

\*e-mail: akisheva\_mika@mail.ru

### Кеңістік пен уақыт мифологиялық және діни сананың бейнелері ретінде

КСРО ыдырағаннан кейін посткеңестік дәуірдегі адамның дүниетанымдық нұсқаулары өз құндылықтарын жоғалтты. Адам өзінің идеологиялық нұсқаулары мен рухани құндылықтарын қайта қарауға мәжбүр болды. Адамдың сеніп жүргенінің барлығы құнсыз болып шықты. Адамның алдында тағы да жаңа идеологиялық бағдарлар мен рухани құндылықтарды орнату мәселесі тұрды. Осылайша, адам болмысында не қасиетті, не киелі, олардың қайнар көздері қайда деген сұрақтар өзекті болды. Белгілі бір уақыттан кейін олардың құнсызданбасына кепілдік қайда? Демек, миф жасау мәселелері бүгінгі күні де өзекті. Бұл мақалада авторлар өз алдына мынадай мақсат қойды – мифологиялық және діни дүниетанымдық әмбебаптардың қазіргі адамның болмысына әсерін талдау. Осыған байланысты адам өзінің дүниедегі рөлі мен орнын анықтайды. Бұл әмбебаптардың әсері адамның әлемдегі орнын анықтап қана қоймайды, сонымен бірге әлемнің көрнекі бейнесін береді, яғни оның өмір сүру уақыты мен кеңістігі. Бұл зерттеудің ғылыми-тәжірибелік маңыздылығы посткеңестік дәуірдегі адамдардың кейбір идеалдардан соқырлықпен «босатылып», басқа жалған идеалдарға сенбеуімен байланысты. Рухани бағыт-бағдарсыз, дүниетанымсыз адам бостандық лабиринттерін кезеді. Оған мысал ретінде терроризм, діни экстремизм сияқты заманымыздың келеңсіз құбылыстарын айтуға болады.

**Түйін сөздер:** миф, діни сана, мифологиялық уақыт, сакралды уақыт, әлеуметтік кеңістік.

М. Шуматова<sup>1\*</sup>, Э. Шуматов<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Университет имени Уалиханва, г. Кокшетау, Казахстан

<sup>2</sup>Академия гражданской защиты имени М. Габдуллина МЧС РК, г. Кокшетау, Казахстан

\*e-mail: akisheva\_mika@mail.ru

### **Пространство и время как образы мифо-религиозного сознания**

После развала СССР мировоззренческие ориентиры человека постсоветской эпохи утратили свои ценности. Человек был вынужден переосмыслить свои мировоззренческие ориентиры и духовные ценности. То, во что верил человек, обесценилось. Перед человеком вновь стал вопрос об утверждении новых мировоззренческих ориентиров и духовных ценностей. Тем самым актуализировались вопросы – что же в человеческом бытии есть священного и сакрального, где их истоки. Где гарантия тому, что через определенное время они также не обесценятся. Следовательно, вопросы мифотворчества актуальны и сегодня. В данной статье авторы поставили перед собой следующую цель – проанализировать влияние мифологических и религиозных мировоззренческих универсалий на бытие современного человека. В зависимости от этого человек определяет свою роль и место в мире. Влияние указанных универсалий не просто определяют место человека в мире, но и дают наглядную картину мира, то есть время и пространство его бытия. Научно-практическая значимость этого исследования обусловлена тем, что постсоветский человек «освободившись» от одних идеалов слепо, не поверил другим лжеидеалам. Без духовных ориентиров и мировоззренческих установок человек блуждает в лабиринтах свободы. Примером чему могут служить такие негативные феномены современности, как терроризм и религиозный экстремизм.

**Ключевые слова:** миф, религиозное сознание, мифологическое время, сакральное время, социальное пространство.

#### **Introduction**

Initially, natural relations dominated in connections and relationships between people, that is, in his individual life activity, a person was guided by natural relations. Both an individual and any type of his social existence had an adaptive nature of his existence. The main activities that ensured the relationship of archaic man with the nature around him were hunting, gathering, and subsequently shepherding. In the conditions of an archaic community, relationships between people were formed on the basis of consanguinity. Here a person was born into pre-determined and rigidly fixed social relations. Naturally, therefore, the goals of his activities were given to him as if from the outside. As a result, he became an executor or functionary of these goals given to him from the outside, and the norms organizing and regulating his joint activities with his peers became actual subjects of activity. So, the norms that organize and regulate the individual life activity of archaic man in an environment with his own kind are presented in his consciousness in the form of traditions, which he perceived as unchangeable and eternally given. As a result, M. Eliade comes to the following conclusion. An ancient man in his actions, rituals, customs, traditions, that is, in his entire way of life, pursues one goal – to annul elapsed time, to abolish history by constantly returning to its time, by repeating the cosmogonic act. “Man becomes aware of the

sacred because it itself, shows itself, as something wholly different from the profane” (Eliade, 1961: 11). Man tried to neutralize and eliminate any manifestations of time as a creative-production process and relationship. This is most clearly represented in the celebration of the New Year. For archaic people, the New Year is a special ritual through which the destruction of worldly (historical) time was carried out. Therefore, in a certain sense, it can be argued that for a person in an archaic society, that is, a person who guides natural relations, space and time do not exist.

According to M. Eliade, space is the dominant principle in the life of ancient man, it is the sphere of structured, harmonious existence. All significant life events were interpreted by him through likening them to an act of cosmogony. “It may be said, in general, that the majority of the sacred and ritual trees that we meet with in the history of religions are only replicas, imperfect copies of this exemplary archetype, the Cosmic Tree” (Eliade, 1991: 44). In an eternal, motionless cosmos, that is, timeless, archaic man could exist in a continuous present, independent of the past and not entailing a natural future.

#### **Justification of the choice of articles and goals and objectives**

The purpose of the study is to analyze space and time as ideological guidelines of human religious



consciousness in the archaic and medieval era. Based on this, it is necessary to reveal space and time as forms of sacred (religious) human activity for the production and reproduction of human existence and endowing it with meaning-forming values and imperatives. The relationship to space and time is the form of a person's relationship to the manifestation of the sacred and sacred, that is, that which gives a person's life meaning and value.

The loss of the universal meaning and value of existence, not only of an individual person, but also of all humanity, is an ideological crisis that is a characteristic feature of modernity. Being in a spiritual vacuum, a person recreates old images, and rethinks the historical process and his place in it. Therefore, mythological and religious ideas must be subjected to historical and philosophical analysis in order to determine their modifications in the consciousness of modern man. To reveal the extent to which these ideas have undergone changes in the consciousness of modern man is the task of this work.

### Scientific research methodology

The theoretical and methodological basis is the activity approach, which, in the context of the idea of society as a self-organizing and self-developing system, made it possible to consider space and time as forms of organization of human religious activity. A comparative method was also used, consisting of a comparison of various spatio-temporal forms of religious activity.

To identify the deep essence of phenomena, their meanings and place in human consciousness, the phenomenological method was used. The hermeneutic method was used to interpret and interpret the myths. With the help of these methods, the sacred and sacred were revealed not only in the consciousness of ancient man, but also their presence in the consciousness of modern man.

### Main part

#### *On the formation of religious thinking*

Regarding the very origin of religious thinking, religion as a social institution, we generally have many assumptions, but scattered specifics, and therefore an endless number of discussions on this matter. How and when ancient man broke down in favor of explaining everything through God, we generally know little. All we have is that "we have very little idea of how, in empirical terms, this particular miracle is accomplished. We just know

that it is done, annually, weekly, daily, for some people almost hourly; and we have an enormous ethnographic literature to demonstrate it" (Geertz, 1993: 90). So, this is all we can boast of today. In an archaic society, norms (traditions) are primarily aimed at organizing the joint activities of people in order to satisfy nature-conforming needs, that is, their main goal is to preserve the integrity of their natural existence. "One notion that is generally taken to be characteristic of all that is religious is the notion of the supernatural" (Durkheim, 1995: 22). Here, Durkheim brightly manifests that "the sacred–profane dichotomy is not equivalent to good–evil, as the sacred could be either good or evil, and the profane could be either as well" (Pals, 1996: 99). And therefore, the formation of social (supernatural) existence itself, and social space (time) as well, was out of the question for them. Here, in fact, one approach was clear, which was expressed in the fact that at some point a person began to deify absolutely everything. "If nothing was divine then all things were, the world itself" (Wallace, 1984: 412).

So, if the time of a person's life is something unique, individual, personified, then this contradicts the eternal archetypes that determine everything. As a result, in his mythological worldview, man sets as his main goal the abolition, destruction of worldly, historical, profane time. Thus, he destroys himself as a unique individuality, that is, it is not he, but the immortal race that has real existence. Here a very important division appears in man's very relationship to God, nature and himself. This is the separation between the sacred and the profane. "The profane world consists of all that people can know through their senses; it is the natural world of everyday life that people experience as either comprehensible or at least ultimately knowable – the *Lebenswelt* or lifeworld" (Berger, 1973: 15). The sacred and the profane are the result of the interaction of opposites, but on an abstract, mental level, since "everything in his world lives on the very border of its opposite" (Bakhtin, 1984: 176). Therefore, it is important here to understand the very essence of the historical development of the thinking systems of all humankind.

Sacred time itself is the time of prototypes, archetypes, the time of creation by the first person of all traditions, customs, norms of behavior, etc. and so on. "Religion gives to person socially sanctioned forms of actualization of unconscious mental processes through archetypal images" (Baitenova, Demeuova, Jung, 2015: 7). Consequently, sacred time is the absolutized social space of ancient man. After all, only strict adherence to customs and

traditions could be a guarantee of survival, hence the power of traditions for ancient man. In this way, religious thinking, religious behavior and, as a consequence, religious language are formed. In this relation, religious behavior “says through its own language” that the world is as *homo religious* would see it, whether or not the real-life participants in religious behavior are aware of it” (Ellwood, 1999: 104). Consequently, myth is the social reality of ancient man, that is, the social space in which he lives. The world of ancient man is not in change and formation, i.e. he is motionless, and even eternal. Man lives in space, but not in time. Space is space, order, or structured being. Pure time was identified with the endlessly changing and structure less Chaos, i.e. with the fact that there is nothing permanent and enduring. First creation, i.e. time, as the act of the beginning of life, was interpreted by ancient man as the emergence of harmony from chaos, space from time.

As a result, for ancient man, the space of his life had priority over the time of his life, and he tried with all his might to preserve this dominance of the space of his life. Since in a society where “production and consumption were of a natural nature and were limited to satisfying immediate “natural” needs, changes in the conditions of production, forms and methods of activity occurred very slowly, they were passed on almost unchanged from generation to generation. And since socio-historical time did not change significantly, the task of society was to preserve the existing state or time, that is, no longer time, but the space of common life. Consequently, the time of life of an archaic person does not change, since it, constantly being annulled, is reproduced in an unchanged state as the time of first creation, i.e. Time for ancient man was, as it were, invariant. The conservation of the life time of an archaic person ultimately leads to the conservation of the space of his life. This is reflected in the fact that a person begins to occupy a certain position in the community, which, according to tradition, is inherited, passed on from generation to generation. The space of traditional society is strictly and rigidly subordinated. This is a relationship of personal dependence, where and when a person becomes a hostage to himself, his alienated essence.

K. Marx, analyzing archaic forms of unification of people, comes to the following conclusion: “The goal of all these communities is preservation, i.e. reproduction of the individuals forming the community as owners, i.e. their reproduction under the same objective mode of existence, which at the same time establishes the relations of the members of

the community to each other and therefore forms the community itself. But this reproduction is inevitably at the same time both the production anew of the old form and its destruction.” Thus, if the old form of communication is reproduced, i.e. the space and time of a community’s life do not change, and then what is meant by its destruction?

In archaic society, according to K. Marx, agricultural labor was the dominant labor. And it is the land, i.e. a certain space turned out to be a mediating, connecting link both between man and man, and between man and nature. “For archaic man, the land, first of all, acted as a kind of bond that made it possible to combine these two attributes of settled life: naturalness and sociality.” The consciousness of archaic man could not help but think of man outside a certain territory – the earth. Proof of this, for example, can be the fact that to the names of great philosophers, thinkers or sages the name of the city or locality from which they came was added as a surname. For example, Heraclitus of Ephesus, since from the city of Ephesus, Diogenes of Sinope (from Sinope), as well as Zeno of Elea, Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, etc. and so on.

For ancient man, the earth was the space of his life. We emphasize space, not the time of his life. Therefore, ancient man could not even imagine himself outside this certain territory; he merged with it, i.e. identified himself with it, did not distinguish between himself and the land, which “contributed to the emergence of such a social phenomenon as place-centrism,” notes V.S. Baturin (Baturin, 2002: 49). Here one should not understand “place”, “land”, “space” either purely physically or purely socially. It is only modern man who divides physical and social space as a matter of course. For ancient man, they are fused, syncretic; one has not yet separated from the other. Man discovered even astronomical time only because the natural process and the production process were fused at the initial stage of human development. In the era when agricultural labor dominated, the production process was subordinated to natural cycles, i.e. natural time. Agrarian time is natural time, not eventful, which is why it does not need precise measurement and is not amenable to it. It was a time of people who have not mastered nature, but obey its rhythm.

Therefore, a community is always associated with a certain territory, but it cannot constantly reproduce itself in a limited territory, because over time it is not able to feed an ever-increasing population. And if the space and time of her life, labor productivity, etc. remained unchanged, then

there is only one way for the further movement of these communities – colonization, the seizure of new lands, that is, the development of new territories. Not only the community, but also all pre-capitalist societies were characterized by the predominance of the extensive method of production over the intensive one, i.e. the development of labor productivity was accomplished mainly by quantitative methods. Therefore, the real reason for all the wars of that time, including the Crusades, was the seizure and development of new spaces, new territories, only through the conquest of which was the further development of a self-preserving social whole possible. But one should not make an unambiguous conclusion that people's social relations did not change at all. Changes occurred, but for significant changes to occur in the development of society and man, millennia were needed. Therefore, K. Marx writes that this destruction was at the same time the preservation of the old social form, since it was not new dimensions of social space and time that were being mastered, but only new territories were being conquered.

People whose economy was based on a nomadic lifestyle are no exception to the rule. The seasonality of migrations naturally copied the rhythms of nature. But, like sedentary peoples, they also regularly, if not more often, clashed over good pastures. Consequently, the basic properties and parameters of the space and time of life of a nomadic society did not differ significantly from sedentary societies. Even if we assume that the empirical ideas about space and time of nomadic peoples are in some way different from sedentary peoples, then categorical analysis largely shows their similarities. A distinctive feature of the views of these societies on the nature of social space and time from the ideas of modern man is a negative attitude towards any changes, i.e. to time, and maintaining the existing way of organizing social life, i.e. spaces of shared life. So, the logic of the individual life activity of archaic man was aimed at preserving the existing state, i.e. for the reproduction of the existing social whole.

#### *Spatiotemporal existence of human being*

Christianity proposed and introduced into life a completely new artificial way of organizing people. If in an archaic community the basis for uniting people was consanguineous ties, and in antiquity the social status of a free citizen, then in religion (Christianity) this connecting principle of a new type of social space was faith. Faith unites people. Apparently, it was no coincidence that it was

believed that someone who could not renounce his mother, father, or members of his family could not get into this space, since it is not consanguineous, but rather spiritual grounds that underlie the unity and unification of people. Outside of this religious community based on faith, the existence of an individual in the Middle Ages turned out to be almost impossible. According to Hegel's witty remark, religious (Christian) consciousness is a torn consciousness. In it, with the dominance of old ideas on the nature of space and time, a different attitude towards them is formed. This equally applies to the Christian God (who was Yahweh) himself. "Yahweh is both kind and wrathful; the God of the Christian mystics and theologians is terrible and gentle at once" (Eliade, 1976: 450). For the first time, a person begins to comprehend his existence from the position of time, that is, he places himself not only in space, but also in time. For a medieval person, time appears as the story of the salvation of the soul, that is, as a time of personal salvation. It is no coincidence that Augustine, in his *Confession*, where he talks about his mental suffering and torment until his soul found peace in the Christian faith, considers the problem of time and space in such detail. Augustine, in this regard, turns human thinking from knowledge of nature in its pure form to the understanding that it is necessary to consider nature through the prism of religious thinking. Since Augustine was sure that "it was God's grace that had been his prime mover in that way, it was a spontaneous expression of his heart that cast his self-recollection into the form of a sustained prayer to God" (Augustine, 1955: 5); and in this regard, Augustine's position was a kind of turning point in the history of the development of thinking and paradigm shifts.

In principle, the spatio-temporal existence of a medieval man is the opposite of the existence of an ancient Greek. Thus, in the image of a person in the ancient chronotope, as M.M. Bakhtin notes, there was and could not be anything intimate-private, secret-personal, turned towards himself, fundamentally lonely. A person here is open in all directions, he is entirely outside, there is nothing in him "for himself alone" there is nothing that is not subject to public-state control and reference. Here everything was entirely public. Thus, antiquity dissolves the human in the social (polis), the lifetime of the ancient Greek is subordinated to the space of his life, and free time itself, as such, is considered only in the sphere of politics. Christianity radically changes this ratio. She puts the emphasis not on the external, but on the internal in a person, not on the social, but on the individual-spiritual. Consequently,

the value of a person's life is associated not with the spatial parameters of his existence, but with the orientation toward achieving immortality by his soul. Hence the goal of human life is the salvation of one's soul. In this regard, the time of life for a medieval person is the sphere of his intimate and personal life. Every action of a person in the space surrounding him determines the nature of his future afterlife.

Initially, in the history of the development of society, social space had priority over social time. All characteristics of social time – the time during which a person's social life flows – were considered through the prism of socio-spatial (social) refraction. Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration if we can say that social time has been absorbed into social space. If the time of an ancient person "either does not move or rotates in a circle", then Christianity breaks the cyclical mythological time. Before this, time was clearly represented either in the form of a point or in the form of a circle, because everything repeats itself (a point is a more abstract expression of time as a circle (wheel)), therefore it was one-dimensional, but Christianity, having laid the beginning of time, set the point in motion, or breaks the circle, i.e. lays down a new image of time – linear, the essential characteristic of which is irreversibility and uniqueness. Thus Christian historical time is also mythological. Although it is linear, it is not infinite, since history is inevitably approaching its end – the Last Judgment. Despite this, the merit of religion is that it opened another dimension of time, namely the future.

It should be noted that the basis for the formation of the concepts of social space and social time is human social activity. But collective activity and social relations are also the basis of space and time as categorical forms. Categories, according to K. Marx, reflect social relations, that is, the social relations of people determine the categorical system of thinking. But at the same time, categories are also forms of spiritual (creative) human activity (Kant). Therefore, a person who has developed his ability to think to the categorical level is able to regulate and organize his activities, including social activities. In this regard, in all so-called pre-capitalist formations, space and time are categories, but not categories of spiritual (creative) human activity, but categories of culture. Thus, space and time are not abstract concepts, not forms of a person's "I", not forms of his creative activity, but the content of ideas in which he believed and in which he actually lived. Or, to put it differently, space and time are not factors of development, not forms of consciousness and self-

awareness, not universal forms of all being, i.e. the world, but its special parts. Since the unity and integrity of the world, for example, in the medieval worldview, were determined by its creation, but the creator himself and his "spark" – the soul – were believed to exist outside of time and space.

The man of the Middle Ages in his daily activities and life was guided by them (categories of culture), that is, they performed a certain social-regulatory function, but at the same time their influence on human activity and communication manifested itself spontaneously and unconsciously. Consequently, space and time as categories of culture are unique regulators of social activity. In this regard, time and space can influence a person's understanding of culture and in the sense that by mixing these categories, a person can create social multiculturalism. The latter implies various multicultural institutions, such as tolerant education, politics, interpersonal connections, etc. "If in multiculturalism the main goal is to celebrate differences, then multicultural education has the same goals and spirit" (Sugeng Bayu Wahyono and other, 2022: 474). In his daily life, the man of the Middle Ages obeyed them, they were naturally implied in his activity and communication, but at the same time they were not reflected, did not become the property of consciousness. The complete revolution in the Middle Ages from the polis, public, spatial existence of a person to his personal, intimate, internal, temporary existence does not mean that thereby his internal subjectivity (soul) was developed in a person, for it is just a "spark" of God, i.e. e. manifestation of his essence. Or, to put it differently, it is not man himself who does good and virtuous deeds and deeds, but God, i.e. man is just a tool and a means of manifestation of his will. Consequently, subjectivity is not attributed to man himself, but only to God, and therefore his entire inner, spiritual existence is a manifestation of the divine in him.

## Results and discussion

Man did not have independence; his Self was completely dissolved in the supersensible, otherworldly. Space and time were perceived by man as forms of manifestation of the sacred and sacred. Man did not have self-worth, but acted only as a manifestation or mediator of his supersensible destiny. As a result of this, in a relationship of personal dependence, a person's life activity, in general, was not aimed at self-development, but only at the self-preservation of the social whole.

Therefore, social space acquires a certain priority over social time, and communication subordinates activity.

The main results of the article are the following theses:

- the influence of religious ideas on the formation of individual space directly affects the development of social-suprasubjective connections of the individual;

- a person's social space and time are largely derived from his perception of the basic principles according to which his internal sense of reality is built, including religious ideas;

- in many ways, a person's religious principles are created under the influence of the understanding of sacredness as such.

### Conclusion

To sum up, with the dominance of relationships of personal dependence, society had almost unlimited dominance over man. Man did not have independence; his Self was completely dissolved in the social Self. Man did not have self-worth, but acted only as a manifestation of the will of the social whole, that is, all his value was reduced to functionality, to a means of expressing the will of the Society. And therefore his entire consciousness was entirely tribal, clan, polis, social. This was largely determined by the fact that these methods of organizing people were characterized by poor development of productive forces. Since social forms of existence were just being formed and separated from the natural existence of man, then, naturally, the nature of human activity was aimed at their preservation, since the preservation of the community guaranteed the preservation of the lives of its individual members. As a result, in a relationship of personal dependence, a person's life activity, in general, was not aimed at self-development, but only at the self-preservation of the social whole. Therefore, social space acquires a

certain priority over social time, and communication subordinates activity.

Thus, we can draw the following conclusion: if time is the inner feeling of a person (Kant), then space is the intuition of the social in a person. Consequently, as soon as a person began to consciously relate to time, he contrasted the individual and the social, i.e. opposed himself to the social whole, distinguished himself as a separate individual. But in doing so, man opposed himself not only to society, but also to nature. Consequently, man, through time, also distinguished between the natural and the social, i.e. time is not only a prerequisite for the identification of man as a separate individual, but also a prerequisite for the formation of man as a social being. With the awareness of time comes the end of the tribal, archaic consciousness. This is also important not only within the framework of the ontogeny of an individual, but also of social space, state building, and the formation of democratic societies. This is especially important for our young state. "In public and political discourse, the issue of religion is constantly present, and the influence of religion is scaled up in everyday practices. This is the specificity of the post secular period of religion in modern conditions" (Burova, Sagikyzy, Hejazi, 2022: 24). Everyone knows that Kazakhstan is still in the transit stage of forming a state worldview. This worldview requires that it contains some so-called pillars, thanks to which we can talk about the creation of a full-fledged and self-sufficient Kazakh society. Here, a special role can be assigned to national identity. "Therefore, to regenerate the national culture, shaped by different historical phases, all relevant variables that have contributed to its formation are essential" (Bilal Ahmad Malik, 2023: 396). All this together gives a more complete understanding of what time and space are, both in terms of their influence on the life world of an individual person, and the degree of influence of spatio-temporal factors on the further development of society.

### References

- Augustine (1955) "Introduction". Confessions and Enchiridion. Library of Christian Classics. Translated by Outler, Albert C. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. Print. – 421.
- Baitenova N.Zh., Demeuova A.A. C.G. Jung and E. (2015) Fromm psychoanalytic paradigm of the phenomenon of religion // KazNU Bulletin. Religious studies series. №4 (4). 2015. – 4-12.
- Bakhtin, M.M. (1984) Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. – 334 p.
- Baturin V.S. (2002) Sotsial'naya deyatelnost': priroda, sushchnost', strategiya organizatsii. – Karaganda: Izd-vo KarGU. – 323 p. (in russian)
- Berger, Peter. A Rumour of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural – PB – Pelican – 1973. – 267 p.

Bilal Ahmad Malik (2023) Islam and Nationalist Mobilization In Kazakhstan: Post-Soviet Cultural [Re]Framing and Identity [Re]Making // Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies (QIJS). Volume 11, Number 2, 2023. pp. 383-426.

Burova E., Sagikyzy A., Hejazi S. (2022) Indicators of the Process of Religiolization // Vol. 30 No. 2 (2022): Eurasian Journal of Religious Studies. – pp.22–36.

Durkheim, Emile [1912] 1995 The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. – Edited and translated by K. E. Fields. New York: The Free Press. – 464.

Eliade, Mircea (1961) The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (trans. Willard R. Trask), Harper Torchbooks, New York. – 215.

Eliade, Mircea (1976) Myths, Rites, Symbols: A Mircea Eliade Reader, Vol. 2, Ed. Wendell C. Beane and William G. Doty, Harper Colophon. – New York: Harper & Row. – 661 p.

Eliade, Mircea (1991) Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism (trans. Philip Mairet). – Princeton: Princeton University Press. – 244.

Ellwood, R. (1999) The Politics of Myth: A Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell. – Albany: State University of New York Press. – 304.

Geertz, C. (1993) Religion as a cultural system // The interpretation of cultures: selected essays, Geertz. – Clifford. – London: Fontana Press. – 87–125.

Pals, D. (1996) Seven Theories of Religion. – New York: Oxford University Press. US ISBN 0-19-508725-9 (pbk). – 233.

Sugeng Bayu Wahyono, Asri Budiningsih, Suyantiningsih Suyantiningsih, Sisca Rahmadonna (2022) Multicultural Education and Religious Tolerance: Elementary School Teachers' Understanding of Multicultural Education in Yogyakarta // Al-Jāmi'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies. Vol. 60, no. 2 (2022), pp.467–508.

Wallace, Stevens (1984) Collected Poems. – New York: Faber and Faber. – 560.

**Information about authors:**

*Shumatova Meruert Maratkyzy – Lecturer of the Department of History, Geography and Social and Humanitarian Disciplines of Sh. Ualikhanov Kokshetau State University (Kokshetau, Kazakhstan, e-mail: akisheva\_mika@mail.ru).*

*Shumatov Eldar Galymzhanuly – Candidate of Philosophy, Acting Professor of the Department of Religious Studies and Cultural Studies of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: bkm58@mail.ru).*

**Авторлар туралы мәлімет:**

*Шуматова Мерuert Маратқызы – Ш. Уәлиханов атындағы Көкшетау мемлекеттік университеті тарих, география және әлуметтік-гуманитарлық пәндер кафедрасының оқытушысы (Көкшетау қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: akisheva\_mika@mail.ru).*

*Шуматов Эльдар Галымжанұлы – философия ғылымдарының кандидаты, ҚР ТЖМ М. Ғабдуллин атындағы Азаматтық қорғау академиясы (Көкшетау қ., Қазақстан, e-mail: mgabdullin2019@mail.kz).*

*Registered: April 8, 2024.*

*Accepted: June 11, 2024.*

**ШЕТЕЛ БАСЫЛЫМДАРЫ**

---

**FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS**

---

**ЗАРУБЕЖНЫЕ ПУБЛИКАЦИИ**

**З. Агаева** 

Институт философии и социологии  
Национальной Академии Наук Азербайджана, г. Баку, Азербайджан  
e-mail: ziba.agayeba57@gmail.com

## ПРОБЛЕМЫ МОНОЛИТНОСТИ МОРАЛИ И РЕЛИГИИ

В статье акцентируется внимание на анализе взаимосвязи морали и религии, рассматриваются взгляды отдельных мыслителей на специфические черты в рассмотрении соотношения морали и религии, а также религия рассматривается как источник нравственных ценностей. Делается вывод, что даже философы, которые исследовали мораль и религию в отдельности, приходили в итоге к мысли об их единстве, монолитности. В статье так же проанализировано влияние морали и религии друг на друга. В статье в таком же ракурсе рассматриваются вопросы соотношения разума и веры, будучи формой общественного сознания, раскрывается суть неразрывной связи этих двух понятий. Автор приходит к выводу о том, что утвердившиеся знания формируют рациональный взгляд на окружающий мир. Вместе с этим человек познает мир с помощью окружающего мира. С этой точки зрения вера носит разветвленный характер и в целом является связывающим звеном между человеком и обществом. В сущности, вера стоит выше самого человека и проявляется через нравственные ценности. Человек живет и творит не только для себя, он делает это и ради других. В этом и заключается с точки зрения веры смысл жизни.

**Ключевые слова:** культура, мораль, этика, нравственность, ценности, человек, общество, взаимосвязь.

Z. Agaeva

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology  
of Azerbaijan National Academy of Science, Baku, Azerbaijan  
e-mail: ziba.agayeba57@gmail.com

### Problems of monolithy of morality and religion

The article focuses on the analysis of the relationship between morality and religion, considers the views of individual thinkers on specific features in considering the relationship between morality and religion, and considers religion as a source of moral values. It is concluded that even philosophers who studied morality and religion separately, eventually came to consider their unity, solidity. From this point of view, faith has a branched character and, in general, is a connecting link between a person and society. In essence, faith stands above the person himself and is manifested in the existence of moral values. Man lives and creates not only for himself; he does it for the sake of others. This is the meaning of life from the point of view of faith.

**Key words:** culture, morality, ethics, morality, values, person, society, relationship.

З. Агаева

Әзірбайжан Ұлттық Ғылым Академиясының Философия  
және әлеуметтану институты, Баку қ., Әзірбайжан  
e-mail: ziba.agayeba57@gmail.com

### Мораль және дін монолиттілігі мәселесі

Мақалада имандылық пен діннің арақатынасын талдауға баса назар аударылып, адамгершілік пен діннің арақатынасын зерттеуде нақты белгілерін көрсеткен жеке ойшылдардың көзқарастары қарастырылады. Дін адамгершілік құндылықтардың қайнар көзі ретінде тұжырымдалады. Мораль мен дінді бір-бірінен бөлек зерттеген философтардың өзі ақырында олардың біртұтастығын мойындады деген қорытынды жасалады. Сондай-ақ, мақалада имандылық пен діннің бір-біріне әсері де талданады. Осы тұрғыдан автор мақалада ақыл мен сенімнің арақатынасы мәселелері қарастырып, қоғамдық сананың бір түрі ретінде ала отырып, осы екі ұғымның ажырамас байланысының мәнін ашады. Адам қоршаған дүниенің көмегімен дүниені таниды, қалыптасқан



білім қоршаған дүниеге рационалды көзқарасты қалыптастырады деген қорытынды жасайды. Осы тұрғыдан алғанда иман тармақталған сипатқа ие және жалпы алғанда адам мен қоғамды байланыстырушы буын болады деп тұжырымдайды. Негізінде иман адамның өзінен жоғары тұрады және адамгершілік құндылықтардың болуымен көрініс береді. Адам өзі үшін өмір сүреді әрі өзі үшін ғана емес, өзгелер үшін де. Иmandылық тұрғысынан өмірдің мәні де осы.

**Түйін сөздер:** мәдениет, мораль, этика, мораль, құндылықтар, адам, қоғам, қарым-қатынас.

## Введение

Проблема религии в современном мире занимает особое место. Как проповедники божьего закона, классики философии религии в свое время, так и в современный период большинство ученых проводящих исследования в этой области, ищут точку соприкосновения морали и религии. Это делается для того, чтобы обеспечить устойчивость моральных ценностей в соответствии с установленной религией морали и этики, которые являются неотъемлемой частью любой религии, ее фундаментом, ядром. Так, например, французский ученый С. Московичи в своем исследовании «Бог создал машину», показывает: «религия как общество воспринимает себя как личность и позволяет нам жить вместе» (Московичи, 1998). В этом контексте, великий философ, мыслитель И. Кант часто говорил о внутреннем голосе, «категоричном императиве» божественной природы человека, его духовном призвании (Соловьев, 2005). По мнению мыслителя, человек полон духовной дисциплины, ему помогли в этом древние тексты араических религий, священных книг, и в сурах Корана и в хадисах так же присутствует идея Бога и существование загробной жизни, идея личности и поведения.

## Обоснование выбора темы и цели и задачи

Мораль и религия всегда влияли на формирование ценностно-семантических отношений человека по отношению к миру. Философы от древности до настоящего времени, так или иначе, в своих трактатах пытались адекватно понять суть этих отношений. С одной стороны, ценностное отношение человека к миру связано с миром обязательств, а с другой – ценностная интерпретация мира всегда была связана с миром бытия, то есть с существенным пониманием мира обязательств и его роли в системе познавательной и практической человеческой деятельности. Отбросив все условности, автор поставил эту проблему, расширил и углубил границы анализа данных вопросов, обратив особое внимание из-

учению социологических и философских корней религии. В настоящей статье рассматривается философия религии, которая сделала огромный путь в своем развитии, и поэтому мы могли бы попытаться выявить закономерности и принципы этого пути. Основные вопросы связаны со сложным мировоззрением между моралью, религией и разумом, и делаются попытки ответить на вопросы, возникающие в отношениях между моралью и религией, Основным заключением данной статьи будет попытка обоснования, неизбежная взаимосвязь между моралью и религии.

## Научная методология исследований

Методологической основой статьи является признание принципа абсолютности морали, позволяющего рассматривать нравственную жизнь человека как стремление к проявлению своей высшей сущности. Философский метод позволил проанализировать взгляды мыслителей на соотношение морали и религии. Диалектический метод помог при выяснении противоречивого характера соотношения морали и религии. В исследовательской работе применяется ряд научных подходов и методов, включая в том числе системно-структурный анализ, методы сравнительного и теоретического анализа.

## Результаты и обсуждение

### *Взаимосвязь морали и религии в философии*

Вопросу о происхождении морали и преданности своей религии пишет писатель Мел Томпсон. По его мнению, имеются три популярных варианта, раскрывающих проблему связи религии и морали: первый вариант, «автономия», то есть, «ссылка на идею духовности религии и основывается при этом не только на независимость ума»; второй вариант, «гетерономия», то есть моральный закон, основывающийся на внешних источниках (например, культуры), на воздействие религии и культурных ценностей; третий вариант, «теономия», то есть источником духовности является сам Бог (Томпсон, 2001: 6-7).

Часть исследователей делают попытку оценить роль религии в жизни людей. «В последние годы, растет интерес к различным аспектам духовной жизни, будь то современные или древние общества. Роль мифа и ритуала в древние времена доказывает, что религия является неотъемлемой частью культуры и важной составляющей древней цивилизации. Мифы и ритуалы (традиции), регламентирующие порядок в мире и обществе, объясняют систему ценностей и норм, разрешений и запретов. Они являются своеобразной системой шифрования наследие прошлого. Сложная символика мифологии и религии, является важной частью культурных достижений современного человека» (Мовсумова, 2011: 5). С подобным мнением нельзя не согласиться. Действительно, духовность и культура, крепко переплетены с религией. Духовность и религия пересекаются в точке, где для каждого из них вопрос о смысле человеческой жизни, из общего круга проблем, является чрезвычайно важным. Например, мыслитель девятнадцатого века, великий русский писатель Л.Н. Толстой будучи верующим христианином, в своем произведении «Исповедь» (1878-1882) создал так называемое религиозно – духовное учение. Написание этого романа совпало с глубоким кризисом в духовной жизни Льва Толстого. В сложный для себя период кризиса писатель ищет ответы на поставленные самим перед собой волнующие его на этот период жизни вопросы: в чем смысл жизни, какова глубина разницы между добром и злом, что такое смерть, какова мера любви к жизни и страха смерти, как стать бессмертным? (Толстой, 1989: 414). В результате, Священный Синод (т.н. религиозная цензура) объявил этот роман глашатаем «антихристианского» еретического учения и запретил его издание.

Л. Толстой, Л. Фейербах, И. Кант, Спиноза считали, что если от религии вычистить саму религию, веру, то на ее месте останется только лишь мораль. Исторические факты свидетельствуют о том, что духовность способна жить в отдельности от религии, независимо от нее. История знает страны, в которых господствовало многобожие, которые подарили миру великие духовные достижения. Древняя Греция является наиболее ярким примером отмеченного. Здесь доброта, мудрость, справедливость, мужественность были приняты в качестве норм поведения, именно здесь была разработана концепция золотого правила морали и дано определение понятия этики. И в наше время, перечисленные выше

ценности сохраняют свое значение и составляют богатство всего человечества.

Другой пример, идеологи церкви признали Эпикура (ок. 341-270 до н.э.) атеистом за его уникальное, отличное от богословия учение. Эпикур принимает существование богов, он верит в их бессмертную и счастливую сущность. По его представлениям боги проживают в тихих пространствах между мирами и категорически не вмешиваются в жизнедеятельность людей. Одною только этого постулата было достаточно, для того чтобы вызвать протест идеологов церкви. С их точки зрения Эпикур атеист. Такое заключение делается только лишь на основании того, что он отрицает вмешательство богов в жизнь людей, а это в свою очередь означает, что отделившаяся от религии нравственность, уже больше не религия. Маркс в своей докторской диссертации впервые называет Эпикура «первым героем, растоптавшим и разрушившим культ богов».

Для того, чтобы быть нравственным и вообще жить в нравственном мире, надо самому быть олицетворением морали и духовности. Это не возможно для не обладающего такими качествами человека. Для обоснования идеи существования Бога Декартом был выдвинут следующий постулат (Декарт, 1989): существование Бога и религии необходимо человеку для устранения сомнений и разрешения непосильных проблем.

В большинстве случаев человеческая жизнь определяется двумя факторами. Это ум и вера. Выражаясь словами Имама Али: «Нет большего богатства, чем разум». (Потому что он показывает путь к спокойствию и счастью в мире и в Потусторонней жизни). Предел нищеты – невежество. (Невежественный человек вынужден, для достижения своих целей, просить помощи у других. Предостерегайте людей от совершения недостойных и неприглядных поступков). Нет завета лучше, чем быть порядочным. Нет поддержки лучше, чем дать правильный совет. (Правильное решение достигается в следствии консультаций)» (Seyyid Razi, 2007: 709).

Разум и вера, будучи формами общественного сознания, неразрывно связаны друг с другом. Утвердившиеся знания формируют рациональный взгляд на окружающий мир. Вместе с этим человек познает мир с помощью окружающего мира. С этой точки зрения вера носит разветвленный характер и в целом является связывающим звеном между человеком и обществом. В сущности, вера стоит выше самого человека и проявляется в существовании нравственных

ценностей. Человек живет и творит не только для себя, он делает это и ради других. В этом и заключается с точки зрения веры смысл жизни.

Понятие веры уходит своими корнями в понятия добра и зла, на его основании регулируются внутренние качества человека. Иными словами, вера есть форма развития общественной стороны человеческой сущности (Qasimzadë, 1999: 124).

Будучи составной частью общества, проживание человека в обществе в одиночестве носит сложный характер. Таким образом, вера противоречит индивидуализации человека. Все, что не запрещено индивидуализмом, то разрешено; другими словами, все разрешается делать, только при этом оставаться освобожденным от ответственности.

Как известно большинство исследователей считает, что именно такое положение существовало в поздний период развития Древнеримской Империи. Погрязшие в индивидуализме, эгоизме, жадности, аморальности, жестокости, насилии общество Древнего Рима, начиная со второй половины четвертого века, принимает христианство. Как видно, история повторяется (Eliade, 1997: 355).

#### *Религия как источник нравственных ценностей*

Религия – один из основных источников нравственных ценностей, которые в свою очередь являются не только межрелигиозными ценностями, но в тоже время отличаются традициями многообразных народов внутри различных религий. Однако в религиозно-нравственных системах есть общие темы, которые отождествляются и подвергаются критике. Эти высказывания не составляют составную часть какой-либо религиозно-нравственной системы, хотя и могли стать составной частью некоторых не религиозно – нравственных систем. Тем не менее, недостатки основных религиозно – нравственных систем, в некоторых случаях дают основание для отрицания идеи, которая выражается в том, что «религия является основным источником религиозных и нравственных ценностей». Всякая религиозно – нравственная система основывается на идее о том, что, моральные и духовные ценности, посланные Богом, распространяются на все человечество. Таким образом, несмотря на то, с чьей стороны не определялись бы те или иные религиозно – нравственные ценности, в конечном итоге они подчинены Богу.

В религиозно-нравственных отношениях непослушание и сомнения недопустимы. Тем не менее, истинная духовность заключается не просто в послушании: человек, несущий моральную ответственность должны быть решительными в своем выборе. За непослушание религиозно-нравственная система предусматривает наказание, иногда вплоть до пожизненного заключения. Истинный моральный выбор, не может зависеть от желания избежать наказания.

Тем не менее, мы считаем, что пожизненное наказание за незначительные грехи, само по себе носит аморальный характер. В таком случае смертная казнь за кражу и воровство, можно считать более справедливым приговором.

Наравне с наказанием проблема награждения послушных так же подчиняется определенным правилам. Однако истинный нравственный выбор не может руководствоваться надеждой на награду прижизненную или жизнь потустороннюю. Если человек делает нравственный выбор только лишь из-за награды, его выбор основан не на нравственные ценности, а руководствуется собственными интересами, в общем, на эгоизме.

По утверждению богословов, религиозно нравственные ценности намного выше светских, атеистических ценностей. Несмотря на то, что каждая из религий свои религиозные ценности ставит выше ценностей других религий, категоричны в своей уверенности о превосходстве религиозных ценностей над атеистическими.

В жизни каждого народа вера, духовность и культура неразрывно связаны друг с другом. Разрыв этого органического единства может привести к плачевным результатам. Фундамент человеческой сущности должна составлять мораль. А это невозможно без участия религии. Только религия, являясь крепким моральным стержнем, дает людям сведения и твердые рекомендации о моральных ценностях.

Зачем человек живет? Какими ценностями он при этом руководствуется? –подобного рода вопросы волнуют представителей различных конфессий. От ответа на эти вопросы зависит будущее целой цивилизации.

Внутренняя мораль человека изначально иррациональна и, как известно, основывается на голосе совести. Именно в религии внутренние моральные законы принимают форму конкретных рациональных категорий культуры и, в конечном итоге, в обществе принимают форму законов. Все законы основаны на морали. Если они не отвечают принципам моральных законов, законы общества не работают. В человеческом

обществе духовность, семья составляют основу существования цивилизации.

Моральные ценности и моральные мотивы занимают важное и исключительное место в сердце каждого человека. Это, одним словом можно назвать духовностью. Нравственность носит характер регулятивной категории, она, используя запреты и ограничения, оценивает поступки людей, деля их на добрые и злые, плохие и недопустимые. Наравне с состраданием в сердцах людей, нравственность формирует понятия истины, справедливости и утверждает идеалы красоты.

История интеллектуального развития человечества носит ярко выраженный религиозно-нравственный характер. Люди на всех этапах развития истории пытались, основываясь на законах религии-общества-нравственности разыскать пути и тенденции для улучшения различных оттенков жизни. При этом формируется их психологический характер и субъективное отношение на религиозно-нравственные ценности. В этой связи эстетическая оценка как бы остается в тени, моральные, духовные стороны жизни намного превосходят над внешним видом.

С призм религиозных ценностей, несмотря на различия убеждений и верований, которые могут варьироваться, в целом все эти люди, считаются верующими.

Религия утверждает обязательные моральные ценности и выражает требование признания единого начала. Здесь сила единого начала растворяется с истинной силой духа истины. Религиозные настроения приводят к признанию высших ценностей космическими, имеющими вне человеческое значение.

Любое мировоззрение, где идеал носит всего лишь относительное значение, не зависимо от сопровождающих религию и порождающих ее психологических эффектов, теряет свое значение и несет без религиозное, атеистическое значение.

В целом человеку не чужды как теоретические и эстетические мотивы, так и религиозные ценности. Человек оценивает истину и красоту не только с точки зрения религиозных ценностей, он также это делает и с призм общечеловеческих ценностей. Религия требует от человека «любви к Богу, отличное отношение человека к миру, земной жизни», заставляет по-другому взглянуть на окружающий мир, без юрисдикции, бездоказательно признать все перечисленное. В этом скрывается невероятная и глубокая истина.

Если человеческая сущность ограничена узким внутренним содержанием, если субъективные человеческие желания являются единственным критерием для земной практики, тогда религиозно-нравственные ценности отойдут на задний план, уступая свое место эгоизму.

В целом, все какие-либо объективные ценности человеческой деятельности (напр., объект религиозных убеждений или национального достоинства и т.д.), носящие субъективное значение, направлены на обеспечение и реализацию личных потребностей.

Любая вера, независимо от содержания создает свои собственные моральные нормы. Иными словами, от верующего требуется в своей жизни и деятельности, в своих интересах и пожеланиях четко определить грани хорошего и плохого.

Мораль, основанная на вере в объективные ценности и на признании внутренней святости любой цели, в сравнении с верой признается нормой и средством служения. Поэтому, несмотря на то, что жизнь верующего строго регламентируется религиозной моралью, здесь мораль не самостоятельна и играет роль посредника. Каждое моральное требование может здесь быть обосновано, либо лишено конечной цели. Именно поэтому, религиозная мораль не претендует ни на мистификацию, ни на отрицание. Только в одном случае, в случае отсутствия абсолютных ценностей – то есть предоставление в период субъективных человеческих потребностей и требований, вследствие логического несоответствия закона, мораль является психологической основой мировоззрения, как неизбежный процесс. Там, где человек свое «Я», свои достижения и цели не связывает с непосредственным участием моральных ценностей, которые по своему значению приравниваются к субъективным требованиям и, является предметом субъективных интересов, такие как – жертва, бескорыстие, аскетизм, самолишения, они не зависят от характера суждений, так как в противном случае они не подпадают под ответственность кого-либо, никому другому не посильно и не исполнимо. В этом случае цели или идеал не воспринимаются как обязательные ценности, они воспринимаются как подчинение и служение. Это значит, что мораль не только занимает важное место, она в тоже время превращает разум в абсолютного судью. Лишенных веры в абсолютные ценности людей нельзя назвать аморальными, безнравственными.

Религия же не может встать на один уровень с безнравственностью, эти два понятия взаимно исключают друг друга, так как такие объективные ценности как любовь, вера, убеждения, основаны на религии. Для духовно обнищавших людей, жизнь не носит объективный внутренний смысл. Для них единственным, приносящим счастье является материальное благополучие, человек направляет все свои усилия на обеспечение своих субъективных потребностей и всяческими силами ведет беспощадную борьбу с препятствиями, встающими перед ним (Mahmudov, 1998: 59).

На наш взгляд, эта мысль хоть логически и плохо аргументирована, с психологической стороны поведение такого человека крепко связано цепями осуждения. В этой цепи осуждений в самом деле прослеживается безверие и безмерное ужесточение моральных требований, ключевым фактором при этом становятся беспринципность, отрицание объективной разницы между добром и злом, и высокая честность в исполнении эмпирических принципов. Для такого человека слово «культура» в полном смысле слова, светлое понятие «мораль», чужды.

В целом, связь между религией и культурой настолько монолитна, что можно назвать их двумя берегами одной реки. Близость религии и культуры раскрывается в культурных проявлениях. Однако религия оказывает сильное воздействие на моральное качество общества. В любой религии или религиозных воззрениях есть значительная степень морально-нравственного начала (Block, 1962: 1908).

Влияние религии наблюдается не только во взаимоотношении человека с Богом, она также регулирует взаимодействие человека как в рамках, так и за рамками самой религии.

Бог сам по себе представляет воплощение нравственности, поэтому требование выполнения его моральных норм теми, кто в него верует необходимо.

## Заключение

В основе всех монотеистических религий ярко выраженное нравственное начало. В них с большим уважением и любовью оберегаются общечеловеческие моральные нормы. Так, любовь к матери и родине, преданность семье, трудолюбие, гостеприимство, уважение к старшим и др. причисляются к священным моральным нормам. В религии, так же, как и в обыденной жизни перечисленные выше нормы выполняются и чтутся.

Во все времена религия обладала мощью держать людей в рамках морали, создавала условия для их совместного проживания. Однако в процессе глобализации в обществе укрепляются и начинают преобладать принципы «все для себя», «что выгодно, то удобно», которые в итоге приводят к установлению индивидуализма. Общество атомизируется, личные мысли, личные интересы превращаются в доминанты. Идет процесс постепенного отчуждения общества от традиционных норм морали.

В итоге наравне с распадом традиционных отношений между людьми наблюдается процесс моральной атомизации – процесс распада нравственных связей. Подобные процессы ослабляют общество и приводят к индивидуализму, ослабляют взаимоотношения индивидуума и различных социальных групп. Это же в свою очередь обостряет криминогенную обстановку в обществе, создает условия, способствующие упадку общепризнанных норм морали.

Ускорение процесса атомизации в слаборазвитых странах становится причиной социального упадка. Подобное общество возможно только в высокоразвитых обществах, с относительно высоким уровнем благополучия. В противном случае этот процесс становится причиной нестабильности. Функционирование атомизированного общества ускоренно приводит к обострению внутренних противоречий, противостоянию населения, социальному взрыву (Лисичкин, Шелепин, 2001).

## Литература

- Block, M. (1962) "Zigeuner", Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, Dritte, völlig neu bearbeitete Auflage, Herausgegeben von Kurt Galling, Tübingen, 1962, VI / 1908-1909.
- Eliade, Mircea ve Couliana, Ioan P. (1997) Dictionary of History of Religions, trans: Ali Erbaş, İnsan Publish. – İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları. – 393.
- Mahmudov, P. (1998) Modern Ideology and Religion. – Baku. – 56-60.
- Qasımzadə, F. (1999) İki fenomen və İslam [Two phenomenon and Islam]. – B: İrşad. – 148.

Seyyid Razi (2007) "Nəhcül-bəlağə" İmam Əli əleyhis-salamın xütbə, məktub və hikmətli kəlamları (tərcümə və şərh). Yenidən işlənmiş ikinci nəşri. Toplayan: Seyyid Razi. Bakı. – 514.

- Декарт Р. (1989) Разыскание истины посредством естественного свет. Соч. в 2 т. Т. 1. – М.: Мысль. – 654.  
Лисичкин В.А., Шелепин Л.А. (2001) Глобальная империя Зла. – М.: "Крымский мост-9Д". – 445.  
Мовсумова Л. Д. (2011) Женское начало в истории человека. – Баку: Элм. – 224.  
Московичи С. (1998) Машина, творящая богов. – Москва: Центр психологии и психотерапии. – 560.  
Соловьев Э.Ю. (2005) Категорический императив нравственности и права. - М.: Прогресс-Традиция. – 416.  
Толстой Л.Н. (1989) Исповедь // Избр. соч. в 3-х томах. Т. 3. – М.: Художественная литература. – 2064.  
Томпсон М. (2001) Философия религии. – М.: Файр-Пресс. – 384.

#### References

- Block, M. (1962) "Zigeuner", Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, Dritte, völlig neu bearbeitete Auflage, Herausgegeben von Kurt Galling, Tübingen, 1962, VI / 1908-1909. (in German)  
Dekart R. (1989) Razıskanie istini posredstvom estestvennoqo sveta [Searching for truth through natural light]. Op. in 2 vol. V. 1. – М.: Mysl. – 654. (in Russian)  
Eliade, Mircea ve Couliana, Ioan P. (1997) Dictionary of History of Religions, trans: Ali Erbaş, İnsan Publish. – İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları. – 393. (in Turkish)  
Qasımzadə, F. (1999) İki fenomen və İslam [Two phenomenon and Islam]. – B: İrşad. – 148. (in Azerbaijan)  
Lisiçkin V.A., Şelepın L.A. (2001) Globalnaya imperiya zla [Global Evil Empire]. – М.: "Krimskiy most-9D". – 445. (in Russian)  
Mahmudov, P. (1998) Modern Ideology and Religion. – Baku. – 56-60.  
Moskoviçi С. (1998) Maşına tvoryaşaya bogov [A Machine that creats gods]. – Moscow: Center of Psychology and Psychotherapy Press. – 560. (in Russian)  
Movsumova L.C. (2011) Jenskoe naçalo v istorii çeloveka [Femininity in the history of man]. – Baku: Elm. – 224. (in Russian)  
Seyyid Razi (2007) "Nəhcül-bəlağə" İmam Əli əleyhis-salamın xütbə, məktub və hikmətli kəlamları [Nahjul-balagha" sermons, letters and wise sayings of Imam Ali (peace be upon him) (translation and commentary). Revised second edition. Collected by: Sayyid Razi]. – Bakı. – 514. (in Azerbaijani)  
Solovyev E.Yu. (2005) Kateqoriçeskiy imperativ nnavstvennosti i prava [The categorical imperative of morality and law]. – М.: Proqress-Tradisiya. – 416. (in Russian)  
Tolstoy L.N. (1989) İspoved [Confession]. Fav. Op. in 3 vol. V.3. – М.: Fiction. – 2064. (in Russian)  
Tompson M. (2001) Filosoфиya religii [Philosophy of Religion]. – М.: Fire Press. – 384. (in Russian)

#### **Сведения об авторе:**

*Агаева Зибә Багадурқызы – доктор философских наук, ассоциированный профессор Института философии и социологии Национальной Академии Наук Азербайджана (г. Баку, Азербайджан, e-mail: ziba.agayeba57@gmail.com).*

#### **Information about author:**

*Agayeva Ziba Bagadurkyzy – Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of Azerbaijan National Academy of Science (Baku, Azerbaijan, e-mail: ziba.agayeba57@gmail.com).*

*Поступила: December 21, 2023.*

*Принята: June 13, 2024.*

## АВТОРЛАРҒА АРНАЛҒАН МӘЛІМЕТ

### ҚазҰУ Хабаршысы, Дінтану сериясы журналына жариялауға ұсынылатын мақалаларға қойылатын техникалық талаптар:

Журналда материалдарды жариялау Open Journal System, онлайн жіберу және рецензиялау жүйесі арқылы жүзеге асырылады. Жүйеге тіркелу немесе кіру «Материалдарды жіберу» бөлімінде қол жетімді.

Корреспонденция авторы журналға жариялау үшін ілеспе хат ұсынуға міндетті.

#### Авторларға қойылатын талаптар:

• Редакторлар алқасы журналдың ғылыми бағыты бойынша ілгеріде жарияланбаған мақалаларды қабылдайды. Мақалалар ТЕК журнал сайтының (Open Journal System немесе Editorial Manager) функционалы арқылы жүктелген жағдайда (doc, .docx, .rtf) форматтарында электронды нұсқада ұсынылады.

• Шрифт өлшемі – 12 (аңдатпа, түйін сөздер (5), әдебиеттер тізімі – 10, таблица тексті – 9-11), шрифт – Times New Roman, туралануы – мәтіннің еніне сәйкес, аралығы – бірлік, азат жол – 0,8 см, жиектері: жоғарғы және төменгі – 2см, оң және сол жағы – 2 см.

• Сурет, таблица, график, диаграмма және т.б. мәтін ішінде міндетті түрде нөмірі және тақырыбымен көрсетіледі (Мысалы, 1 сурет – Сурет тақырыбы). Сурет, таблица, график, диаграммалардың саны жалпы мақала көлемінің 20% мөлшерінен аспауы қажет (кей жағдайда 30%).

• Мақала көлемі (авторлар туралы мәлімет, тақырыбы, аңдатпа, түйін сөздер мен әдебиеттер тізімін қоспағанда) әлеуметтік-гуманитарлық бағыттар үшін 3000 сөзден кем болмауы әрі 7000 сөзден аспауы керек.

#### Мақала құрылымы (мақаланы рәсімдеу үшін ҮЛГІ-ні қолданыңыз):

##### Алғашқы бет:

• Бірінші жолда – FTAMP нөмірі (grnti.ru), туралануы – сол жақ шетке қарай, шрифт – қалың.  
• Мақала тақырыбы (тек мақала тілінде БАС ӘРІПТЕРМЕН, аударламалары Әдеттегідей) мақаланың мәні мен мазмұнын айқындап тұруы қажет және оқырманның назарын аударарлықтай болуы қажет. Тақырып қысқа, ақпаратты болуы әрі жаргон сөздер немесе қысқарған сөздерді қамтымауы керек. Тақырыптың лайықты ұзындығы – 5-7 сөзден (кей жағдайда 10-12 сөз) құралады, туралануы – орталыққа қарай. Мақала тақырыбы міндетті түрде қазақ, орыс және ағылшын тілдерінде ұсынылуы шарт.

• Мақала авторы (-лары) – Инициалдар мен тегі, жұмыс орны (мүшелігі/аффилиация), қала, мемлекет, электронды пошасы – қазақ, орыс және ағылшын тілінде жазылады.

• **Аңдатпа** көлемі қазақ, орыс және ағылшын тілдерінде **150-300 сөз** аралығында болуы тиіс.

Аңдатпа құрылымы келесідей МІНДЕТТІ тармақтарды қамтиды:

- Зерттеу тақырыбы жайлы кіріспе сөз,
- Ғылыми зерттеудің мақсаты, негізгі бағыттары мен ойы,
- Жұмыстың ғылыми және тәжірибелік мәнінің қысқаша сипаттамасы,
- Зерттеу әдіснамасының қысқаша сипаттамасы,
- Зерттеу жұмысының негізгі нәтижелері, талдаулар мен қорытындылар,
- Жүргізілген зерттеудің құндылығы (аталмыш жұмыстың сәйкес білім саласына қосқан үлесі),
- Жұмыс қорытындысының тәжірибелік мәні.
- Түйін сөз/тіркестер – қазақ, орыс және ағылшын тілінде 5-7 сөз.

#### Кіріспе келесідей негізгі элементтерден құралады:

• Тақырып таңдау негіздемесі; тақырыптың немесе проблеманың өзектілігі. Тақырыпты таңдау негіздемесінде ілгергілердің тәжірибесінің сипаттамасы негізінде проблемалық жағдаяттардың бар-жоқтығы хабарланады (белгілі бір зерттеудің болмауы, жаңа нысанның пайда болуы және т.б.). Тақырыптың өзектілігі осы тақырыпты оқуға деген жалпы қызығушылықпен анықталады, бірақ қойылған сұрақтарға толымды жауаптың болмауынан тақырыптың теориялық немесе тәжірибелік маңыздылығымен дәлілденеді.

• Жұмысыңыздың нысаны, пәні, мақсаты, міндеті, әдісі, тәсілі, болжамы мен маңыздылығын анықтау. Зерттеу мақсаты тезис дәлелдерімен байланысты, яғни зерттеу пәнін автор таңдаған аспектіде ұсыну болып табылады.

• Материал мен әдістер – материалдардың сипаттамасынан және жұмыс барысынан, сондай-ақ қолданылған әдістердің толық сипаттамасынан тұрады.

• Зерттеу материалының сипаттамасы оның сандық және сапалық жағынан бейнеленуін білдіреді. Материалдың сипаттамасы – зерттеу нәтижелері мен әдістерінің сенімділігін анықтайтын факторлардың бірі болып табылады.

• Бұл бөлімде мәселенің қалай зерттелгені баяндалады: бұрын жарияланған процедураларды қайталамайтын мәліметтер; материалдар мен әдістерді қолдану кезінде міндетті түрде жаңалық енгізу арқылы жабдықты сәйкестендіру (бағдарламалық жасақтау) және материалдардың сипаттамасы қолданылады.

- Ғылыми әдістемеге;
- зерттелу сұрағы/сұрақтары;
- гипотеза (тезис);
- зерттеу кезеңдері:

---

- зерттеу әдістері;
- зерттеу нәтижелері.

• Әдебиет шолуы бөлімінде шетелдік авторлардың ағылшын тіліндегі зерттеу тақырыбындағы іргелі және жаңа еңбектері (кемінде 15 жұмыс), ғылыми үлесі тұрғысынан осы жұмыстарға талдау, сондай-ақ мақалаңызда толықтырылған зерттеу кемшіліктері қамтылуы керек.

• Шығармаға қатысы жоқ көптеген сілтемелердің болуы немесе өзіңіздің жетістіктеріңіз туралы, алдыңғы жұмысыңызға сілтемелердің болуына ЖОЛ БЕРІЛМЕЙДІ.

• Нәтижелер және талқылау бөлімі – сіздің зерттеу нәтижелеріңізді талдауға және пікірталасуға мүмкіндік береді. Зерттеу барысында алынған нәтижелер туралы қорытынды беріледі, негізгі мәні ашылады. Әрі бұл мақаланың маңызды бөлімдерінің бірі. Онда олардың жұмысының нәтижелерін талдап, сәйкес нәтижелерін алдыңғы жұмысымен, талдаулары мен қорытындыларымен салыстырғанда талқылау қажет.

• Қорытынды, нәтиже – осы кезеңдегі жұмыс нәтижелерін жинақтау және қорытындылау; автор алға қойған тұжырымның растығын және алынған нәтижелерді ескере отырып, ғылыми білімнің өзгеруі туралы автордың қорытындысын растау. Қорытынды абстрактілі болмауы керек, оларды белгілі бір ғылыми саладағы зерттеу нәтижелерін қорытындылау үшін, ұсыныстарды немесе одан әрі жұмыс істеу мүмкіндіктерін сипаттай отырып қолдану керек.

• Қорытындының құрылымында: зерттеудің мақсаттары мен әдістері қандай? Нәтижелері қандай? Қандай тұжырымдар бар? Дамуды енгізу, қолдану перспективалары мен мүмкіндіктері қандай? деген сұрақтар болуы керек.

• Пайдаланылған әдебиеттер тізімі немесе библиографиялық тізім жаратылыстану-техникалық бағыттар бойынша әдебиеттердің кем дегенде 10 атауларынан және әлеуметтік-гуманитарлық бағыттар бойынша 15 атаулардан тұрады, ал ағылшын тіліндегі тақырыптардың жалпы саны кемінде 50% болуы керек. Егер әдебиеттер тізімінде кириллицада берілген еңбектер болса, сілтемелер тізімін екі нұсқада ұсыну қажет: біріншісі – түпнұсқада, екіншісі – романизацияланған алфавитте (транслитерация – <http://www.translit.ru>).

• Романизацияланған библиография келесідей болуы керек: автор (лар) (транслитерация) → (жақша ішінде жыл) → транслитерацияланған нұсқадағы мақала тақырыбы [мақала тақырыбын ағылшын тіліне төрт бұрышты жақшаға аудару], орыс тіліндегі дереккөздің атауы (транслитерация немесе ағылшын) атауы – бар болса), ағылшын тіліндегі басылым мәліметтері.

**Мысалы:** Gokhberg, L., Kuznetsova, T. (2011) *Strategiya-2020: novye kontury rossiiskoi innovatsionnoi politiki* [Strategy 2020: New Outlines of Innovation Policy]. *Foresight-Russia*, vol. 5, no 4. – 8-30. Пайдаланылған әдебиеттер тізімі алфавиттік тәртіпте келтіріледі әрі ТЕК мәтінге сілтеме жасалған жұмыстар ғана көрсетіледі.

• ГОСТ 7.1-2003 сәйкес орыс және қазақ тілдеріндегі библиография стилі «Библиографиялық жазба. Библиографиялық сипаттама. Жалпы талаптар және құрастыру ережелері» (ҒЖБССБК тізіміне енген басылымдарға қойылатын талап).

• Романизацияланған библиографияның стилі, сондай-ақ әлеуметтік-гуманитарлық салаларға арналған ағылшын (басқа шетел) тіліндегі дереккөздер – Американдық психологиялық қауымдастық (<http://www.apastyle.org/>) үлгісі пайдаланылады.

Бұл бөлімде мыналар ескерілуі керек:

• ғылымның осы саласында жарықкөрген және автор шығармашылығында негізделген негізгі ғылыми басылымдар, алдыңғы қатарлы зерттеу әдістері сілтемеге алынады;

• өз еңбектеріңізге шамадан тыс сілтеме жасаудан аулақ болыңыз;

• ТМД/КСРО авторларының басылымдарына шамадан тыс сілтеме жасаудан аулақ болыңыз, әлемдік тәжірибені қолданыңыз;

• библиографиялық тізімде белгілі шетелдік авторлар мен зерттеушілер мақала тақырыбы бойынша шығарған іргелі және өзекті жұмыстар болуы керек.

• Әлеуметтік-гуманитарлық бағыттағы мәтінге сілтемелер мәтін ішінде жақшаның ішінде бірінші авторы, шыққан жылы: парақтың (беттердің) саны көрсетіледі. **Мысалы, (Залесский, 1991: 25).** Егер әдебиеттер тізімінде бір автордың бір жыл ішінде жарияланған бірнеше жұмысы болса, шыққан жылына «а», «б» әрпі және т.б. белгі қойылады. Мысалы, (Садуова, 2001а: 15), (Садуова, 2001б: 22). Жаратылыстану мақалалары үшін сілтемелер төртбұрышты жақшада келтірілген, мәтінге сілтемелер келтірілген жұмыстар көрсетілгендей нөмірленеді.

**Библиографиялық сілтемелерді рәсімдеу үшін Mendeley Reference Manager құралын пайдалана аласыз.**

**Мақала жариялау құны – 2000 теңге/бет** (doc, .docx, .rtf) A4 форматтарында электронды нұсқада ұсынылады).

**Реквизиттер:**

«Әл-Фараби атындағы Қазақ ұлттық университеті» коммерциялық емес акционерлік қоғамы

Индекс 050040

Мекенжай: Алматы қ., Эль-Фараби даңғылы, 71

БИН 990140001154

КБЕ 16

АО «First Heartland Jysan Bank»

ИИК KZ19998СТВ0000567141 – теңге

ИИК KZ40998СТВ0000567151 – USD

БИК TSESKZKA



## МАЗМҰНЫ – СОДЕРЖАНИЕ – CONTENT

<i>Ю. Шановал</i> Вовлечение казахстанских женщин в террористическую организацию ИГИЛ: фактор идентичности .....	3
<i>A. Shanbayeva, Zh. Kantarbayeva, John Mahoney</i> Activities of Mosques of Kazakhstan in the field of Religious Education .....	16
<i>A. Shagyrbay, N. Meimankhozha, B. Moldakhmet</i> Features of the socio-political situation in Islamic countries after gaining independence (informational and religious studies aspects).....	30
<i>M. Zeinesh, J. Dosmagambetova, U. Aimbetova, K. Khalykov</i> Revitalization of religious consciousness of the youth of the Republic of Kazakhstan .....	40
<i>A.-F. Bolatzhan, K. Bishmanov</i> Prevention of religious extremism and terrorism in the context of the confrontation between secularism and religious symbolism.....	50
<i>A. Mukan, N. Mukan, M. Juzey</i> Religious integration and disintegration functions: the example of Kazakhstani studies .....	61
<i>A. Akimkhanov, B. Abdilkhakim, A. Janenuly</i> The belief system of Deobandi School and its position towards Salafism .....	73
<i>III. Канафьева</i> Қазіргі Пәкістандағы этникалық және діни азшылықтардың дискурсы .....	84
<i>M. Shumatova, E. Shumatov</i> Space and time as representations of mytho-religious consciousness .....	95

### Шетел басылымдары – Foreign publications – Зарубежные публикации

<i>З. Агаева</i> Проблемы монолитности морали и религии .....	104
Авторларға арналған мәлімет .....	111